From: bulahsadbury00@gmail.com   
      
   In this blog post we have analysed the Uroburos code that disables the old   
   Windows 7 Kernel Patch Protection, and have given overview of the new   
   Patchguard version 8 implementation. The reader should now be able to   
   understand why the attacks such as the    
   one used by Uroburos could not work with the new version of Kernel Patch   
   Protection. It seems that the new implementation of this technology can defeat   
   all known attacks. Microsoft engineers have done a great amount of work to try   
   to mitigate a class of    
   attacks .   
      
   I used this version, based on the work of Fyyre ( -tower.de/). After   
   installation on a test PC I kept an eye on outbound network traffic for a   
   while in my router (Ubiquiti Edge) and didn't see anything. Fyyre's site also   
   has Windows 7 SP1 and Windows 8    
   patchguard disablers.   
      
   Disable Patchguard Windows 81   
   Download Zip https://t.co/LmJmxKWia1   
      
      
      
   The second approach is the one I have been using so far thanks to PPLKiller. I   
   use its disablePPL sub-command to disable the protection every time I need to   
   debug a protected process for research purposes.   
      
   The option /disableLSAProtection does the same thing as /disablePPL , except   
   that it automatically retrieves the PID of the LSASS process. The target PID   
   is then passed as a parameter, along with a custom structure (more about that   
   later), to the    
   function disableProtectedProcesses(...).   
      
   The function disableProtectedProcesses() first opens the device \\.\RTCore64,   
   which is automatically created when the (64-bit) driver is loaded. It will use   
   this handle to send commands to it through the DeviceIoControl API.   
      
   To resolve this problem do the followings:-   
   1] Boot computer with the Windows XP CD-ROM in the CD-ROM drive.   
   2] To repair a Windows XP installation using Recovery Console, press R.   
   3] At the command prompt, type the following commands:-   
       
    cd \windows\system32\drivers [Press the ENTER Key]   
       
    ren ntfs.sys ntfs.old [Press the ENTER Key]   
       
    If the ntfs.sys file is there and corrupt it will rename it. If it is not   
   there then it was missing.    
       
   4]At the command prompt, type the following command, and then press ENTER:   
   copy X:\i386   
   tfs.sys drive:\windows\system32\drivers [Where X=CD-ROM Drive]   
      
   5]Remove the Windows XP CD from CD-ROM drive, type quit, and then   
   press ENTER to quit the Recovery Console.   
      
   6. Restart the system.   
      
      
       
      
      
   This allows CosmicStrand to gain hold of the execution once the Windows NT   
   kernel starts and disable the PatchGuard, which is specifically designed to   
   prevent any modifications in the Windows NT kernel.   
      
      
      
   Driver Signature Enforcement is part of Windows Code Integrity (CI) and,   
   depending on the Windows build version, it is located in ntoskrnl.exe or   
   CI.dll as a global non-exported variable (flag). Before Windows 8 build 9600,   
   the DSE flag is located in    
   ntoskrnl.exe as nt!g_CiEnabled, which is a global boolean variable toggling   
   DSE either enabled or disabled. In any other more recent builds, the DSE flag   
   can be found in CI.dll as CI!g_CiOptions, which is a combination of flags   
   (0x0=disabled, 0x6=enabled,   
    0x8=test mode).   
      
   In a nutshell, the idea is to (ab)use a vulnerable signed driver with an   
   arbitrary kernel memory read/write exploit, locate either the g_CiEnabled or   
   g_CiOptions variables in kernel memory and overwrite the value with 0x0 to   
   disable DSE using the    
   vulnerable driver. Once DSE is disabled, the malicious driver can be loaded,   
   after which the DSE value should be restored as soon as possible, because DSE   
   is protected by PatchGuard. Sounds relatively straightforward you might say,   
   however the hard part    
   is locating g_CiEnabled or g_CiOptions, because even though we know where to   
   go looking, they are not exported so we will need to perform offset   
   calculations.   
      
   I doubt that Microsoft has hardcoded the list of AntiViruses somewhere and   
   decides which processes should get this flag based on the certificate, so how   
   does windows decide which processes should get this flag?   
      
   In April 2019, the Norton 360 brand was revived to replace Norton Security,   
   adding Norton Secure VPN, 10 GB of online backup per-user, as well as premium   
   plans incorporating LifeLock identity theft protection.[29][30]Additional   
   features have been added    
   to the Norton 360 product line, including a specific suite of tools for gaming   
   in 2021,[31] and social media monitoring services in February 2022.[32]Norton   
   360 won three categories in AV-TEST Institute's 2021 Awards, for Best   
   Protection and Best    
   Performance for Windows Home, MacOS security, and Android security for   
   consumer use.[33] In January 2022, Norton installed a cryptominer that would   
   mine Ethereum once activated by the user; the feature was permanently disabled   
   in September of that year.[   
   34]   
      
   Norton 360 software is not sold; it is a purchased subscription for a stated   
   period (e.g. one year). The software (e.g. firewall, antivirus) is   
   automatically disabled at the end of the subscription period, unless a new   
   subscription is purchased.   
      
   Taking my cues from Abatchy, I decided to try and bypass SMEP by using a   
   well-known ROP chain technique that utilizes segments of code in the kernel to   
   disable SMEP and then heads to user space to call our shellcode.   
    eebf2c3492   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)