XPost: soc.history, soc.culture.russian, alt.religion.christian.east-orthodox   
   XPost: alt.politics.religion   
   From: hayesstw@telkomsa.net   
      
   Inconsistent foundations: why Huntington was wrong about Belarus?   
      
   In his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of   
   World Order Samuel P. Huntington [1] attributed Belarus to the   
   Orthodox Civilization. According to him, the imaginary dividing line   
   between the Western and the Orthodox civilizations runs through the   
   territory of Belarus. In fact, it lies close to the eastern border of   
   interwar Poland, which included the western areas of today’s Belarus.   
   Our expert Dr. Kiryl Kascian discusses why constitutional identity of   
   Belarus contradicts to its attribution to the Orthodox Civilization by   
   Huntington.   
      
   The idea of this text primarily is inspired by the contemporary   
   politics in a wider region of Eastern Europe. The ideological   
   foundations of these developments are linked to significantly diverse   
   interpretations of history and their institutionalization. Hence, they   
   echo Huntington’s framework of civilizations’ clash.   
   “Russian world” as a form of Civilizations’ Clash   
      
   Huntington suggested that “Russia is creating a block with an Orthodox   
   heartland under its leadership and a surrounding buffer of relatively   
   weak Islamic states which it will in varying degrees dominate and from   
   which it will attempt to exclude the influence of other powers” (p.   
   164). He also underlines two other core elements of this framework.   
   First, it’s the centrality of post-Soviet Orthodox countries for “the   
   development of a coherent Russian bloc in Eurasian and world affairs”.   
   Second, it is pivotal for Russia not only to maintain this system, but   
   to have it accepted and approved by the world.   
   In one of my previous texts with ICELDS, I emphasized that the Russian   
   legislation lacks any clear definition of the concept of the “Russian   
   World”. It represents a hybridization of cultural views with some   
   political agendas, and its sources are primarily public addresses and   
   other texts of Russian politicians, clergy and intellectuals. It also   
   seems that appeals to this unwritten doctrine is equally important for   
   at least some Russia’s neighboring countries. For example, Ukrainian   
   authorities view the “Russian World” as a security threat and a   
   justification for Russia’s interference in the domestic affairs of   
   Ukraine [2].   
      
   Considering the notion “Orthodox” in the terms proposed by Huntington,   
   it seems relevant to focus on the statements by the two leading   
   Russian public figures, namely Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Gundiaev   
   (known as Patriarch Kirill). Putin’s “Crimean Speech” of March 2014   
   suggested that the baptism of Prince Vladimir in Khersones   
   “predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and   
   human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and   
   Belarus”[3]. Concurrently, Gundiaev actively promotes the Russian   
   world as a system of common values which the entire Eastern Slavic   
   civilization created through the populace’s baptism by Prince Vladimir   
   in the Dnieper river in Kyiv [4]. Therefore, their messages suggest   
   the central role of the Orthodox Christianity for the Russian   
   historical canon and for the ideological foundations of the relations   
   with the neighboring Eastern Slavic countries. In any case, it is   
   Russia and its culture that assume the role of a “civilizational   
   magnet” within this framework. Meanwhile, Huntington’s view on Russia   
   and its geopolitical ambitions in its immediate neighborhood is   
   significantly consistent with the Weltanschauung of the leadership of   
   the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church.   
      
   Constitutional self-perception of history in Belarus   
      
   As for Belarus, Huntington (p. 164) interpreted some developments of   
   the early 1990s in Belarus in a way that allows him to conclude that   
   as of 1995 Belarus was “part of Russia in all but name” with “little   
   sense of national identity” and with significant fractions of the   
   population who “seem to identify as much with Russia as with their own   
   country.” These observations were first published as a book back in   
   1996, following just five years of the reinstated independence of   
   Belarus. Nevertheless, since then Belarus sustained as an independent   
   state, although it remained an active member of the Russian-led   
   economic and security alliances in the post-Soviet space.   
   The official interpretation of the Belarusian statehood’s history can   
   be found in the a concise phrase in the Preamble of the country’s   
   Constitution. According to this document, contemporary Belarus relies   
   on “the centuries-old history of development of Belarusian statehood.”   
   Interestingly, this formula of the statehood was elaborated during the   
   period described by Huntington, as the country adopted its   
   Constitution on 15 March 1994. The Preamble with this formula remained   
   unchanged even when in 1996 a new substantially-revised version of the   
   Constitution was adopted.   
      
   Although the Constitution does not contain references to specific   
   historical state formations on the territory of modern Belarus, its   
   draft mentioned that the Belarusian statehood rooted in the Grand   
   Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) and the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BNR)   
   [5]. Declared in 1918, the BNR can be regarded as the Belarusian   
   statehood in modernity and the first one which used the name   
   “Belarus”. At the same time, the role of the GDL, which existed until   
   1795 and since 1569 was in the state union with the Kingdom of Poland,   
   is important as it was the first formation which united the Belarusian   
   lands within a single state.   
      
   As for the GDL, both Soviet and modern Russian historical narratives   
   are dominated by the view that suggests that the Eastern Slavic   
   territories were allegedly conquered by Lithuanians and later   
   subordinated to the Polish authorities. However, the Belarusian view   
   on the GDL as a form of the Belarusian historical statehood (though   
   indirectly) can observed earlier in the constitutional acts of the   
   BNR. Therefore, this approach cannot be regarded as an invention of   
   the Belarusian nationalism in the late Soviet Union [6].   
   Still, the current Belarusian historical narrative states that the   
   earlier statehood tradition encompasses the Duchies of Polack and   
   Turau, which later were incorporated into the GDL. This process   
   generally complies with the formulation of the Belarusian   
   constitutional Preamble and its view upon the historical development   
   of the Belarusian statehood as a sequence of the following formations:   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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