XPost: alt.anonymous, alt.privacy.anon-server
From: noreply@dirge.harmsk.com
Stupid Claas wrote:
>A pretty much lying Fritz Wuehler user wrote:
>> Nomen Nescio wrote:
>> > On 25 Oct 2025, Radio Eriwan posted some
>> > news:1761435073483161656.ac@radio-eriwan.ru:
>> >
>> > > Fritz Wuehler once wrote, without thinking too much beforehand:
>> > > > Radio Claashole sent:
>> > > > > A stupid YAMN user wrote:
>> > > > > > Nomen Nescio wrote:
>> > > > > > > On 24 Oct 2025, Anonymous posted
>> > > > > > > some news:20251024.191615.6d53543f@yamn.paranoici.org:
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > > [Spam] same [Spam] censoring [Spam] shit [Spam] different
>> > > > > > > > [Spam].
>> > > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > > Apparently it's okay for a particular sporging asshole to
>> > > > > > > > destroy groups and services for all, but not okay to use YAMN
>> > > > > > > > / neodome to counter the jerk.
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > yamn is not so anonymous after all.
>> > > > > > >
>> > > > > > > what does that say about "anonymous messaging" hmm?
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > Tor is an unsecure real-time system.
>> > > > > > Type I remailing fails to hide message size.
>> > > > > > Only Type II remailing (Mixmaster / YAMN) is secure!
>> > > > > >
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Did you know that YAMN/OmniMix users are the dumbest Usenet users?
>> > > >
>> > > > We just know that you, fascist Claas, and your buddy GabX are the
>> > > > stupidest snake oil peddlers over here ignoring even the most basic
>> > > > principles of secure anonymous remailing. Good luck to your victims.
>> > > >
>> > >
>> > > Ah, ok. So pseudonymous remailing with Mixmaster and YAMN, in your
>> > > eyes, is secure 'anonymous' remailing. Mind you, you must use Tor or
>> > > you would shit in your pants without it. So much for TypeII
>> > > 'anonymous' remailing.
>> >
>> > It all works with Tor. No Tor, no work.
>>
>> Remailers don't need Tor at all. Tor was developed long after the
>> invention of anonymous remailing in order to have something similar for
>> from the anonymity perspective inherently problematic real-time (web)
>> communication.
>>
>> You send some packets to the entry remailer and nobody can figure out
>> which mail message at some exit remailer they represent, if any, as you
>> just may have sent dummy packets. That isn't pseudonymity, it's true
>> anonymity no matter what shithead Claas tells you.
>>
>
>I think you are the liar and real shithead! Why? Because these pseudonymous
>remailers are publicity run and known as old fashioned TypeII clearnet smtp
>networks where Eve and her friends only need to append the secret keys from
>remailers, to decrypt the incomming messages at an entry. This can be done
>with gag orders. If you would know how the internals work from such old and
>outdated TypeII technology you would not speak such rubbish.
The same BS once again? Really? For how long will you play that game?
First of all, when you need your anonymizers to be anonymous themselves
then you have a really severe problem. And those who have to trust in
your shadow gang are in even bigger trouble.
And how will you get the private keys and passphrases of all remailers
worldwide to compromize remailer chains, as that's what you have to
achieve? Dumbo, with Type II remailing there are no timing or message
size correlation attacks or further vulnerabilities your light-weight
Tor network suffers from.
>
>And secondly when looking at the pools Eve and her friends see in clear the
remailer packets and the To: header,
The packet's To: header after removing the current remailer's encryption
layer aka its next remailer stop has to be known. How else will you
forward it?
> while messages at exits are held in an
>decrypted state.
Once again, how can an exit remailer forward the original message to its
final destination when it doesn't restore it?
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
|
