299ab63d   
   XPost: alt.society.liberalism, soc.culture.usa, alt.politics.libertarian   
   XPost: alt.society.anarchy   
   From: cbell97@bellsouth.net   
      
   On Oct 24, 2:00 pm, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   > On Wed, 24 Oct 2012 03:06:52 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
   > > On Oct 23, 10:10 pm, Anarcissie  wrote:   
      
   > >> >> Sure, most of us will agree that stuff exists, or that we are   
   > >> >> conscious.   
   >   
   > >> > The point being: a normal human being will accept identity,   
   > >> > existence, and consciousness as manifestly obvious, and must be   
   > >> > *taught* to believe otherwise  -- at Occidental, Columbia and   
   > >> > Harvard, for example.   
   >   
   > >> A normal human being will also say that the earth is obviously flat, or   
   > >> they would, if they were not told to think otherwise by Harvard and   
   > >> other authorities, and punished if they professed disbelief.   
   >   
   > > That is not correct: a normal human being would say the earth is the   
   > > earth and that it exists and he is aware of its existence, but as to   
   > > whether it is "flat" he does not know until he can know what "flat"   
   > > means and how "flat" can be measured.   
   >   
   > > Prior to making such statements as alleging there needs to be definition   
   > > given to axioms just like every other concept like "flat", why don't you   
   > > actually read what I have provided you about the irreducible uniqueness   
   > > of what are axiomatic concepts and address that in refutation or other   
   > > kind of acknowledgment that you know what you are talking about.   
   >   
   > > This is not how they do it at Occidental, Columbia or Harvard, but this   
   > > is the way it ought to be:   
   >   
   > > Proposition: Unlike ordinary concepts, they are not susceptible of   
   > > definition (except ostensively), because there are no more basic   
   > > concepts in terms of which they could be defined.   
   >   
   > I wasn't talking of analyzing them into components.   
      
   But when you state the following, you are attempting analysis:   
      
   > If we are going to do logic about X, be it consciousness,   
   > existence, identity, or something else, we have to be   
   > able to define X in such a way that we know whether   
   > something is or isn't X.  Otherwise everything is X   
   > (it has no boundaries) and there is nothing particular   
   > to say about it.   
   >   
      
   X is not defined if it is axiomatic.  Never mind Rand, look up   
   Descartes.  See proposition above, and respond in such a way as to not   
   say: "Never mind your proposition, this is what I have to say . . . "   
      
   > Below, you mention being aware of something 'by means   
   > of consciousness.'  However, if being aware of something   
   > refers to maintaining an internal model of some external   
   > object, we know we can build machines which can do that,   
      
      
   No, after one is willing to address the above proposition, which you   
   have now three times refused to do, then one addresses how the   
   axiomatic X -- that which is assumed to be manfifestly true without   
   resort to proof -- and then one, when speaking of Rand's Objectivism,   
   turns away from Descartes rationalism to something else that does not   
   involve the "internal model" being in the mind from any means which is   
   not organic and empirically discoverable -- but, even so, that does   
   not matter as to whether the concept of consciousness is axiomatic.   
      
   True or false (and why)?   
      
   Unlike ordinary concepts,axiomatic concepts are not susceptible of   
   definition (except ostensively), because there are no more basic   
   concepts in terms of which they could be defined.   
      
   True or false (and why)?   
      
   > but it would be doubtful whether we would want to say   
   > that the machines are conscious in the sense that an   
   > animal may be conscious -- that is, the subject of a   
   > set of experiences.  So I, at least, am uncertain what   
   > you mean by 'consciousness' here and if you were going   
   > to use it in an axiom as the basis of proving various   
   > propositions to me, I would need a better definition.   
      
      
   The ostensible meaning to consciousness -- again -- is obvious and it   
   is merely an evasion on your part to avoid answering the above   
   proposition. <>   
      
   It is manfiestly impossible to prove conscious within a state of non-   
   consciousness in the same way as for you to be able to prove your non-   
   existence when you do not exist.   
      
    Proposition: One cannot analyze (or "prove") existence as such, or   
    consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries. An attempt to   
    "prove" them is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to "prove"   
    existence by means of nonexistence, and consciousness by means of   
    unconsciousness.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)