XPost: alt.privacy.anon-server, news.software.nntp   
   From: fritz@spamexpire-202508.rodent.frell.theremailer.net   
      
   Claas wrote:   
   >Anonymous User wrote:   
   >>   
   >> There's no proof the circuit length can be identified at the exit.   
   >   
   >More hops add longer latency which can be meassured.   
   How will you measure latency without getting hold of both ends?   
   And you've no idea how latency varies tremendously dependent on   
   factors like routing and computer processing power.   
      
   >   
   >> But there's an immense risk to get three nodes run by a single   
   >> operator, who then has you by the balls.  That's why there's the   
   >> inept concept of entry guards.   
   >>   
   >> Read , add the   
   >> middle node to the equation and you're at to the core of the problem.   
   >> It's not only about correlation attacks.  It's about the worst case   
   >> of an attacker getting hold of the whole three-hop circuit!  -  BANG!   
   >>   
   >> That's a simple calculation even the FUD spreaders here can't deny.   
   >>   
   >Tell us the math equation for that, compared to more hops, which a   
   >sophisticated nation state can add.   
   Too stupid to do your math?  Hint: It's an exponential function.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)