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   XPost: alt.society.liberalism, soc.culture.usa, alt.politics.libertarian   
   XPost: alt.society.anarchy   
   From: anarcissie@gmail.com   
      
   On Sat, 27 Oct 2012 14:54:21 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
      
   > On Oct 27, 10:50 am, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   >> On Sat, 27 Oct 2012 02:39:12 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
   >> > On Oct 26, 11:41 pm, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   >> >> On Fri, 26 Oct 2012 16:11:11 -0700, Charles Bell wrote:   
   >> >> > On Oct 25, 11:13 am, Anarcissie  wrote:   
   >>   
   >> >> >> We don't have to prove existence from a state of non-existence,   
   >> >> >> we just have to have an (existent) method of distinguishing   
   >> >> >> existence from non-existence in a sufficiently reliable manner to   
   >> >> >> construct a logical system upon it.   
   >>   
   >> >> > There is no "reliable logical system" based on the axiom,   
   >> >> > existence exists, only that no premise or conclusion can   
   >> >> > contradict the axiom, existence exists, and for consciousness   
   >> >> > exists and causality (as a corollary to indentity) exists. To deny   
   >> >> > that any logical conclusion or premise may not contradict these   
   >> >> > axiomatic concepts is to say that you can effectively contradict   
   >> >> > reality: that you can, indeed, not exist and prove your   
   >> >> > non-existence   
   >>   
   >>   
   > [snip repetition]   
   >> One doesn't refute axioms, because they are by definition assertions   
   >> taken on faith,   
   >   
   >   
   > I do not think you are willing to understand what 'axiomatic concept'   
   > is and that 'axiom', in a mathematical or logical propositional sense,   
   > is not the same meaning as 'axiomatic concept' but rather a subset of   
   > it.   
   >   
   > You cannot sensibly criticize Rand's Objectivism because it is within   
   > the Realism School of philosophy unless you can positively argue   
   > convincingly for whatever Idealism you identify as working for you --   
   > or that Rand's Realism, not being within Rationalism or Nominalism or   
   > Empiricism or Kantianism, is incorrect in identifying 'axiomatic   
   > concepts' as *not* arbitrary taken-as-truth premises implicit in your   
   > characterization: "veto over logical conclusions" or "assertions taken   
   > on faith." If you cannot refute  the axiomatic concepts Existence,   
   > Identity, Consciousness, and by  ostensible meaning these are   
   > fundamental to everything that is in the  universe, then you have no   
   > cause to criticize such axiomatic concepts  unless you are not a Realist   
   > or a Realist but also a Rationalist (from Descartes to Popper) and   
   > therefore would need to demonstrate how all those philosophies are   
   > better at describing the real universe than Objectivism.   
      
   I take 'axiom' to mean an assertion which is either   
   actually believed to be self-evidently true, or is   
   taken to be true for the benefit of an argument.  As   
   far as I know this is the common usage of the term.   
      
   I would think the concepts which made up an axiom would   
   have the same quality, although I am willing to be shown   
   otherwise.   
      
   In any case, one cannot refute an axiom because to refute   
   means to disprove, and an axiom is by definition an   
   assertion taken on faith (at least provisionally).  If you   
   could disprove an axiom, you could prove the axiom, and then   
   it would be a theorem, not an axiom; it would depend on some   
   other axioms.  One can say of an axiom that one believes it,   
   doesn't believe it, is agnostic about it, or believes it is   
   meaningless, but one can't prove or disprove it.   
      
   Likewise, I don't see how one can prove or disprove a   
   concept.  One might say of a concept that it was or was not   
   meaningful or useful, but if it is not an assertion or   
   proposition one can't subject it to a logical test.  For   
   example, 'There are pink unicorns on Ganymede' is a   
   statement which could be taken on faith, or be proved or   
   disproved based on other statements, possibly derived   
   from observation, but its component concepts, such as   
   'unicorn', 'pink', 'on', 'Ganymede' are by themselves   
   neither true nor false, but are usable in the sense that   
   instances of the set of items or experiences covered by   
   the concept can be pointed out or described.   
      
   Hence I cannot refute (or prove) the items you asked   
   me to refute some way back in this conversation.   
      
      
   >   
   >   
   >> Now, if you avoid the realist-nominalist dispute and say 'Stuff exists'   
   >> or 'existing is going on',   
   >   
   >   
   > It is possible and likely to avoid any deviation from Realism in that   
   > you will need to prove your non-existence while not existing, or simply   
   > say nothing of value to anyone. Skeptism itself assumes that any   
   > certainty on the validity of skepticism is impossible -- or in other   
   > words, assumes that nothing of value is equal to something of value with   
   > regards to any philosophical conclusion.   
      
      
   A proper skeptic, in my opinion, would also be   
   skeptical of skepticism.  Otherwise the skeptic   
   would have an absolute belief in skepticism, which   
   would be contradictory.  The non-contradictory   
   skeptic is compelled to skepticism by the ongoing   
   failure of believers to produce certainties, but   
   should certainly not deny that they might at some   
   time somehow produce one or more certainties.   
      
      
   >> >> We are perhaps somewhat constrained here by English linguistic   
   >> >> habits,   
   >> >> which demand that verbs be given particular agents   
   >>   
   >> > Propositions for axiomatic concepts are by nature tautological in   
   >> > that x is whatever x is.  (That is Artistotle: a proposition whose   
   >> > negation is inconsistent or self-contradictory) . Most tautologies   
   >> > are empty but axiomatic concepts are necessary tautologies.   
   >>   
   >> I'm not worried about tautology at the moment.   
   >> I think it's important to be careful about carrying in hidden concepts.   
   >>  For instance,   
   >> 'Existence exists' not only asserts the idea of something existing, but   
   >> the idea that abstractions are real.   
   >   
   > Abstractions (concepts), of course, are real but what they are in   
   > relation to an external relaity from the mind, one would have to read   
   > Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.   
   >   
   > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ayn-rand/#TheCon   
   >   
   > An entity's status as a unit is not intrinsic, since the basis of its   
   > status is our mental process of differentiation and integration. But   
   > neither is its status subjective, the process is based on actually   
   > existing similarities and differences; rather, its status is objective   
   > [*]. Consequently, Rand rejects as a false dichotomy the debate between   
   > realists and nominalists over the nature of universals. (“Realism,” as a   
   > theory about universals, is to be distinguished from the kind of   
   > perceptual realism that Rand accepts.) Rand identifies universals with   
   > concepts [*], understood as attributes of consciousness, and so   
   > repudiates the intrinsicism of the realists [*]; for Rand, the problem   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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