[continued from previous message]   
      
   > intentionality or freedom being able to choose your own path, as opposed   
   > to proceeding down a preprogrammed path. Well, physics tells us that   
   > even elementary particles have that, in the simplest possible form:   
   > quantum indeterminacy (the idea that the physical facts of the universe   
   > seem to be indeterminate on the subatomic level).   
   >   
   > In fact, if you ask Levin the classic question How low can you go? Is   
   > there anything in the world that’s not somewhere on the spectrum of   
   > cognition? he’ll tell you: "I don’t believe there is a zero in our   
   > world."   
   >   
   > He’s happy to acknowledge that the level of indeterminacy in an   
   > elementary particle is a "very stupid-low level of freedom," but it’s   
   > not nothing. And that’s all the panpsychist needs in order to explain   
   > consciousness as a simple story of scaling. Once upon a time, there was   
   > a little particle that was a little bit conscious. It got together with   
   > more particles, and they formed a cell that was a little bit more   
   > conscious. It got together with more cells, and they formed an animal   
   > that was even more conscious…   
   >   
   > The biggest challenge to panpsychism: the combination problem   
   > But wait a second. There’s a problem for the panpsychist here. If the   
   > tiniest particles have conscious experiences, how exactly do they   
   > combine to produce a more complex thing with its own conscious   
   > experience? What’s more, how do we explain things like tables or chairs?   
   > Panpsychists generally do not argue that those things are conscious   
   > subjects but how do we explain why they aren’t, while the collection of   
   > atoms known as a human is?   
   >   
   > This is known as the "combination problem," and it’s typically seen as   
   > the biggest challenge to panpsychism. Any panpsychist owes you an   
   > explanation of why they think the littlest bits are conscious, and   
   > humans are conscious, but the table is not.   
   >   
   > Our old friend Giordano Bruno anticipated this way back in the 16th   
   > century. He argued that even though the tiniest "corpuscles" inside a   
   > table are conscious, they do not produce a unified conscious subject   
   > when they come together in the form of an inorganic object. "I say,   
   > then, that the table is not animated as a table, nor are the clothes as   
   > clothes," he wrote, but "in all things there is spirit, and there is not   
   > the least corpuscle that does not contain within itself some portion   
   > that may animate it."   
   >   
   > Panpsychists like Leidenhag make the same move today. "I think it   
   > follows our intuitions to say that a table isn’t conscious because the   
   > parts are not interacting together there’s no real unity going on with a   
   > table," she told me. "Whereas with a plant, there really is clear   
   > unity."   
   >   
   > In other words, a plant is a goal-directed system with unity of purpose.   
   > Its parts are all working together as a team to perform the essential   
   > processes that keep the system running. That’s very different from a   
   > table, where particles are squished together but are not collaborating.   
   >   
   > A small budding flower on a fuzzy stem, outlined by golden sunlight.   
   > A small budding flower on a fuzzy stem, outlined by golden sunlight.   
   > That sounded to me like Leidenhag was saying that the table is not   
   > conscious because it’s not alive. So I asked her if she thinks that   
   > aliveness and consciousness are one and the same.   
   >   
   > "What I would say is aliveness is one name for the process by which   
   > conscious parts unify to form new conscious wholes," she replied. "So I   
   > could say that a single electron is not alive, but it is conscious. And   
   > when it is part of a living system, it creates a bigger consciousness."   
   >   
   > Leidenhag acknowledges that she can’t prove an electron is conscious or   
   > that panpsychism is right about consciousness. But, she told me, "I   
   > think it’s the most plausible of a bunch of implausible views about   
   > consciousness."   
   >   
   > Strawson said the same thing. "It’s the least worst view," he laughed.   
   >   
   > Here’s the really funny thing: Panpsychists and materialists will both   
   > concede that they can’t disprove the other camp’s view, because we don’t   
   > have definitive evidence either way. Yet both believe their own view is   
   > the simplest and likeliest explanation the most "parsimonious," as   
   > Strawson and Seth each told me.   
   >   
   > Panpsychism has the advantage of letting us sidestep the hard problem.   
   > But materialism has an advantage, too: no combination problem. So, does   
   > one come out ahead?   
   >   
   > The difference between them may be more methodological than anything   
   > else. Materialism restricts itself to what it can establish empirically,   
   > testable detail by testable detail, with the hope of groping its way   
   > toward a broad theoretical framework. Panpsychism has historically let   
   > itself dream big, starting out with the broad theory and hoping to fill   
   > in the details later. What’s exciting is that scientists like Levin are   
   > now combining the methodology of materialism with the theory of   
   > panpsychism, seeing how they might fit together. These scientists are   
   > digging right underneath the wall that was erected in the 17th century   
   > the one that split matter from mind. Where that will lead is anyone’s   
   > guess.   
   >   
   > What are the ethical implications? Does panpsychism mean I can’t eat   
   > anything?   
   >   
   > A few years ago, I was chatting about panpsychism with a friend. I   
   > mentioned that I don’t know if the theory is true, but I hope it is.   
   > When my friend asked why, I said simply, "So many little buddies   
   > everywhere!"   
   >   
   > To me, panpsychism offered an enchanted view of the world. I suspected   
   > that if it were the prevailing view, people might be less likely to feel   
   > lonely or to destroy nature, because they’d see kin everywhere.   
   >   
   > But my friend had a totally different reaction. He was horrified by the   
   > idea of panpsychism. "Think of how much suffering there could be in the   
   > world!" he said.   
   >   
   > His reaction points to the big ethical question looming over   
   > panpsychism: If it’s right, then how the hell are we supposed to live?   
   > If everything is conscious, then can we not eat anything?   
   >   
   > For one thing, panpsychism doesn’t argue that everything is equally   
   > conscious. Different things are conscious to different degrees, so we   
   > might feel different levels of moral obligation to them.   
   >   
   > "It has made me a more committed vegetarian because it’s just made me   
   > more sensitive to the consciousness of other creatures. It forces you to   
   > think about your moral reasoning," Leidenhag told me. But, she added, "I   
   > don’t think that it makes it impossible for you to go about your life   
   > consuming things."   
   >   
   > While the consciousness of a given creature may matter a lot, morally   
   > speaking, lots of other things matter, too. Consider our relationship to   
   > the creature: Have we made it dependent on us by domesticating it, or   
   > does it live in the wild? Has it had the chance to live a full life? Is   
   > it fundamentally hostile to us? Bedbugs may have some degree of   
   > consciousness, but that doesn’t mean you’re a moral monster if you call   
   > an exterminator. Your own ability to survive and thrive is also part of   
   > the moral calculus. It’s probably inevitable that sometimes the   
   > interests of different conscious beings are going to be in tension with   
   > each other, or flat-out incompatible; when that happens, we have to make   
   > choices as best we can.   
   >   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-DOS v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)