defb8c55   
   From: joss@nospampleasewerebritish.nekrodomos.net   
      
   On Sat, 19 Jun 2004 22:03:47 +0100, Kevin Calder wrote:   
      
   > In message   
   > ,   
   > joss  writes   
   >>On Sat, 19 Jun 2004 02:26:36 -0600, ghost wrote:   
   >   
   >>   
      
   A lot of the stuff here might echo ghost's comments, we seem to be of the   
   same mind here.   
      
   >>> Searle sounds like a machine-bigot. Sorry, but he does. Utterly denying   
   >>> the possiblity of something that we haven't even really begun to   
   >>> explore shuts doors that may need to be opened to understand the   
   >>> concept fully.   
   >   
   >>I agree here. In another thread you replied to my Nexus6 comment by   
   >>saying "but weren't Nexus6 biological". Why, if something is constructed   
   >>from cells does it gain the ability to be conscious?   
   >> Why is it valid to assume   
   >>that a biological entity which behaves in a certain way is conscious, but   
   >>a mechanical entity which behaves in the same way is not conscious?   
   >   
   > You are doing the scientific equivalent of putting the horse before the   
   > carriage here, IMHO.  Consciousness, as far as I can tell from my amateur   
   > interest in neuroscience, seems to be a feature of things that have   
   > brains, and very specially, conscious states seem to be caused by the   
   > physical state of the brain itself.  It seems to make sense to me to say   
   > that consciousness is feature of brains, and a brain is a pretty specific   
   > physical thing, made out of specific physical stuff.  I don't see why a   
   > simulation of brain activity, which is made of different stuff would   
   > necessarily exhibit the same characteristics as a brain, given that it   
   > isn't actually a brain, or equivalent to one.   
      
   With respect, I think that you are committing the same crime. From the   
   discussion so far, the only definition of consciousness that you have put   
   forward is along the lines of "something possessed by organic brains, but   
   not by machines". That's not a definition, that's telling me what has   
   something and what hasn't. To link in to your liquid/fluid dynamics   
   points, it's like saying "water is something you can put in a glass, but   
   not in a sieve". It may well be true, but it doesn't help me if I don't   
   know what water is.   
      
   >>What   
   >>if we created a simulation using artificially created biological cells?   
   >>Would they be conscious?   
   >   
   > It depends.  Are you suggesting that we make a model of a brain using the   
   > same materials and architecture as a brain?  If you are then the answer is   
   > yes.  But that's not a model, that's a brain.   
      
   How about if the cells are entirely manufactured? How about if each cell   
   behaves exactly like the corresponding cell in the brain, but is made from   
   silicon?   
      
   > If you are suggesting that we build a computer out of brain material, and   
   > then have it run a computational simulation of brain activity, then the   
      
   What's the difference between a simulation of brain activity and a real   
   brain? If it is that the simulation doesn't behave correctly in some   
   situations then it doesn't have a place in this argument. If the   
   difference is that the simulation was created artificially, but behaves   
   identically, I don't see why one has some property and another hasn't.   
      
   > answer is no.  Its not a brain.  We have no reason to believe that   
   > non-brains are conscious.  If we don't need a reason, then we might as   
   > well declare the economy, the tectonic plates and the amazon rain forest   
   > conscious.  In fact, we might would be entitled to declare everything   
   > conscious.  Not very scientifically satisfying though is it?   
   >   
   >>The consciousness argued by Searle and other weak AI proponents is that   
   >>consciousness is, effectively, like "spirit".   
   >   
   > Rubbish.   
   >   
   > So the "liquidity" of liquids is some kind of spiritual fantasy is it? The   
      
   Liquidity can be measured and observed. The analogue here would be "if   
   this compound flows like a liquid and behaves like a liquid in all   
   circumstances, but is made from compound X not compound Y then it is not a   
   liquid". (Any mention of colloids will result in a severe   
   poking-out-of-tongue.)   
      
   > lower order components of the "liquid" system collectively cause the   
   > property of "liquidity" in the same way that the lower order, material,   
   > chemical components of the brain collectively cause the higher order   
   > property of "consciousness".  If you mess with the chemical, material   
   > components of the brain, you end up messing with the higher order   
   > properties of the system, and thereby affecting conscious states.  Take   
   > some drugs or get a lobotomy.  You will see the causal link.   
      
   Hah! I might just do that.   
      
   Seriously. If your definition of consciousness relies on it occurring in   
   an organic system then it's trivially true that machines cannot have it. I   
   was understanding consciousness to be something along the lines of   
   self-awareness.   
      
   >> I call upon Occam's razor   
   >>here: if consciousness cannot be measured or observed except by effects   
   >>that can be simulated then there is no reason for it to be in our models.   
   >   
   > (Im assuming that we both are willing to presuppose that consciousness   
   > exists.)   
      
   Unfortunately not. Still, if you give me a satisfactory definition of   
   consciousness then I will reconsider.   
      
   > Consider the difference between what you are proposing consciousness is,   
   > and what Searle is proposing consciousness is.   
   >   
   > It's you who keeps implying that it is somehow a non-physical phenomena.   
   > Your "cannot be measured or observed" is starting to sound pretty mystical   
   > to me.   
   >   
   > The Philosophical Disney Land is closing for the evening! Its time to join   
   > the team science!   
   > Leave Cartesian dualism behind!   
      
   It's strange. This is all stuff I'd accuse you of! What exactly is   
   consciousness, in a physical sense? I know I've said this a few million   
   times this post, but I think it's very difficult to thrash out an argument   
   without defining what we're arguing about.   
      
   > And, to anticipate an objection, there was a time when we couldn't model   
   > fluid dynamics, but we didn't conclude that it was impossible.  Searle is   
      
   We could, however, observe fluidic properties. Consciousness is not like   
   that. We can only observe the appearance of consciousness. There aren't   
   any fluid dynamics models that I know of which state that things that   
   behave perfectly according to all the models are not fluids.   
      
   >>Unfortunately, this is an area that is kind of like religious debate.   
   >   
   > Really?  Oh well.  That's that then.   
   > Lucky they didn't say that about fluid dynamics, isn't it?   
      
   It's not really an analogous case. I wish people would say it more about   
   religion, though :o)   
      
   >>Without a way to prove that consciousness is possessed by something or   
   >>not, it's just a matter of belief.   
   >   
   > This is the "Other Minds" objection again.  I note that you didn't address   
      
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