096dd68e   
   ekrodomos.net> d436387b   
   From: ghostGARBAGE@bitstreamnetMOREGARBAGE.com   
      
   In article   
   ,   
    joss  wrote:   
      
   > On Fri, 18 Jun 2004 13:15:42 +0100, Kevin Calder wrote:   
   >   
   > > Anyone familiar with David Searle and his arguments about the   
   > > difficulties involved in equating simulated consciousness with   
   > > consciousness per se?   
   > >   
   > > His most famous I think is the "Chinese room argument".   
   > >   
   > > His position in a miniaturised nutshell is that simulations of   
   > > consciousness, computational models of brain activity and the like are   
   > > merely simulations, and are not sufficient for consciousness.  So he's   
   > > claiming that an AI that works by modelling brain function as a bunch of   
   > > computations, or by mimicking behaviour and thereby passing the turing   
   > > test, isn't conscious at all, and can't be.  Basically I suppose he is   
   > > saying that the turing test, and the fields of scientific exploration   
   > > based on the turing test (specially AI, and more specifically the   
   > > "strong AI thesis") are all a load of crap.   
   > >   
   > > Anyone got any objections?   
   >   
   > I think that my main argument against the Chinese Room argument is that it   
   > states that there is an unmeasurable, undefined quality ("consciousness")   
   > which cannot be possessed by the AI but is inherently possessed by a   
   > human. Also, an observer cannot determine whether this quality is   
   > possessed by something else. My point would therefore be that if such a   
   > quality is unobservable and unprovable then it either does not exist, or   
   > its existence is insignificant.   
   >   
   > My extension to the Chinese Room argument is this: Imagine if the   
   > hypothetical man in the room has not only a set of rules which cause him   
   > to write the correct Chinese phrase, but an adaptive set of rules which   
   > govern how he behaves in all aspects of life. Now   
   > imagine that he does not refer to a book for the rules, but has the rules   
   > memorized and follows them instantly and implicitly. To any observer, he   
   > would appear to understand and speak Chinese perfectly. I believe that he   
   > WOULD understand and speak Chinese perfectly to all intents and purposes.   
   > This man would be indistinguishable from any other human walking around,   
   > but according to Searle would not be "conscious". I simply disagree.   
   >   
   > If something behaves as a simulation which is perfect in every way, then I   
   > believe it should be treated as if it were the object of its simulation. I   
   > would treat a Nexus 6 exactly as I would treat a human :o)   
   >   
   > Joss   
      
   the short version:   
      
   If a simulation is in everyway indistinguishable from the real thing,   
   what's the difference in the end results?   
      
      
   ghost   
   ~/~u forget the power of the monkey nugget to regulate brute reality. -alias~/~   
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