XPost: sci.physics, talk.politics.guns, alt.checkmate   
   XPost: alt.animals.ethics.vegetarian   
   From: dereknash@groupmail.com   
      
   On Sat, 7 Dec 2019 01:35:10 -0800, Dutch  wrote:   
      
   >On 2019-12-06 11:57 p.m., Derek wrote:   
   >> On Fri, 6 Dec 2019 14:39:42 -0800, Dutch  wrote:   
   >>   
   >>> On 2019-12-06 5:38 a.m., &y wrote:   
   >>>> On Thu, 5 Dec 2019 14:53:52 -0800, OrigInfoJunkie  wrote:   
   >>>>   
   >>>>> On 12/5/2019 2:37 AM, &y wrote:   
   >>>>>> On Wed, 4 Dec 2019 18:37:40 -0800, OrigInfoJunkie    
   wrote:   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> On 12/4/2019 3:14 PM, &y wrote:   
   >>>>>>>> On Wed, 4 Dec 2019 12:10:44 -0800, OrigInfoJunkie    
   wrote:   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> On 12/4/2019 5:55 AM, &y wrote:   
   >>>>>>>>>> On Tue, 3 Dec 2019 15:17:18 -0700, Just Wondering  wrote:   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> Animals have rights.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> Correct.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> No, false.  Animals do not, and *cannot*, have rights.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> Support that claim or let it remain invalid.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> Animals are the wrong class of entity to have rights.   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>> That doesn't support your claim.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> It does.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> Rights exist to   
   >>>>>>> regulate relations among moral actors - humans - and allowances are   
   made   
   >>>>>>> for the negligible number of humans who are only moral patients.   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>> You have no valid reason to deny those same allowances to the moral   
   patients   
   >>>>>> used to produce medicines, food, clothing and cruel entertainment for   
   moral   
   >>>>>> agents.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> Of course I have.  Rights are an evolutionary development of, by and for   
   >>>>> humans.  They apply *only* to the class of entity that includes moral   
   >>>>> agents.  Human moral patients have rights because they are members of   
   that   
   >>>>> class.  Any human who is a moral patient rather than a moral agent is in   
   >>>>> that state either temporarily (babies, small children, people in comas,   
   >>>>> people under anesthesia) or because something catastrophic has happened.   
   >>>>> They are exceptions.  It is *normal* for non-human animals to be, always   
   >>>>> and only, moral patients.  It is abnormal for humans.  The "marginal   
   cases"   
   >>>>> argument is dead.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> Thank you, but I don't remember trying to make the case for animal rights   
   by   
   >>>> trying to debunk the argument from species normality. Let's make a deal,   
   >>>> shall we, because I can see by the strength of your response that you're   
   >>>> probably fully aware of Machan's broken chair analogy and have a good   
   >>>> grounding of the arguments for and against the petition for animal rights.   
   >>>> By that token of respect I'm looking for something mutual and hoping   
   you'll   
   >>>> realise I can identify a strawman when presented.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> To date, your argument against the petition is limited to the single   
   >>>> observation that they are the wrong class of entity to have rights, I   
   >>>> believe. That doesn't persuade me to accept it. In fact, I must reject it   
   >>>> based on its circularity. It presumes that only humans can have rights   
   >>>> because they are human and have rights.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> On that same note, by presenting that strawman you seem eager to persuade   
   me   
   >>>> into accepting the idea that the moral worth of an individual depends   
   solely   
   >>>> on what is normal for that individual's kind or species. It's worth noting   
   >>>> here that should the term kind or species be supplanted by race by a bad   
   >>>> actor for political advantage, only a quick pair of hands will be able to   
   >>>> get the lid back on that can of worms before the entire argument is used   
   as   
   >>>> a platform for something not too dissimilar to this one.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> Nevertheless, it's an attractive argument to those who give no thought as   
   to   
   >>>> why a human trait gives good reason to lift him up as a worthy bearer of   
   >>>> rights while at the same time condemning non-human animals as being   
   unworthy   
   >>>> of those basic protections that rights provide. But to make that argument   
   >>>> you need to show why human traits alone are sufficient to grant us a   
   higher   
   >>>> moral status and explain why non-human traits are insufficient and   
   unworthy   
   >>>> of it. The reason cannot simply be that humans value humans because they   
   are   
   >>>> human and have human traits. The reason behind your argument must be   
   >>>> impartial to head off bias and non-circular to avoid invoking a fallacy.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> Pain is a trait shared equally by both and should bring animals and humans   
   >>>> together under the same protection rights provide, yet while rights   
   protect   
   >>>> us from wilfully inflicting it on our own kind for the utility it can   
   bring,   
   >>>> they are callously withheld from animals on the basis that, while they are   
   >>>> the same as us, morally they can never be. I can't support that kind of   
   >>>> mocking false-profession, and that's why I support the petition for animal   
   >>>> rights.   
   >>>>   
   >>>   
   >>> It's simplistic and confusing to view the holding of rights as binary.   
   >>> We ought to talk about classes of rights. Humans are assumed to have   
   >>> certain rights known generally as "human rights",   
   >>   
   >> Well, they wouldn't be known generally as anything else, would they?   
   >> My God - why do you even bother?   
   >   
   >The significance of that clarification is lost on you? There is a   
   >pervasive tendency, as "OrigInfoJunkie" demonstrated, to speak only of   
   >"rights" without recognizing that *human* rights is not the only   
   >possible application of the concept, that it's possible to not   
   >disqualify animals from having rights because they lack moral agency.   
   >   
   >>> with all the moral   
   >>> agency that goes with them. That does not mean we can't still apply a   
   >>> class of rights that do not entail moral agency.   
   >>   
   >> You really don't have a clue, do you? You've been spouting this kind of   
   >> bullshit here for over 15 years and you still don't get it.   
   >   
   >If that's the case then I eagerly wait to hear your refutation of what I   
   >said. I won't hold my breath.   
   >   
   >>> When we charge someone   
   >>> with animal cruelty, are we not by implication saying that the dog had   
   >>> some kind of right, i.e. not to be abused?   
   >>   
   >> If you truly believe that why did you say the exact opposite?   
   >>   
   >>  "I measure my right to be free from physical assault   
   >>   by looking if laws and sanctions exist against anyone   
   >>   who would assault me. Such laws and sanctions exist   
   >>   to protect domestic animals from abuse, so I must   
   >>   conclude that they hold rights against humans who   
   >>   would abuse them."   
   >>   Dutch Sep 20 2005 http://tinyurl.com/9g3yp   
   >>   
   >> "I believe that it is defensible to say that an animal   
   >>  that is protected by laws and morals from being   
   >>  attacked in some way by a human holds a right   
   >>  against humans."   
   >>  Dutch 16 Oct 2011 http://tinyurl.com/3rdntg8   
   >>   
   >> Why are you always lying, Dutch? You're a laughing stock.   
   >   
      
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