b399c27c   
   XPost: alt.society.liberalism, soc.culture.usa, alt.politics.libertarian   
   XPost: alt.society.anarchy   
   From: anarcissie@gmail.com   
      
   On Sat, 27 Oct 2012 02:39:12 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
      
   > On Oct 26, 11:41 pm, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   >> On Fri, 26 Oct 2012 16:11:11 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
   >> > On Oct 25, 11:13 am, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   >>   
   >> >> We don't have to prove existence from a state of non-existence, we   
   >> >> just have to have an (existent) method of distinguishing existence   
   >> >> from non-existence in a sufficiently reliable manner to construct a   
   >> >> logical system upon it.   
   >>   
   >> > There is no "reliable logical system" based on the axiom, existence   
   >> > exists, only that no premise or conclusion can contradict the axiom,   
   >> > existence exists, and for consciousness exists and causality (as a   
   >> > corollary to indentity) exists. To deny that any logical conclusion   
   >> > or premise may not contradict these axiomatic concepts is to say that   
   >> > you can effectively contradict reality: that you can, indeed, not   
   >> > exist and prove your non-existence   
   >>   
   >> >> I'm not denying consciousness or existence, I'm just saying that so   
   >> >> far they're pretty vague concepts to use in logic   
   >>   
   >> > What sort of concept of "existence", other than the self-evident one,   
   >> > would allow one to say he can prove that he does not exist when, in   
   >> > reality, he does not exist?   
   >>   
   >> > If there be vagueness or ambiguity in 'existence' then propose an   
   >> > alternate meaning to 'existence" than  the self-evident one.   
   >>   
   >> I suppose it depends on what you want to do with the axioms; they could   
   >> be loosely or vaguely conceptualized if all you're going to do with   
   >> them is give them veto power over certain logical developments.   
   >>   
   >>   
   > I do not think you are willing to understand what 'axiomatic concept' is   
   > and that 'axiom', in a mathematical or logical propositional sense,   
   > is not the same meaning as 'axiomatic concept' but rather a subset of   
   > it.   
   >   
   >> I'm not really happy with a formulation like 'existence exists' because   
   >> it's something of an issue whether abstractions have any sort of being   
   >> other than as constructions in human minds.   
   >   
   > Yes, you are willing to remove your thinking from Realism. [The above is   
   > rather Nominalist.]  However, you cannot sensibly criticize Rand's   
   > Objectivism because it is within the Realism School of philosophy unless   
   > you can positively argue convincingly for whatever Idealism, or   
   > Nominalist-Empiricist perhaps as above, you identify as working for you   
   > -- or that Rand's Realism, not being within Rationalism or Nominalism or   
   > Empiricism or Kantianism, is incorrect in identifying 'axiomatic   
   > concepts' as *not* arbitrary taken-as-truth premises implicit in your   
   > characterization: "veto over logical conclusions." If you cannot refute   
   > the axiomatic concepts Existence, Identity, Consciousness, and by   
   > ostensible meaning these are fundamental to everything that is in the   
   > universe, then you have no cause to criticize such axiomatic concepts   
   > unless you are not a Realist or a Realist but also a Rationalist (from   
   > Descartes to Popper) and therefore would need to demonstrate how all   
   > those philosophies are better at describing the real universe than   
   > Objectivism.   
      
      
   One doesn't refute axioms, because they are by definition   
   assertions taken on faith, presumably because they accord   
   with the experiences of those who believe in them.  Or   
   maybe merely with their desires.  In any case, one _can_   
   decline to accept an axiom, but that is different from   
   refuting it (showing that it isn't true in some universal,   
   fundamental way).   
      
   Now, if you avoid the realist-nominalist dispute and say   
   'Stuff exists' or 'existing is going on', you will   
   probably not get too much resistance, even from inveterate   
   skeptics, except of course from Theraveda Buddhists.  But   
   you will have a hard time getting someone who doesn't   
   believe that consciousness or identity are fundamentally   
   real to accept their existence as axiomatic.   
      
   This is aside from the problem of defining them well   
   enough to say anything definite about them, or to   
   perform reliable logical operations on propositions   
   containing them.   
      
      
   >> We are perhaps somewhat constrained here by English linguistic habits,   
   >> which demand that verbs be given particular agents   
   >   
   > Propositions for axiomatic concepts are by nature tautological in that x   
   > is whatever x is.  (That is Artistotle: a proposition whose negation is   
   > inconsistent or self-contradictory) . Most tautologies are empty but   
   > axiomatic concepts are necessary tautologies.   
      
   I'm not worried about tautology at the moment.   
   I think it's important to be careful about   
   carrying in hidden concepts.  For instance,   
   'Existence exists' not only asserts the idea   
   of something existing, but the idea that   
   abstractions are real.  'I think, therefore I   
   am' seems to say 'Thinking is going on, so   
   there must be something doing the thinking',   
   but it sneaks in the concept of 'I'.  Both   
   sentences seem merely to posit existence, but   
   in fact take large jumps to make other   
   assertions.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)