XPost: alt.anonymous, alt.privacy.anon-server   
   From: noreply@mixmin.net   
      
   Pseudonymous Claas wrote:   
      
   >On 26 Oct 2025, Anonymous User  posted some   
   >news:20251026.191810.4d48fceb@dirge.harmsk.com:   
   >   
   >> Stupid Claas wrote:   
   >>>A pretty much lying Fritz Wuehler user wrote:   
   >>>> Nomen Nescio  wrote:   
   >>>> > On 25 Oct 2025, Radio Eriwan  posted   
   >>>> > some news:1761435073483161656.ac@radio-eriwan.ru:   
   >>>> >   
   >>>> > > Fritz Wuehler once wrote, without thinking too much beforehand:   
   >>>> > > > Radio Claashole  sent:   
   >>>> > > > > A stupid YAMN user wrote:   
   >>>> > > > > > Nomen Nescio  wrote:   
   >>>> > > > > > > On 24 Oct 2025, Anonymous    
   >>>> > > > > > > posted some   
   >>>> > > > > > > news:20251024.191615.6d53543f@yamn.paranoici.org:   
   >>>> > > > > > >   
   >>>> > > > > > > > [Spam] same [Spam] censoring [Spam] shit [Spam]   
   >>>> > > > > > > > different [Spam].   
   >>>> > > > > > > >   
   >>>> > > > > > > > Apparently it's okay for a particular sporging asshole   
   >>>> > > > > > > > to destroy groups and services for all, but not okay   
   >>>> > > > > > > > to use YAMN / neodome to counter the jerk.   
   >>>> > > > > > >   
   >>>> > > > > > > yamn is not so anonymous after all.   
   >>>> > > > > > >   
   >>>> > > > > > > what does that say about "anonymous messaging" hmm?   
   >>>> > > > > >   
   >>>> > > > > > Tor is an unsecure real-time system.   
   >>>> > > > > > Type I remailing fails to hide message size.   
   >>>> > > > > > Only Type II remailing (Mixmaster / YAMN) is secure!   
   >>>> > > > > >   
   >>>> > > > >   
   >>>> > > > > Did you know that YAMN/OmniMix users are the dumbest Usenet   
   >>>> > > > > users?   
   >>>> > > >   
   >>>> > > >   We just know that you, fascist Claas, and your buddy GabX   
   >>>> > > >   are the   
   >>>> > > > stupidest snake oil peddlers over here ignoring even the most   
   >>>> > > > basic principles of secure anonymous remailing. Good luck to   
   >>>> > > > your victims.   
   >>>> > > >   
   >>>> > >   
   >>>> > > Ah, ok. So pseudonymous remailing with Mixmaster and YAMN, in   
   >>>> > > your eyes, is secure 'anonymous' remailing. Mind you, you must   
   >>>> > > use Tor or you would shit in your pants without it. So much for   
   >>>> > > TypeII 'anonymous' remailing.   
   >>>> >   
   >>>> > It all works with Tor.   No Tor, no work.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> Remailers don't need Tor at all.  Tor was developed long after the   
   >>>> invention of anonymous remailing in order to have something similar   
   >>>> for from the anonymity perspective inherently problematic real-time   
   >>>> (web) communication.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> You send some packets to the entry remailer and nobody can figure   
   >>>> out which mail message at some exit remailer they represent, if any,   
   >>>> as you just may have sent dummy packets. That isn't pseudonymity,   
   >>>> it's true anonymity no matter what shithead Claas tells you.   
   >>>>   
   >>>   
   >>>I think you are the liar and real shithead! Why? Because these   
   >>>pseudonymous remailers are publicity run and known as old fashioned   
   >>>TypeII clearnet smtp networks where Eve and her friends only need to   
   >>>append the secret keys from remailers, to decrypt the incomming   
   >>>messages at an entry.  This can be done with gag orders. If you would   
   >>>know how the internals work from such old and outdated TypeII   
   >>>technology you would not speak such rubbish.   
   >>   
   >> The same BS once again?  Really?  For how long will you play that   
   >> game?   
   >>   
   >> First of all, when you need your anonymizers to be anonymous   
   >> themselves then you have a really severe problem.  And those who have   
   >> to trust in your shadow gang are in even bigger trouble.   
   >>   
   >> And how will you get the private keys and passphrases of all remailers   
   >> worldwide to compromize remailer chains, as that's what you have to   
   >> achieve?  Dumbo, with Type II remailing there are no timing or message   
   >> size correlation attacks or further vulnerabilities your light-weight   
   >> Tor network suffers from.   
   >>   
   >>>   
   >>>And secondly when looking at the pools Eve and her friends see in   
   >>>clear the remailer packets and the To: header,   
   >>   
   >> The packet's To: header after removing the current remailer's   
   >> encryption layer aka its next remailer stop has to be known.  How else   
   >> will you forward it?   
   >   
   >An IP packet doesn't have a "To:" header, it has source and destination   
   >fields.   
      
   Wasn't it about electronic mail thus about remailer packets?  You're   
   truly stupid in terms of Einstein.   
      
   >   
   >>> while messages at exits are held in an   
   >>>decrypted state.   
   >>   
   >> Once again, how can an exit remailer forward the original message to   
   >> its final destination when it doesn't restore it?   
   >   
   >The arriving message header is stripped, the destination retained.  The   
   >messge body remains encrypted.   
      
   That's what you do with your flawed Tor hack.  With anonymous remailing   
   the message as a whole is decrypted either, at a middle man remailer,   
   resulting in a completely different dataset of uniform size, now   
   revealing the next remailer, or, at the exit remailer, unveiling one of   
   n parts of the mail message destined for the final recipient.   
      
   --   
   'Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not   
   sure about the universe.' (Albert Einstein)   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)