From: kcalder@blueyonder.co.uk   
      
   Anyone familiar with David Searle and his arguments about the   
   difficulties involved in equating simulated consciousness with   
   consciousness per se?   
      
   His most famous I think is the "Chinese room argument".   
      
   His position in a miniaturised nutshell is that simulations of   
   consciousness, computational models of brain activity and the like are   
   merely simulations, and are not sufficient for consciousness.  So he's   
   claiming that an AI that works by modelling brain function as a bunch of   
   computations, or by mimicking behaviour and thereby passing the turing   
   test, isn't conscious at all, and can't be.  Basically I suppose he is   
   saying that the turing test, and the fields of scientific exploration   
   based on the turing test (specially AI, and more specifically the   
   "strong AI thesis") are all a load of crap.   
      
   Anyone got any objections?   
   --   
   Kevin Calder   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)