XPost: soc.culture.indian, alt.fan.jai-maharaj, talk.politics.tibet   
   XPost: alt.politics, talk.politics.misc, soc.culture.india   
   From: alt.fan.jai-maharaj@googlegroups.com   
      
   Forwarded post:   
      
   Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7   
   November 1950 not only deploring Indian Ambassador KM   
   Panikkar's action but also warning about dangers from China   
      
   Friends of Tibet, friendsoftibet.org   
      
   My dear Jawaharlal,   
      
   Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet   
   meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically   
   fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not   
   able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking   
   over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with   
   you what is passing through my mind.   
      
   I have carefully gone through the correspondence between   
   the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking   
   and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to   
   peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador   
   and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say   
   that neither of them comes out well as a result of this   
   study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by   
   professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that   
   at a crucial period they managed to instill into our   
   Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called   
   desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means.   
   There can be no doubt that during the period covered by   
   this correspondence the Chinese must have been   
   concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action   
   of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of   
   perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith   
   in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been   
   unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy   
   or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it   
   appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama.   
   Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an   
   explanation or justification for Chinese policy and   
   actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one   
   of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and   
   unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he   
   made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is   
   impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the   
   so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations   
   in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they   
   must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us   
   as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or   
   strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the   
   Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them,   
   indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the   
   friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their   
   friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not   
   with them being against them", this is a significant   
   pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last   
   several months, outside the Russian camp, we have   
   practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese   
   entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances   
   on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we   
   could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its   
   apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our   
   discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and   
   in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about   
   our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with   
   suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least   
   outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little   
   hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have   
   done already to convince China of our good intentions,   
   friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador   
   who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly   
   point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the   
   Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross   
   discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our   
   protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but   
   also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is   
   determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is   
   not a friend speaking in that language but a potential   
   enemy.   
      
   In the background of this, we have to consider what new   
   situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of   
   Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up   
   to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been   
   worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have   
   been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat   
   from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no   
   trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own   
   domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In   
   1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not   
   endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan   
   autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship.   
   Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-   
   signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems   
   to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very   
   soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has   
   entered into with us in the past. That throws into the   
   melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with   
   Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during   
   the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is   
   united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and   
   north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a   
   population ethnologically and culturally not different from   
   Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the   
   frontier and the existence on our side of a population with   
   its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the   
   elements of the potential trouble between China and   
   ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that   
   Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the   
   communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other.   
   Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the   
   Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important   
   part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also.   
   Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line   
   round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement.   
   Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different   
   from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers.   
   The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times   
   more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie   
   concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger   
   from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both   
   communist and imperialist. While our western and north-   
   western threat to security is still as prominent as before,   
   a new threat has developed from the north and north-east.   
   Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence   
   has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our   
   defence measures have so far been based on the calculations   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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