From: wbe@UBEBLOCK.psr.com.invalid   
      
   I previously posted:   
   > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.at/2018/01/reading-privi   
   eged-memory-with-side.html   
   > entitled "Project Zero: Reading privileged memory with a side-channel".   
      
   > That one I'm still reading...   
      
   Now that I've read the whole thing...   
      
   It reminds me of the concerns government agencies had about using any   
   sort of time sharing operating system for classified material.   
   NSA-provided mods to Solaris to produce Secure Solaris, for example,   
   worried a lot about ways code on the trusted side might be able to   
   signal a process on the untrusted side and thereby leak data.  Made-up   
   examples might be changing some device state or framebuffer pixel in   
   some way that the unsecure process could detect, or varying the   
   scheduling of a process, or the amount of memory in use, etc.  The   
   general idea has been around for decades -- a spy who goes for coffee   
   every morning before work, but whose wristwatch is very accurately set,   
   so that walking through the door at 09:00:00 means something different   
   than at 09:00:10 to the guy across the street who also has a watch   
   accurately set, but looks the same to anyone else.   
      
   The general idea was simply that getting a few bits at a time out was   
   sufficient, and here, with Meltdown and Spectre, attackers not only can   
   get data out, they don't even have to run anything on the secure side to   
   do it.   
    -WBE   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)