From: slider@anashram.com   
      
   I’ve lived through two major geopolitical shifts in my lifetime: the end   
   of the Cold War, which ushered in America’s “unipolar moment,” and the   
   Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, which ushered in the war on terrorism.   
      
   Now, we are experiencing another turning point – what the Germans call a   
   Zeitenwende — that might be even more unsettling. The new world disorder   
   has been brought about primarily by the Russian invasion of Ukraine but   
   also by other factors, including the rise of China, Iran’s nuclear program   
   (which has now produced enough fissile material to build a bomb), North   
   Korea’s out-of-control nuclear and missile programs (more missile tests in   
   2022 than in any previous year), the decline of globalization, and the   
   rise of isolationist and protectionist sentiment in the United States. We   
   are struggling to define the post-Ukraine war world even as the war itself   
   rages on. The closest parallel I can think of was the struggle to define   
   the post-World War II world in the late 1940s and early 1950s.   
      
   That, too, was a scary, unsettled time. Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union took   
   over Eastern Europe while acquiring a nuclear arsenal. Mao Zedong and his   
   Communist Party toppled the Nationalist government in China. The United   
   States was convulsed by a Red Scare over supposed communist spies and   
   subversives.   
      
   Things appeared to come to a head in June 1950, when North Korea, an ally   
   of China and the Soviet Union, invaded South Korea and U.S. forces rushed   
   to South Korea’s defense under the banner of the United Nations. After   
   U.N. forces pushed back the North Korean onslaught, Chinese troops entered   
   the war on Nov. 25, 1950, and sent the allies reeling back. The U.S.   
   commander, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, wanted to respond by attacking China   
   with tactical nuclear weapons. “I’ve worked for peace for five years and   
   six months,” a dismayed President Harry S. Truman wrote in his diary on   
   Dec. 9, 1950, “and it looks like World War III is here.”   
      
   Today, as many fear a nuclear war as a result of another unprovoked   
   invasion (this one in Ukraine), it is worth recalling how the worst was   
   averted more than 70 years ago. Truman disregarded the extremists from   
   both left and right. Some (such as Henry Wallace, who served as vice   
   president under Franklin D. Roosevelt) argued for accommodation with the   
   Soviets; others (including many senior Air Force generals) argued for   
   preventive war against the U.S.S.R. or a wider war with China.   
      
   Truman prudently chose a middle path by adopting a policy of containment   
   designed to stop the spread of communism without risking a direct conflict   
   with Moscow. He responded to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1948   
   not by sending U.S. ground forces to fight their way to the embattled city   
   but by sending U.S. cargo aircraft to keep it alive. The cornerstone of   
   his strategy was to forge alliances with like-minded nations, including   
   former enemies Italy, West Germany and Japan. American multilateralism   
   produced both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947   
   and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 — the economic   
   and military underpinnings of the U.S.-led world order. This was followed   
   by the signing of defense treaties with Japan (1951) and South Korea   
   (1953) to extend collective security to East Asia.   
      
   That world order now faces an unprecedented challenge from Russia. If   
   Russian President Vladimir Putin can get away with his aggression in   
   Ukraine, international law will give way to the law of the jungle. It is   
   vitally important to defeat Russia to send a message that aggression does   
   not pay, even if the nature of that defeat remains to be determined, while   
   also managing the threats posed by China, Iran and North Korea.   
      
   That would be a monumental challenge for any president. But Joe Biden, for   
   all his faults and frailties, is rising to the task in a manner   
   reminiscent of Truman, another president who was underestimated. Many   
   details differ, of course. But it is striking just how much Biden’s   
   general approach echoes that of Truman, and his successor Dwight D.   
   Eisenhower, who responded to a world in crisis reminiscent of our own by   
   building and maintaining alliances with like-minded countries to contain   
   authoritarian aggressors without risking World War III.   
      
   Biden has done a particularly impressive job of marshaling an   
   international coalition to sanction Russia and support Ukraine — and   
   keeping that coalition united in the face of Putin’s attempts to use   
   Russian energy as an economic weapon to send Europe and the United States   
   into a recession. Biden has wisely eschewed provocative proposals, such as   
   imposing a “no-fly” zone over Ukraine, while continuing to provide the   
   Ukrainians with (most of) the weapons they need to defend themselves. Like   
   Truman, he is finding a middle path of avoiding a direct superpower   
   conflict while containing the Kremlin’s expansionism. He may soon have to   
   confront — as Truman and then Eisenhower did in Korea — the difficult   
   issue of how to end a war where a U.S. ally might not be able to win a   
   complete victory. (Meaning, in this case, a return to Ukraine’s 2014   
   borders.)   
      
   While containing Russia, Biden has been expanding links between U.S.   
   allies in Asia and Europe; one of the year’s most underappreciated   
   developments was that leaders of Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and   
   Australia attended the NATO summit in Spain. This is part of a bigger   
   American project to bring Asian and even European nations together to   
   deter China from starting a war over Taiwan — something that nearly   
   happened during the Quemoy and Matsu crises of the 1950s. Biden has put   
   emphasis on the Quad dialogue among the United States, India, Japan and   
   Australia, as well as the AUKUS (Australia-U.S.-U.K.) alliance to build   
   nuclear submarines for Australia, while also maintaining lines of   
   communication with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is another example   
   of his middle path: strengthening deterrence while avoiding war.   
      
   Biden’s biggest shortcoming has been in the economic sphere: Because he is   
   not willing to challenge protectionist sentiment in Congress, he won’t   
   rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a vital economic counterweight to   
   the China-dominated trade bloc in Asia. His Inflation Reduction Act is   
   alienating allies in both Europe and Asia with its protectionist   
   provisions that provide an advantage to U.S. manufacturers of electrical   
   vehicles. Biden ignores Truman’s insight that reducing “restrictive trade   
   and financial measures throughout the world” will lead to a “progressive   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)