From: dohduhdah@yahoo.com   
      
   Op 24/04/2024 om 19:09 schreef Richmond:   
   > sobriquet  writes:   
   >   
   >> For instance, we could see a teapot on a table in front of us and be   
   >> conscious of the fact that there is a teapot on the table.  We can't   
   >> reduce this exclusively to brain activity, because we have to take   
   >> into account that there actually is a teapot on the table for us to   
   >> draw a valid conclusion regarding our state of awareness of this.  We   
   >> might be hallucinating that we see a teapot on a table that isn't   
   >> really there and then it would be silly to proclaim that we are   
   >> conscious of an imaginary teapot that only exists in our mind.   
   >>   
   >   
   > Why is it silly to proclaim consciousness of an imaginary teapot? We   
   > could for example say we are imagining a teapot and then say we are   
   > conscious of the image, and that we are imagining, and describe it.   
   >   
   > If you ask me to imagine a teapot, and then ask me what colour it is, I   
   > could tell you, and I suppose you could do the same with your own   
   > imaginary teapot.   
   >   
   > Some theorize that the purpose of consciousness is to allow us to do   
   > psychology, i.e. to have some insight into what it is like to be someone   
   > else. So in order to describe my own thoughts, imaginations, even   
   > hallucinations to someone else, I need to be conscious of them. I need   
   > to look at them objectively and imagine them as they could be someone   
   > else's.   
      
   That depends on whether you're aware of the hallucinatory character of   
   your observations.   
   For instance, we can look at an image of an optical illusion and it may   
   appear to us like the image is moving. But we might know from the fact   
   that it is a jpg image that it must actually be a static image (given   
   that the jpg file format rules out animations), so we may realize that   
   somehow our brain is playing tricks on us, giving us the impression of   
   observing motion, while there is no actual motion.   
   Then it makes sense to claim being conscious of the fact that the   
   observed motion is an illusion.   
   But it would be silly to claim that the fact that the optical illusion   
   appears to show motion that it must actually be moving and being   
   conscious of this motion, given that motion is ruled out by looking at a   
   static image.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)