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|    alt.fan.noam-chomsky    |    Founded cognitive approach to politics    |    62,757 messages    |
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|    Message 62,465 of 62,757    |
|    Steve Hayes to All    |
|    Chomsky: US Approach to Ukraine and Russ    |
|    05 Mar 22 05:36:51    |
      XPost: soc.culture.russian, soc.rights.human, talk.politics.misc       From: hayesstw@telkomsa.net              Chomsky: US Approach to Ukraine and Russia Has “Left the Domain of       Rational Discourse”              he Russia-Ukraine crisis continues unabated as the United States       ignores all of Russian President Vladmir Putin’s security demands and       spreads a frenzy of fear by claiming that a Russian invasion of       Ukraine is imminent.              In a new exclusive interview for Truthout on the ongoing       Russia-Ukraine crisis, world-renowned public intellectual Noam Chomsky       outlines the deadly dangers of U.S. intransigence over Ukrainian       membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even when       key Western allies have already vetoed earlier U.S. efforts in that       direction. He also seeks to shed some light on the reasons why       Republicans today seem to be divided on Russia.              Chomsky — whose intellectual contributions have been compared to those       of Galileo, Newton and Descartes — has had tremendous influence on a       variety of areas of scholarly and scientific inquiry, including       linguistics, logic and mathematics, computer science, psychology,       media studies, philosophy, politics and international affairs. He is       the author of some 150 books and recipient of scores of highly       prestigious awards including the Sydney Peace Prize and the Kyoto       Prize (Japan’s equivalent of the Nobel Prize), as well as dozens of       honorary doctorate degrees from the world’s most renowned       universities. Chomsky is Institute Professor Emeritus at the       Massachusetts Institute of Technology and currently Laureate Professor       at the University of Arizona.              The following transcript has been lightly edited for length and       clarity.              C.J. Polychroniou: Tensions continue to escalate between Russia and       Ukraine, and there is little room for optimism since the U.S. offer       for de-escalation fails to meet any of Russia’s security demands. As       such, wouldn’t it be more accurate to say that the Russia-Ukraine       border crisis stems in reality from the U.S.’s intransigent position       over Ukrainian membership in NATO? In the same context, is it hard to       imagine what might have been Washington’s response to the hypothetical       event that Mexico wanted to join a Moscow-driven military alliance?              Noam Chomsky: We hardly need to linger on the latter question. No       country would dare to make such a move in what former President       Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Secretary of War Henry Stimson called “Our       little region over here,” when he was condemning all spheres of       influence (except for our own — which in reality, is hardly limited to       the Western hemisphere). Secretary of State Antony Blinken is no less       adamant today in condemning Russia’s claim to a “sphere of influence,”       a concept we firmly reject (with the same reservation).              There was of course one famous case when a country in our little       region came close to a military alliance with Russia, the 1962 missile       crisis. The circumstances, however, were quite unlike Ukraine.       President John F. Kennedy was escalating his terrorist war against       Cuba to a threat of invasion; Ukraine, in sharp contrast, faces       threats as a result of its potentially joining a hostile military       alliance. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s reckless decision to       provide Cuba with missiles was also an effort to slightly rectify the       enormous U.S. preponderance of military force after JFK had responded       to Khrushchev’s offer of mutual reduction of offensive weapons with       the largest military buildup in peacetime history, though the U.S. was       already far ahead. We know what that led to.              The tensions over Ukraine are extremely severe, with Russia’s       concentration of military forces at Ukraine’s borders. The Russian       position has been quite explicit for some time. It was stated clearly       by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at his press conference at the       United Nations: “The main issue is our clear position on the       inadmissibility of further expansion of NATO to the East and the       deployment of strike weapons that could threaten the territory of the       Russian Federation.” Much the same was reiterated shortly after by       Putin, as he had often said before.       Historian Richard Sakwa … observed that “NATO’s existence became       justified by the need to manage threats provoked by its enlargement” —       a plausible judgment.              There is a simple way to deal with deployment of weapons: Don’t deploy       them. There is no justification for doing so. The U.S. may claim that       they are defensive, but Russia surely doesn’t see it that way, and       with reason.              The question of further expansion is more complex. The issue goes back       over 30 years, to when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was       collapsing. There were extensive negotiations among Russia, the U.S.       and Germany. (The core issue was German unification.) Two visions were       presented. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a Eurasian       security system from Lisbon to Vladivostok with no military blocs. The       U.S. rejected it: NATO stays, Russia’s Warsaw Pact disappears.              For obvious reasons, German reunification within a hostile military       alliance is no small matter for Russia. Nevertheless, Gorbachev agreed       to it, with a quid pro quo: No expansion to the East. President George       H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker agreed. In their words to       Gorbachev: “Not only for the Soviet Union but for other European       countries as well, it is important to have guarantees that if the       United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of       NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread       in an eastern direction.”              “East” meant East Germany. No one had a thought about anything beyond,       at least in public. That’s agreed on all sides. German leaders were       even more explicit about it. They were overjoyed just to have Russian       agreement to unification, and the last thing they wanted was new       problems.              There is extensive scholarship on the matter — Mary Sarotte, Joshua       Shifrinson, and others, debating exactly who said what, what they       meant, what’s its status, and so on. It is interesting and       illuminating work, but what it comes down to, when the dust settles,       is what I quoted from the declassified record.              President H.W. Bush pretty much lived up to these commitments. So did       President Bill Clinton at first, until 1999, the 50th anniversary of       NATO; with an eye on the Polish vote in the upcoming election, some       have speculated. He admitted Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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