XPost: alt.business.import-export, alt.politics.trump, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh   
   XPost: sac.politics, talk.politics.guns   
   From: yourdime@outlook.com   
      
   Much of the media focus on the Trump administration’s reciprocal tariff   
   policy has been on the progress of tariff negotiations with each US trade   
   partner. With respect to communist China, media headlines in recent weeks   
   have concentrated on the tit-for-tat of tariffs proposed by the US and   
   “countered” by China that eventually led to a temporary tariff de-   
   escalation agreement reached between the two countries in Geneva on 14   
   May.   
      
   That deal sets the table for comprehensive US-China trade negotiations   
   that will include non-tariff-related issues that have long been barriers   
   to US companies and products in China – a relatively unreported on but key   
   objective of President Trump’s trade strategy.   
      
   US-CHINA TARIFFS AND COUNTER-TARIFFS   
      
   Re-balancing trade with China has taken center stage in the second Trump   
   administration since the signing of Executive Order 14195, which declared   
   a national emergency regarding fentanyl and other drug trafficking from   
   China that was accompanied by an additional 10% tariff imposed on all   
   Chinese imports.   
      
   China’s response was setting 15% tariffs on US coal and liquefied natural   
   gas, 10% tariffs on US oil and agricultural machinery, and implementing   
   non-tariff measures that included launching an antitrust investigation   
   into Google and adding some US companies to its “Unreliable Entity List.”   
   Companies on that list face penalties and barriers to the Chinese domestic   
   market, including trade and investment restrictions, entry bans, permit   
   revocations, and fines.   
      
   On 4 March, the US raised tariffs on all Chinese products to 20%. China   
   retaliated on 10 March, with 10-15% tariffs on select US agricultural,   
   meat, and dairy products, a suspension of US lumber imports, and a   
   revocation of soybean import licenses for three US firms.   
      
   On 2 April, President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 which established   
   a 34% “reciprocal tariff” on all Chinese imports, bringing the effective   
   US tariff rate on Chinese goods to 145%. China retaliated with a 34%   
   tariff on all US goods plus non-tariff measures such as implementing   
   export restrictions on Chinese-controlled rare earth elements vital for   
   strategic manufacturing processes and adding more US companies to the   
   Unreliable Entity List.   
      
   On 8 April, in response to this Chinese retaliation, President Trump   
   signed Executive Order 14259 which increased tariffs on Chinese imports   
   from 34% to 84% (effective April 9, 2025), in response to China’s   
   retaliatory measures. On April 9, 2025, he signed Executive Order 14266   
   that established an effective total US tariff rate of 145% on Chinese   
   goods. China immediately retaliated by raising tariffs on all US exports   
   to total tariff rate of 147.6% while adding more US companies to its   
   Unreliable Entity List.   
      
   On 14 May, US and Chinese negotiators agreed to a temporary 90-day tariff   
   reduction. The US reduced its tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30%   
   while China reduced its tariffs on US goods from 147.6% to 10%. China also   
   agreed to suspend its various retaliatory non-tariff measures while formal   
   negotiations on a comprehensive trade deal are completed.   
      
   CHINESE NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS   
      
   Chinese retaliation to new US tariffs has included a few non-tariff   
   actions, as identified above. However, the list of non-tariff-related   
   barriers to US (and other countries) implemented arbitrarily by China’s   
   Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is extensive, complex, and fraught with   
   peril for companies interested in doing business in China. It is ironic   
   that, despite regular pronouncements from Chinese leader Xi Jinping about   
   steps being taking to “open China,” the policies and regulations   
   implemented over the past 40+ years by MOFCOM have done the exact   
   opposite.   
      
   Here are some of the more onerous non-tariff measures and practices   
   throttling US and other foreign companies in China that President Trump’s   
   reciprocal tariff policy is attempting to address.   
      
   State-sponsored mercantilist practices. The Chinese regime has implemented   
   efforts that violate World Trade Organization rules agreed to when China   
   joined the WTO in 2001. China heavily subsidizes its state-owned   
   enterprises (SOEs) in violation of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and   
   Countervailing Measures. A 2023 report from the US Congress noted that   
   China “uses an intricate web of industrial policies, including subsidies,   
   forced technology transfer, and market access restrictions, to distort   
   market behavior, achieve dominance in global markets, and increase US   
   dependency on PRC imports.” Subsidies allow Chinese companies to undercut   
   production costs of foreign companies and gain market share domination in   
   various commercial sectors by “dumping” cheap Chinese goods in countries   
   around the world. A companion practice is China currency manipulation   
   which undervalues the yuan to makes its exports cheaper.   
      
   Market access restrictions. In addition to the arbitrarily maintained   
   Unreliable Entity List noted above, China restricts access to its domestic   
   market through various policies, rules, and blacklists. For example, China   
   has not joined the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), despite   
   promises made in its Accession Protocol to do so. This limits foreign   
   companies’ access to China’s public procurement market. China routinely   
   blocks agricultural imports – typically without any scientific basis other   
   than claims of pest contamination – as punitive measures that provide   
   leverage points in diplomatic negotiations. These blacklists are also   
   intended to favor Chinese producers at the expense of foreign entities. On   
   the flip side, China has restricted access to critical raw materials such   
   as rare earth elements in direct violation of WTO precursor GATT Article   
   XI, General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, which prohibits non-   
   tariff restrictions on imports and exports among WTO countries.   
      
   Read more   
      
   https://stuinsd.substack.com/p/behind-the-us-china-tariff-negotiations   
      
   https://floppingaces.net/most-wanted/the-great-wto-scam-how-china-rigged-   
   global-trade-and-trump-finally-called-their-bluff/   
      
   --- SoupGate-DOS v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)