XPost: alt.anonymous, alt.privacy.anon-server   
   From: nobody@yamn.paranoici.org   
      
   On 26 Oct 2025, Anonymous User  posted some   
   news:20251026.191810.4d48fceb@dirge.harmsk.com:   
      
   > Stupid Claas wrote:   
   >>A pretty much lying Fritz Wuehler user wrote:   
   >>> Nomen Nescio  wrote:   
   >>> > On 25 Oct 2025, Radio Eriwan  posted   
   >>> > some news:1761435073483161656.ac@radio-eriwan.ru:   
   >>> >   
   >>> > > Fritz Wuehler once wrote, without thinking too much beforehand:   
   >>> > > > Radio Claashole  sent:   
   >>> > > > > A stupid YAMN user wrote:   
   >>> > > > > > Nomen Nescio  wrote:   
   >>> > > > > > > On 24 Oct 2025, Anonymous    
   >>> > > > > > > posted some   
   >>> > > > > > > news:20251024.191615.6d53543f@yamn.paranoici.org:   
   >>> > > > > > >   
   >>> > > > > > > > [Spam] same [Spam] censoring [Spam] shit [Spam]   
   >>> > > > > > > > different [Spam].   
   >>> > > > > > > >   
   >>> > > > > > > > Apparently it's okay for a particular sporging asshole   
   >>> > > > > > > > to destroy groups and services for all, but not okay   
   >>> > > > > > > > to use YAMN / neodome to counter the jerk.   
   >>> > > > > > >   
   >>> > > > > > > yamn is not so anonymous after all.   
   >>> > > > > > >   
   >>> > > > > > > what does that say about "anonymous messaging" hmm?   
   >>> > > > > >   
   >>> > > > > > Tor is an unsecure real-time system.   
   >>> > > > > > Type I remailing fails to hide message size.   
   >>> > > > > > Only Type II remailing (Mixmaster / YAMN) is secure!   
   >>> > > > > >   
   >>> > > > >   
   >>> > > > > Did you know that YAMN/OmniMix users are the dumbest Usenet   
   >>> > > > > users?   
   >>> > > >   
   >>> > > >   We just know that you, fascist Claas, and your buddy GabX   
   >>> > > >   are the   
   >>> > > > stupidest snake oil peddlers over here ignoring even the most   
   >>> > > > basic principles of secure anonymous remailing. Good luck to   
   >>> > > > your victims.   
   >>> > > >   
   >>> > >   
   >>> > > Ah, ok. So pseudonymous remailing with Mixmaster and YAMN, in   
   >>> > > your eyes, is secure 'anonymous' remailing. Mind you, you must   
   >>> > > use Tor or you would shit in your pants without it. So much for   
   >>> > > TypeII 'anonymous' remailing.   
   >>> >   
   >>> > It all works with Tor.   No Tor, no work.   
   >>>   
   >>> Remailers don't need Tor at all.  Tor was developed long after the   
   >>> invention of anonymous remailing in order to have something similar   
   >>> for from the anonymity perspective inherently problematic real-time   
   >>> (web) communication.   
   >>>   
   >>> You send some packets to the entry remailer and nobody can figure   
   >>> out which mail message at some exit remailer they represent, if any,   
   >>> as you just may have sent dummy packets. That isn't pseudonymity,   
   >>> it's true anonymity no matter what shithead Claas tells you.   
   >>>   
   >>   
   >>I think you are the liar and real shithead! Why? Because these   
   >>pseudonymous remailers are publicity run and known as old fashioned   
   >>TypeII clearnet smtp networks where Eve and her friends only need to   
   >>append the secret keys from remailers, to decrypt the incomming   
   >>messages at an entry.  This can be done with gag orders. If you would   
   >>know how the internals work from such old and outdated TypeII   
   >>technology you would not speak such rubbish.   
   >   
   > The same BS once again?  Really?  For how long will you play that   
   > game?   
   >   
   > First of all, when you need your anonymizers to be anonymous   
   > themselves then you have a really severe problem.  And those who have   
   > to trust in your shadow gang are in even bigger trouble.   
   >   
   > And how will you get the private keys and passphrases of all remailers   
   > worldwide to compromize remailer chains, as that's what you have to   
   > achieve?  Dumbo, with Type II remailing there are no timing or message   
   > size correlation attacks or further vulnerabilities your light-weight   
   > Tor network suffers from.   
   >   
   >>   
   >>And secondly when looking at the pools Eve and her friends see in   
   >>clear the remailer packets and the To: header,   
   >   
   > The packet's To: header after removing the current remailer's   
   > encryption layer aka its next remailer stop has to be known.  How else   
   > will you forward it?   
      
   An IP packet doesn't have a "To:" header, it has source and destination   
   fields.   
      
   >> while messages at exits are held in an   
   >>decrypted state.   
   >   
   > Once again, how can an exit remailer forward the original message to   
   > its final destination when it doesn't restore it?   
      
   The arriving message header is stripped, the destination retained.  The   
   messge body remains encrypted.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)