From: kcalder@blueyonder.co.uk   
      
   In message , ded-T   
    writes   
   >On Wed, 07 Jul 2004 20:52:10 GMT, Kevin Calder   
   > wrote:   
      
   >>Ghost, you do not experience conscious states merely because you exhibit   
   >>the behavioural characteristics of something that experiences conscious   
   >>states, you are conscious because you have an organ in your skull which   
   >>is producing your conscious states.   
      
   >Or so Searl [and you {?}] assume.   
      
   It seems a most solid assumption offered.  There is plenty of evidence   
   of the connections between physical brains and subjective conscious   
   states. If you blow peoples brains out they certainly seem to lose   
   consciousness.   
      
   At least this is true in all the films I watch.   
      
   >Some questions to ask:   
      
   >What is a conscious state? Define it.   
   >How do you know it's conscious?   
   >How do you measure it and prove what you are measuring is what you   
   >think it is?   
   >What makes a "Searl brain" a conscious brain?   
   >How is that different from a large pile of neural scraps made of   
   >n-dimensional q-dots?   
   >Why? Quantify it.   
      
   I take your point, but if your trying to imply that consciousness is   
   beyond the reach of serious study then I have to say that I really don't   
   see why.   
   I don't think that there is really anything stopping us from sitting   
   down and working out a working definition of consciousness that we could   
   use for a neurological \ psychological study.  Do you?   
      
   Consciousness is the collective term for all of the possible conscious   
   states.  Consciousness states are the medium of my subjective   
   experience.  They begin when I wake, and end when I fall into dreamless   
   sleep.  They seem to be a product of the physical state of my brain, and   
   vary accordingly.  Consequently objects can affect my subjective   
   conscious states, i.e. a bullet lodged in my skull causing me to   
   permanently experience the smell of roses...   
      
   We could get a bunch of contributors from other fields, hash it out over   
   a period of weeks, amass an expansive description and then hack it down   
   to the essentials.  We could do it on a variety of levels, i.e. in terms   
   of brain activity, subjective descriptions of conscious states,   
   psychological analysis e.t.c.  It probably wouldn't be perfect, but it   
   would be probably be good enough to begin a scientific investigation   
   with, and one of the out comes of said investigation might be an even   
   better, more specific definition.   
      
   I really don't think it is that mysterious.   
      
   >How do you know we are "real"   
   > *we* all could be simulations   
      
   A baffling prospect certainly.   
      
   > Just because it has a brain does not make it conscious.   
      
   Are you proposing that consciousness is independent of physical causes?   
   Because if you are, then I am getting scared.  And I include conscious   
   "emerging from complexity" as a physical cause independent definition   
   BTW.   
      
   >What Searl seems to be saying is "you can't, because I say you can't".   
      
   I don't think he ever said that, and I also think its an inaccurate   
   paraphrase.  Its more like he is saying "you can't, because it doesn't   
   make sense to say that you can."   
      
   >Nothing in his arguments seem to be backed by any kind of *actual*   
   >proof. Just "thought experiments" which may be based on faulty   
   >thoughts. Not very scientific.   
      
   What kind of science is strong AI based on?   
      
   Anyway, there is nothing wrong with proof by argument, and thought   
   experiments are a rhetorical form of argument.  Even if you have   
   evidence you need an argument to make it mean something.   
      
   >You said above that consciousness is "caused by brains"... what says   
   >it isn't caused the other way around? Consciousness causes brains.   
      
   Well, there is some science that makes that look pretty unlikely and   
   vice versa the vice versa.   
      
   > Or   
   >the universe anthropomorphic rules cause consciousness. or the phase   
   >of the moon causes them? or Cosmic Rays? or other of a zillion   
   >possible random factors? No proof offered in any shape of form-- just   
   >talk-talk.   
      
   Oh come on!  Pots and kettles and blackness!   
      
   All you are offering is bland, blanket scepticism.   
      
   >What behavioral characteristics does "consciousness" display? Who are   
   >*you* [or Searl for that matter] to determine what is and is not   
   >conscious?   
      
   It isn't an object.  You can't find it and objectively record its   
   properties. The best you can hope for is a sensible, functional model.   
      
   >I seem to recall the Catholic church seems to have the same kind of   
   >thinking as Searl-- animals are not "conscious" because they do not   
   >have "souls"...   
      
   Searle most certainly thinks animals are conscious.   
      
   >The idea that "consciousness is a function of having a brain" is   
   >almost as silly as "consciousness is a function of having a soul". No   
   >proof, no experimental work,   
      
   Except for plenty of science that suggests that the physical state of   
   the brain appears to have a strong effect on conscious states.  If you   
   stimulate certain regions of my brain, I will consciously experience the   
   sensation of someone standing behind me even if no one really is.   
      
   >Searl has not done anything but ejaculate his *belief* with no   
   >laboratory proof that "it cannot be done" [remember Clarke's Third   
   >Law].   
      
   I would disagree, though I don't think Searle is hitting the nail on the   
   head by any means.  Personally I think the problem is malformed.  Our   
   ideas about subjective experiences just don't connect with our ideas   
   about objective science.  Searle thinks we can connect them, I'm   
   interested in this idea, but I'm not entirely convinced.  And to accuse   
   Searle of merely ejaculating his belief is a little strong IMHO, he has   
   concluded that strong AI is false by trying to think through a very hard   
   problem in a sensible manner.  Even if he doesn't manage to solve the   
   problem, perhaps because he underestimates its scale, I think his   
   contribution is commendable at least.   
      
   >I'm not saying the Strong or Weak AI camps are doing any better. They   
   >are having the problem of trying to "meta-think" about thinking. Maybe   
   >we'll never create an AI... not because it is not feasible, but   
   >because we are not equipped to objectively think about how to design a   
   >thinking machine.   
      
   I totally agree.   
      
   >No one has come up with a experimentally provable scheme to test any   
   >of the "theories of consciousness" or even a road map to get to where   
   >there is a testable theory.   
      
   I think its possibly a mistake to think that we might need one.   
   Objective methods work well for objects, but consciousness is not an   
   object.  I think we either need to think about how we can go about   
   studying subjective "things", or if we need to at all.   
      
   > The kinds of "arguments" [including this   
   >one] are the kind of "mental masturbation"   
      
   I'd utterly agree.  But then I think that almost everything that humans   
   do is like masturbation.  But then I do value masturbation very highly   
   indeed.   
      
   >As long as this field of endeavor remains in the hallowed halls of   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)