From: x@x.org   
      
   On 8/19/24 03:09, someone37 wrote:   
   > (Just repostings as there were some formatting issues)   
   >   
   > THESIS   
   >   
   > By a "type 1 physicalist ontology", I mean an account of what exists, in   
   which nothing other than the physical   
   > exists and in which physics is thought of as modelling the rules followed by   
   the physical.   
   >   
   > This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist   
   ontology which can explain the   
   > evidence through its model.   
   >   
   > DEFENCE OF THESIS   
   >   
   > For the purposes of this thesis when I claim that I am consciously   
   experiencing, I mean it is like something to   
   > be me.   
   >   
   > In this defence I am going to use the term experiences to mean conscious    
   experiences.   
   >   
   > Premise 1: I can tell from my experiences that I am experiencing.   
      
   Hmmm.   
      
   I can tell from cats that there are cats.  It doesn't mean that   
   there has to be a cat there if I say there is one there.  All   
   I have to do is repeat the words 'cat' and it is there.  Or   
   something like that.   
      
   Just repeat the word 'experience' with force and it is so.   
      
   Just repeat the word 'cat' and shout it several times and   
   it exists.   
      
   You must BELIEVE in the word EXPERIENCE or it is not   
   actually 'experience'?  I am thinking that is 'proof'?   
   Well, something like that.   
      
      
   >   
   > It could be claimed that through the evidence of the objects each of us   
   experiences, which I will refer to as   
   > experiential objects, there is indirect evidence of a physical. I would   
   disagree, though accept there is evidence   
   > of what I shall refer to as environmental objects.   
   >   
   > With a type 1 physicalist ontology, there might not be physical objects   
   corresponding to those experienced in a   
   > VR type situation. The environmental objects being modelled on a computer.   
   >   
   > While experiencing typing this, I have experienced looking at an object,   
   then looking away from it and then   
   > looking back to it.   
   >   
   > While looking away from it, the experiential object I had been looking at,   
   was no longer an experiential object   
   > of mine. The only experiential object I would have of it would be a memory.   
   But when I experienced looking back   
   > at it again, it became an experiential object.   
   >   
   > But what do I mean "experienced looking back at it again"?   
      
   Yes experience!  EXPERIENCE!!!   
      
   You must worship the word 'experience' as a god or it does not exist.   
      
   If you look back at it again, in your own way you are repeating the   
   word 'experience' again and again.   
      
   >   
   > With the environmental objects idea, there is an environment, often referred   
   to as the universe. And there are   
   > objects in that environment, which I'll refer to as environmental objects.   
   The idea being that while I only ever   
   > experience the experiential human form, and experiential objects, there is   
   an environmental human form   
   > corresponding to the experiential human form that I experience having, and   
   environmental objects. My   
   > understanding is that the experience correlates with the brain activity of   
   the environmental human form that   
   > correlates with the experiential human form I experience having. Give that   
   environmental human a suitable non-   
   > lethal dose of anesthetic then I could cease to have any experience, or   
   remember any experiences for a period of   
   > time.   
   >   
   > Had the environmental humans had a more distributed nervous system setup,   
   like that of an octopus for example, it   
   > might have been harder to realise the distinction between experiential   
   objects and environmental objects. As it   
   > is, I experience having a human form, and can experience putting its hands   
   either side of its head while touching   
   > fingertips. And the hands do feel outside of the head. But I can also   
   realise, that like all the objects I   
   > experience, those are experiential objects. And the space I experience is   
   experiential space. But as mentioned   
   > the experience gives the impression that what I experience correlates with   
   the brain activity of the   
   > environmental human form that correlates with the experiential human form I   
   experience having. And that   
   > environmental brain activity is inside a skull where there is no light.   
   >   
   > Deduction 1: From Premise 1 ("I can tell from my experiences that I am   
   experiencing") I can deduce that at least   
   > part of reality experiences.   
   >   
   > And from Deduction 1 I can deduce:   
   >   
   > Deduction 2: That what I experience can influence my deductions.   
      
   Yes you must derive the word 'experience' from 'EXPERIENCE'!!!   
   This is proof.   
      
   >   
   > And by influence I mean make a difference to what the outcome would have   
   been expected to have been without the   
   > influence.   
   >   
   > This thesis is that philosophy hasn't managed to offer a type 1 physicalist   
   ontology which explains the evidence   
   > through its model. The evidence being what the experience is like, having a   
   form in an experiential object world,   
   > and that experience being able to influence the deductions made.   
   >   
   > The only evidence we have for reality is the experience, and, as far as I am   
   aware: The physics models suggest   
   > that if the entities in their model were used to create an ontology, all   
   that would exist in the ontology would   
   > be the fundamental entities of the model interacting with each other.   
   >   
   > If such an ontology didn't have any of the fundamental environmental objects   
   experiencing, then it would be an   
   > ontology in which nothing that exists experiences. And wouldn't fit the   
   evidence.   
   >   
   > If the ontology did have at least some of the fundamental environmental   
   objects experiencing, then would I be one   
   > of the fundamental environmental objects? If not, then how does the   
   experience I was having influence the   
   > deductions according to their ontology?   
   >   
   > As far as I am aware, no where do the physics models indicate where any   
   experiencing would be expected, or how it   
   > could be tested for. And nor am I aware of any type 1 physicalist ontology   
   that indicates how it would matter to   
   > the environmental human forms what the experience was like, or how the   
   experiential objects have properties which   
   > according to physics the environmental brain state which it correlates with   
   doesn't have.   
   >   
   > SOME POTENTIAL REPLIES   
   >   
   > Obviously the presentation of a type 1 physicalist ontology which did   
   explain, by the ontology model, how it   
   > mattered to the environmental human forms what the experience was like, such   
   that they were discussing it, and   
   > where the properties of the experience were in the ontology. The light for   
   example. As mentioned the brain   
   > activity could be inside a skull where there is no light. The correlation to   
   brain activity in the environmental   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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