8a32aec9
From: kcalder@blueyonder.co.uk
In message
,
ghost writes
>In article ,
> Kevin Calder wrote:
>> In message
>> ,
>> ghost writes
>> >the short version:
>> >If a simulation is in everyway indistinguishable from the real thing,
>> >what's the difference in the end results?
>> Fair enough, but, do you really think that a brain and a computational
>> simulation of a brain are indistinguishable?
>> If I remove the top of your head with a buzz saw, what do you expect to
>> pop out? :)####
>> I'd expect some grey matter that is easily distinguishable from some
>> abstract, invented, computational system that doesn't actually exist in
>> nature of its own accord.
>> But I wouldn't bet any money on it.
>Basically the crux of your, and Searle's,
Really just Searle's, I didn't come up with any of these arguments, and
I don't feel any particular allegiance to them BTW. I agree with Searle
on a few points though.
> arguement is that a
>simulation, no matter how accurate even to the point of being completely
>indistinguishable, can never be treated as the same as the original
>simply because it is not organic in nature?
>Seems like a form of prejudice to me honestly.
This isn't exactly the case.
Think about it sensibly. If you have a simulation of a brain, that is
the identical to a brain (*1) then you don't have a simulation any more,
you have a brain!
And this business of "organic", and "not organic" isn't really relevant.
Its just a throwback from science fiction, Searle isn't interested in
organicity per se. What is relevant is this business of "brain" or "not
brain".
*1: I'll head off a whole class of distracting objections by pointing
out that by this I mean "that is identical to a brain in everyway, /as
far as we can tell/", which is, as far as we are concerned, as good as
it gets.
>If I were to manage to put forth an object that would in every way act
>like a person, pass every possible test you could throw at it
Ok, assuming that consciousness is a feature of brain chemistry (give me
a reason not to, it seems reasonable enough to me(*2)) I am going to
want to cut your person-object's head open and check for a brain. If I
find a bunch of chips in there I'm not logically obliged to assume that
they are conscious, even if they are replicating brain function. See
below.
>Note - I did not say were had reached that point, or are even close to
>reaching that point.
OK. Searle isn't saying that we could never reach this point either, he
is just arguing that even if we did, it wouldn't be significant in the
way that "Strong AI" claims it would be.
>This is all hypothetical. But if we did produce an intelligence that in
>all ways acted exactly like a humanbeing would in every single way it
>couldn't possibly have "conciousness" - and have we even defined
>"conciousness" within this context?
Ok, if we accept that consciousness exists (refuting consciousness is a
whole other can of worms) then, given the state of our current
scientific knowledge about the functioning of the brain as a physical
thing and how its physical states relate to conscious states (go drop
some E's to see what I mean) then doesn't it seem to make sense to say
that brains cause consciousness? I have to admit, that to me, it seems
very sensible to tentatively conclude that consciousness is a physical
phenomena, rooted in the brain and its periphery.
(*2): What is it that you think it is? If you believe that abstract
computational simulations are capable of possessing consciousness then
presumably you don't think that consciousness is a biological phenomena,
which sounds pretty much like a wishy washy "soul" to me. It could be
that you believe that consciousness is a feature of one of the things
that brains and simulations of brains have in common. Usually people
cite "complexity" as the feature in question, but, isn't this business
of things becoming conscious as a result of their complexity also a
little bit transcendentalist? IMHO "consciousness from complexity" is
every bit as unfounded the wishy washy hardware-independent "soul".
Doesn't sound very scientific to me.
However, studying consciousness as a feature of brain chemistry does
sound pretty scientific to me, and computational simulations are an
important way of doing this. Just so long as we keep in mind that just
because the thing we are simulating exhibits certain characteristics, we
can't claim that the simulation will *necessarily* exhibit those same
characteristics. And this is what Strong AI does.
And, once and for all, saying "well imagine a simulation so perfect that
it is indistinguishable from the object" doesn't help, because the only
thing that is indistinguishable from a brain, *is* a brain. Otherwise
you are opening the door to all sorts of anti-scientific,
anti-intellectual taxonomical skepticisms. Its almost deconstruction!
Geez you guys are fickle. When I'm talking about postmodernism you want
hard, rigorous scientific fact, and when i'm talking about hard,
rigorous scientific fact, you want postmodernism! ;)
>Searle sounds like a machine-bigot. Sorry, but he does.
No need to apologise. Feel free to join the abusive, witch burning
masses. Searle is not well received by many. You won't be lonely.
> Utterly denying
>the possiblity of something that we haven't even really begun to explore
>shuts doors that may need to be opened to understand the concept fully.
What shuts doors, IMHO, is adherence to the Strong AI thesis, even
although it is totally unfounded, and doesn't really make much sense.
AI is an important field, it doesn't need wobbly deus ex machina
speculation.
danke,
--
Kevin Calder
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
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