From: lessgovt@gmail.com   
      
   Drones Everywhere: How the Technological Revolution on Ukraine Battlefields Is   
   Reshaping Modern Warfare   
   By Yaroslav Trofimov, Sept. 28, 2023, WSJ   
   “The days of massed armored assaults, taking many kilometers of ground at a   
   time, like we did in 2003 in Iraq—that stuff is gone because the drones have   
   become so effective now,” said retired U.S. Army Sergeant First Class   
   Bradley Crawford, an Iraq    
   war veteran who is now training Ukrainian forces near Bakhmut in a private   
   capacity.   
      
   And, in a potential conflict with a lesser power, America’s overall military   
   edge may also not be as decisive as previously thought. “It’s a question   
   of cost,” said Phillips O’Brien, a professor of strategic studies at the   
   University of St.    
   Andrews in Scotland. “If you can destroy an expensive, heavy system for   
   something that costs much much less, then actually the power differential   
   between the two countries doesn’t matter as much.”   
      
   For instance, each FPV drone, a type of weapon that entered widespread use   
   this summer, costs a fraction of a regular 155mm artillery shell, which is   
   worth some $3,000, let alone main battle tanks priced at millions of dollars.   
      
   Yet the drones now have the precision and speed to catch up with any moving   
   armored vehicle and, if piloted expertly, can disable even the most modern   
   tanks and howitzers. Their cheapness also means that they can be used against   
   any target of opportunity,   
    including cars and small groups of soldiers, emptying out the roads within   
   several miles of the front line.   
      
   Center “A” is one of many Ukrainian forces operating FPV drones. Since   
   June 1, the center’s FPV crews in eastern and southern Ukraine have hit 113   
   Russian tanks, 111 fighting vehicles and 68 artillery systems, causing nearly   
   700 Russian casualties,    
   according to the unit.   
      
   During a few hours one recent morning in Chasiv Yar, Center “A” operators   
   used FPV drones armed with World War II-vintage antitank bombs to destroy, in   
   addition to the pickup truck, two parked Russian military vehicles. They also   
   flew a drone into    
   the window of a Bakhmut high-rise after spotting Russian soldiers—likely   
   also drone operators—moving the curtains. A separate observation drone   
   recorded the resulting explosions.   
      
   The Russians, too, have formidable—and fast-improving—drone capabilities   
   of their own. Minutes after the Center “A” team tried to establish a   
   position in the Chasiv Yar high-rise, it was spotted by a Russian drone and   
   the building was targeted by    
   mortar fire. The Ukrainian troopers quickly ran from the building and then   
   filtered back in groups of two, at long intervals.   
      
   While drones have played an outsize role in Ukraine since Russia’s   
   full-scale invasion began in February 2022, both the sheer number of unmanned   
   aircraft and their effectiveness have increased significantly, with Moscow   
   quickly catching up and    
   sometimes surpassing Ukraine’s capabilities. New types of drones, developed   
   domestically and imported, are reaching the battlefield all the    
   ime—including naval drones that Ukraine has successfully used to damage   
   Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Many    
   drones that were effective just months earlier have become outdated fast and   
   need to be re-engineered to defeat enemy jamming, commanders say.   
      
   “Nothing stands firm,” said the commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Vice Adm.   
   Oleksiy Neizhpapa, in an interview. “War is the time when technology   
   develops. Every operation is different, and if you repeat it the same way, it   
   would make no sense    
   because the enemy already has an antidote.”   
      
   The last time any side made a rapid breakthrough on the ground was the   
   Ukrainian offensive in the Kharkiv and Donetsk regions in September and   
   October last year. At the time, the Ukrainians achieved surprise by taking   
   advantage of undermanned and under-   
   fortified Russian positions.   
      
   The subsequent Ukrainian advance in Kherson last November was the result of   
   Himars missile strikes disrupting Russian logistics to such a point that the   
   Russians chose to withdraw.   
      
   Since last fall, however, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of   
   troops, plugging gaps in defense and laying out extensive minefields and   
   fortifications. Crucially, it has also saturated the front line with drones.   
      
   In June, as Ukraine kicked off its counteroffensive, every time its forces   
   gathered more than a few tanks and infantry fighting vehicles together, their   
   columns were quickly spotted by ubiquitous Russian drones and then targeted by   
   a combination of    
   artillery, missiles fired from choppers and swarms of drones. Minefields   
   channeled these columns into kill zones.   
      
   The Russian military faced the same fate when it gathered a large tank force   
   of its own in an attempt to push into the city of Vuhledar in January, and in   
   subsequent smaller attempts at armored offensives. Noticed by Ukrainians from   
   the air, these    
   columns were also swiftly destroyed.   
      
   After initial heavy losses of Western-supplied tanks and fighting vehicles,   
   Ukrainian troops have now switched to operating in small groups that are   
   ferried toward the front line using armored personnel carriers, and then   
   attempt to advance one tree line    
   after another.   
      
   Drones of all kinds have become increasingly important in the Ukrainian war. A   
   Center ‘A’ operator sits next to a Ukrainian-made RAM strike drone.   
      
   Continuing to move forward, the Ukrainians seized several villages on the   
   southern front in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, and, in recent days,   
   broke through Russian lines south of Bakhmut to take the villages of Andriivka   
   and Klishchiivka. During    
   the Russian offensive between November and May, Moscow scored no notable gains   
   except for Bakhmut.   
      
   “Unfortunately, most of our offensive is now on foot,” said Lt. Gen.   
   Kyrylo Budanov, the commander of HUR. “You could see a mirror picture last   
   fall, when the Russians were carrying out their own offensive, above all in   
   Bakhmut. The same way, the    
   use of heavy armor was minimal, everyone was waging war on foot. I don’t   
   think anything will be different now.”   
      
      
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