1d2f1ac1
XPost: alt.society.liberalism
From: cbell97@bellsouth.net
On Nov 18, 10:44 pm, Dänk 42Ø wrote:
> On Mon, 19 Nov 2012 00:33:16 +0000, Matt wrote:
> > Bert wrote in news:XnsA10F91C678480VeebleFetzer@
> > 216.250.188.141:
>
> >> Innews:XnsA10F86CD3A7D7matttellessprynetcom@88.198.244.100Matt
> >> wrote:
>
> >>> Bert wrote in news:XnsA10F71397ED23VeebleFetzer@
> >>> 216.250.188.141:
>
> >>>> Innews:k8avs0$3mt$2@reader1.panix.comXox
> >>>> wrote:
>
> >>>>> Anonymous sabotaged or blocked these functions.
>
> >>>> While making absolutely no changes of their own?
>
> >>>> Really?
>
> >>>> You believe this crap?
>
> >>> Are you saying that the election machines can be hacked?
>
> >> No, but the other poster certainly was.
>
> > Then certainly, there is nothing to worry about, right?
>
> > Never mind that the voting machines can be hacked easily, as shown by a
> > number of independents.
>
> > Electronic voting is safe, and Republicans simply can't win on their own
> > merits.
>
> Electronic voting is *NOT* safe, and leftards like you have said so
> repeatedly in the past. The only difference now is that Democrats
> outrigged the Republican rigging.
>
> I oppose electronic voting. Banning it nationwide could have been one of
> the things Democrats did to avoid impeaching Bush upon taking control of
> Congress in 2007,
> but they decided farm subsidies were more important
> than clean elections.
>
> Electronic voting can be made secure in theory,
But any other form that utilizes paper such as optical scanning which
is a hybrid which has two levels of opportunies for fraud, stuffing
the paper ballot with paper votes and stuffing the electronic
cartridge in "early votes", is always in theory not secure.
but this requires an open-
> source system using open-source encryption algorithms of the sort that
> are used in all trusted security applications. American voting machines
> are all closed-source proprietary systems, which means there is no way to
> verify that there are no back doors. And instead of insecure Diebold
> machines that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each, hackers could
> design and market a tamper-proof open-source machine for less than a
> hundred dollars.
>
> An electronic ballot signed with two or more encryption keys would allow
> auditors to verify its authenticity while still keeping the voter's
> identity a secret. The encryption can still be broken and ballots
> tampered with by an agency with the resources of a nation-state (e.g.
> NSA), but putting the key generation and ballot control in the hands of
> local jurisdictions should prevent this from occurring.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
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