b399c27c   
   XPost: alt.society.liberalism, soc.culture.usa, alt.politics.libertarian   
   XPost: alt.society.anarchy   
   From: cbell97@bellsouth.net   
      
   On Oct 26, 11:41 pm, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   > On Fri, 26 Oct 2012 16:11:11 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
   > > On Oct 25, 11:13 am, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   >   
   > >> We don't have to prove existence from a state of non-existence, we just   
   > >> have to have an (existent) method of distinguishing existence from   
   > >> non-existence in a sufficiently reliable manner to construct a logical   
   > >> system upon it.   
   >   
   > > There is no "reliable logical system" based on the axiom, existence   
   > > exists, only that no premise or conclusion can contradict the axiom,   
   > > existence exists, and for consciousness exists and causality (as a   
   > > corollary to indentity) exists. To deny that any logical conclusion or   
   > > premise may not contradict these axiomatic concepts is to say that you   
   > > can effectively contradict reality: that you can, indeed, not exist and   
   > > prove your non-existence   
   >   
   > >> I'm not denying consciousness or existence, I'm just saying that so far   
   > >> they're pretty vague concepts to use in logic   
   >   
   > > What sort of concept of "existence", other than the self-evident one,   
   > > would allow one to say he can prove that he does not exist when, in   
   > > reality, he does not exist?   
   >   
   > > If there be vagueness or ambiguity in 'existence' then propose an   
   > > alternate meaning to 'existence" than  the self-evident one.   
   >   
   > I suppose it depends on what you want to do with the   
   > axioms; they could be loosely or vaguely conceptualized   
   > if all you're going to do with them is give them veto   
   > power over certain logical developments.   
   >   
      
   I do not think you are willing to understand what 'axiomatic concept'   
   is and that 'axiom', in a mathematical or logical propositional sense,   
   is not the same meaning as 'axiomatic concept' but rather a subset of   
   it.   
      
   > I'm not really happy with a formulation like 'existence   
   > exists' because it's something of an issue whether   
   > abstractions have any sort of being other than as   
   > constructions in human minds.   
      
   Yes, you are willing to remove your thinking from Realism. [The above   
   is rather Nominalist.]  However, you cannot sensibly criticize Rand's   
   Objectivism because it is within the Realism School of philosophy   
   unless you can positively argue convincingly for whatever Idealism, or   
   Nominalist-Empiricist perhaps as above, you identify as working for   
   you -- or that Rand's Realism, not being within Rationalism or   
   Nominalism or Empiricism or Kantianism, is incorrect in identifying   
   'axiomatic concepts' as *not* arbitrary taken-as-truth premises   
   implicit in your characterization: "veto over logical conclusions."   
   If you cannot refute the axiomatic concepts Existence, Identity,   
   Consciousness, and by ostensible meaning these are fundamental to   
   everything that is in the universe, then you have no cause to   
   criticize such axiomatic concepts unless you are not a Realist or a   
   Realist but also a Rationalist (from Descartes to Popper) and   
   therefore would need to demonstrate how all those philosophies are   
   better at describing the real universe than Objectivism.   
      
      
   > We are perhaps somewhat   
   > constrained here by English linguistic habits, which   
   > demand that verbs be given particular agents   
      
   Propositions for axiomatic concepts are by nature tautological in that   
   x is whatever x is.  (That is Artistotle: a proposition whose negation   
   is inconsistent or self-contradictory) . Most tautologies are empty   
   but axiomatic concepts are necessary tautologies.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)