[continued from previous message]   
      
   The Mixmaster strategy is designed to defeat such attacks, or at least to   
   increase their cost (i.e., to 'attackers') beyond feasibility. If every   
   message is passed through several servers (ideally in different legal and   
   political jurisdictions), then    
   attacks based on legal systems become considerably more difficult, if only   
   because of 'Clausewitzian' friction amongst lawyers, courts, different   
   statutes, organizational rivalries, legal systems, etc. And, since many   
   different servers and server    
   operators are involved, subversion of any (i.e., of either system or operator)   
   becomes less effective also since no one (most likely) will be able to subvert   
   the entire chain of remailers.   
      
   Random padding of messages, random delays before forwarding, and encryption of   
   forwarding information between forwarding remailers, increases the degree of   
   difficulty for attackers still further as message size and timing can be   
   largely eliminated as    
   traffic analysis clues, and lack of easily readable forwarding information   
   renders ineffective simple automated traffic analysis algorithms.   
   Web based mailer   
      
   There are also web services that allow users to send anonymous e-mail   
   messages. These services do not provide the anonymity of real remailers, but   
   they are easier to use. When using a web-based anonymous e-mail or anonymous   
   remailer service, its    
   reputation should first be analyzed, since the service stands between senders   
   and recipients. Some of the aforementioned web services log the users I.P.   
   addresses to ensure they do not break the law; others offer superior anonymity   
   with attachment    
   functionality by choosing to trust that the users will not breach the websites   
   Terms of Service (TOS).   
   Remailer statistics   
      
   In most cases, remailers are owned and operated by individuals, and are not as   
   stable as they might ideally be. In fact, remailers can, and have, gone down   
   without warning. It is important to use up-to-date statistics when choosing   
   remailers.   
   Remailer abuse and blocking by governments   
      
   Although most re-mailer systems are used responsibly, the anonymity they   
   provide can be exploited by entities or individuals whose reasons for   
   anonymity are not necessarily benign.   
      
   Such reasons could include support for violent extremist actions, sexual   
   exploitation of children or more commonly to frustrate accountability for   
   'trolling' and harassment of targeted individuals, or companies (The Dizum.com   
   re-mailer chain being abused    
   as recently as May 2013 for this purpose.)   
      
   The response of some re-mailers to this abuse potential is often to disclaim   
   responsibility (as dizum.com does), as owing to the technical design (and   
   ethical principles) of many systems, it is impossible for the operators to   
   physically unmask those    
   using their systems. Some re-mailer systems go further and claim that it would   
   be illegal for them to monitor for certain types abuse at all.   
      
   Until technical changes were made in the remailers concerned in the mid-2000s,   
   some re-mailers (notably nym.alias.net based systems) were seemingly willing   
   to use any genuine (and thus valid) but otherwise forged address. This   
   loophole allowed trolls to    
   mis-attribute controversial claims or statements with the aim of causing   
   offence, upset or harassment to the genuine holder(s) of the address(es)   
   forged.   
      
   Whilst re-mailers may disclaim responsibility, the comments posted via them   
   have led to them being blocked in some countries. In 2014 dizum.com (a   
   Netherlands-based remailer) was seemingly blocked by authorities in Pakistan,   
   because comments an (   
   anonymous) user of that service had made concerning key figures in Islam.   
   Remailer software   
   QuickSilver and QuickSilver Lite remailer software are Windows e-mail client   
   applications which send messages through Mixmaster anonymous remailer   
   cascades. The newer Lite version is capable of SSL/TLS and with its companion   
   program QuickSilver Aam it    
   supports nym servers.   
   OmniMix is a Windows proxy server, which handles e-mail and usenet postings   
   that come from an ordinary client application in a transparent manner and   
   sends them optionally through the Mixmaster anonymous remailer network   
   dependent on its settings or    
   certain header flags. It's able to interact with nym servers, supports SSL/TLS   
   and Tor with all external communication (NNTP/SMTP/POP3), offers a Tor   
   controller and allows header filtering and an automated addition of hashcash   
   tokens. The OpenPGP    
   compliant 'Whole Message Encryption', which, by including the header section,   
   even makes the structure of a message unrecognizable, can automatically secure   
   non-anonymous communication as well. Its Lazarus IDE is available, presenting   
   the complete source    
   code to build and test the application.   
   News2Remail is an NNTP to remailer proxy for Windows.   
      
   https://www.barnish.org/echolot/rlist2.html   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)