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   From: bobhawke@bigpond.com   
      
   The U.S. Army Gets Transformed By Accident   
   by James Dunnigan   
   January 14, 2010   
   For the U.S. Army, the last decade was one of surprises. In 2000, the   
   army was focused on a somewhat distant future, in which weapons,   
   equipment and tactics were expected to change in some vaguely science   
   fiction fashion. Lots of effort was going into FCS (Future Combat   
   Systems), a family of futuristic vehicles and weapons to replace   
   current ones in twenty years or so. Same with Land Warrior, which   
   would do the same thing for the infantry. Then came September 11,   
   2001, and things began to change in unexpected ways.   
      
   The rapid victory in Afghanistan, where 300 Special Forces operators   
   and CIA field agents, won the war quickly, was a surprise to the   
   public. The war in Afghanistan featured two weapons that were most   
   responsible for victory over the Taliban. The most visible weapon was   
   the smart bomb, usually a one ton, GPS guided weapon dropped from a   
   B-52. The other widely used weapon was cash. Money. Defeating the   
   enemy with a pile of greenbacks is often looked down on, but in   
   Afghanistan it is often much more effective than bombs.   
      
   When the special forces and CIA agents went into Afghanistan in   
   October of 2001, they already knew that, as the British had noted over   
   a century ago, "Afghan's can't be bought, but they can be rented."   
   Even the Taliban had used bribes to defeat some of the Northern   
   Alliance warlords. Since there was no price list, and Afghan warlords   
   knew the Americans had a lot more cash, there was a lot of negotiation   
   involved. But for a few hundred thousand dollars, many warlords were   
   willing to switch loyalty. Moreover, this was an ancient Afghan   
   custom. A warlord became a leader of fighting men by having the   
   resources to take care of his lads. That takes money, and the   
   Americans had a lot more than the Taliban. Going into November and   
   December, more pro-Taliban forces switched sides. This often happened   
   even before a warlord's troops got hit with smart bombs. And a greedy   
   warlord was sometimes led to lower his asking price after such an   
   experience.   
      
   All this got the military theorists and pundits going on about how the   
   Afghanistan experience was the future of warfare. It was, but it   
   wasn't. What happened in Afghanistan was something the United States   
   was ready for. The Special Forces and CIA had been preparing for   
   something like this (supporting one side in a civil war), and we had   
   the weapon to do it in the middle of nowhere (a country with no access   
   to the sea); the smart bomb. Since only a few bombers could be put   
   over Afghanistan (as they had to fly in from thousands of kilometers   
   away), every bomb had to count. The smart bomb was no new wonder   
   weapon, but one that had been around for over half a century. But   
   Afghanistan happened at the time when the smart bomb had been   
   perfected (with the GPS guided version), but not demonstrated in   
   combat yet. Afghanistan was the demonstration. But Afghanistan was not   
   the future of warfare. The "special" in Special Forces means troops   
   trained for rare situations. Everyone kind of forgot that in the   
   aftermath of the Afghan victory.   
      
   The real changes came when it was decided to bait the Islamic   
   terrorist enemy out into the open, by threatening their base; the   
   Middle East. This is one of the oldest strategic moves. When you can't   
   force the enemy to face you in battle, go occupy something he has to   
   come out and fight for. One of al Qaeda's major goals was to drive all   
   non-Moslems, especially military personnel, out of the Middle East. So   
   by invading Iraq, the U.S. not only removed one of the worst tyrants   
   on the planet, but forced al Qaeda to man up and step up. They did,   
   and were slaughtered by the thousands. In doing so, al Qaeda destroyed   
   its standing in the Moslem world. That's because al Qaeda allied with   
   one of their enemies, the secular Baath party. Saddam had used Baath   
   to rule Iraq since the 1970s, and Baath decided that a terror campaign   
   against the majority Shia Arabs would get them back in power. Al Qaeda   
   believed that once the foreigners were driven out, they could take all   
   the credit and crush Baath. But the large number of civilians killed   
   (by Baath and and Qaeda suicide bombs, or Shia and Sunni death   
   squads), appalled the Moslem world. While it was fashionable to blame   
   the United States, this was Islamic radicalism doing what it does,   
   covered in the media courtesy of the U.S. military (which provided   
   enough protection for the Western media to allow the story to be   
   publicized.)   
      
   Along the way, the American army went through some unexpected, and   
   largely unreported, transformations. First, as the American military   
   has done throughout its history, the army quickly adapted to the   
   conditions it found itself in (in the middle of a major terror   
   campaign), and defended itself, while training the new Iraqi army and   
   police force. This was more difficult because the old army and police   
   were dominated by Sunni Arabs, who were still the enemy and still   
   fighting. But although the army was under heavy attack, their casualty   
   rate was a third of what it had been in Vietnam, Korea and World War   
   II. Better training, tactics, weapons, leadership and equipment was   
   the reason. But that was not the kind of stuff that makes for exciting   
   headlines, so it was ignored. Outside the military, at least.   
      
   As the army adapted, it also developed new weapons and equipment   
   (remotely controlled gun turrets, missiles fired from UAVs, GPS guided   
   rockets and shells, jammers to defeat roadside bombs, robots, new   
   armor, new intelligence collection and data mining techniques, MRAPs,   
   and so on.) This was an army of the future, able to not just move more   
   quickly, but also able to evolve new ideas and techniques more   
   rapidly. The army also found that some weapons, like their M-1 tanks   
   and M-2 infantry vehicles were still very relevant.   
      
    The army also discovered that there was a down side to lower   
   casualties. Troops were now spending more time in combat than ever   
   before. As was discovered, and documented, during World War II, that   
   the average soldier can only take so much combat (about 200 days   
   worth) before they become psychologically unfit for the battlefield.   
   The army then went on to find ways to delay the onset of this   
   breakdown, and ways to cure it.   
      
   While the army was just taking care of business, that made it clear   
   that a lot of Cold War era weapons systems were a waste of money. This   
   led to the cancellation of some expensive systems (the Comanche   
   helicopter, Crusader artillery vehicle, FCS and Land Warrior, just to   
   name the big ones). But not just for the army. It became obvious that   
   the Navy and Air Force, which were much less involved in Iraq, also   
   had a lot of expensive new systems that were out of sync with reality.   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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