From: nospam@example.net   
      
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   On Fri, 14 Mar 2025, Richmond wrote:   
      
   > D  writes:   
   >   
   >> On Wed, 12 Mar 2025, Richmond wrote:   
   >>   
   >>>> Has anyone ever managed to present evidence to the contrary? If not,   
   >>>> we are very justified in knowing that the world exists.   
   >>>   
   >>> I don't think that it would be possible to prove that something   
   >>> doesn't exist, or provide evidence of such. On the other hand,   
   >>> existence is a   
   >>   
   >> Again I must mind my language. _Disproving_ the physical world does   
   >> not mean proving that it doesn't exist, although in some logical/weird   
   >> way it might be possible although I cannot see how.   
   >>   
   >> You could prove for instance, that we live in a simulation, or are   
   >> brains in vats, or thoughts in gods mind.   
   >>   
   >> If you prove that, you have "disproven" the physical world, and shown   
   >> that it was just an illusion or misunderstanding in favour of   
   >> something else.   
   >>   
   >> Does that make more sense?   
   >   
   > No. :) Where would the simulation be simulated? on a computer? which is   
   > a physical object. Or a brain in a vat, the vat is a physical   
   > object. Although you have shown that the physical world is different   
   > from the way we thought, it is nevertheless a physical world.   
      
   Don't ask me, you are preaching to the choir! I agree with you. I am just   
   trying to recap arguments by quantum physicists who believe in simulations   
   or infinite worlds. As for doubting any kind of substrate for processing,   
   solipsists do that just fine, but they are very boring to talk with, since   
   they deflect everything by eternal doubt.   
      
   I just shrug my shoulders and let them be, eventually.   
      
   My point is that in theory, the external world, proven by our senses and   
   such simple experiments as asking your wife if she agrees that there is a   
   glass in front of you on the table, or seeing your two hands, could be   
   "disproven" by someone proving that in fact it is a simulation.   
      
   Do you see my point?   
      
      
   >>> So, the idea of the external world being non-existent is pretty much   
   >>> meaningless.   
   >>   
   >> This is an excellent argument in favour of the external world. Maybe   
   >> this will close the book for good on idealism. ;)   
   >   
   > I think something has fallen through the cracks. If we say we have a   
   > physical world because we keep bumping into it, that could mean only   
   > that we have encountered some rule which prevents us going further. But   
   > we have such rules in mathematics, e.g. you cannot divide zero by zero.   
      
   When it comes to the frontiers beyond the limits of science or empiricism,   
   we must forever remain agnostic. It makes no sense to assign truth values   
   to phenomena which we can never verify or falsify. That is why I deny   
   epistemic closure when the implication are things outside of this world.   
      
   Yes, I am of the opinion that my senses have proven 100% that the external   
   world exists. Yes, should someone come up with a proof of simulation, I   
   will change my mind, if I can undersand the proof. No one has done this in   
   2500 years of philosophy and I am pretty certain no one will.   
      
   And finally, there is a limit beyond which science cannot take us, we must   
   forever remain agnostic about that, such as possibly, the ultimate, low   
   level substrate of reality.   
      
   > What does 'external world' or 'physical' world actually mean? is it   
   > about substance, matter, etc. But if we keep chopping things in half we   
   > end up with something which is not substance or matter, we end up with   
   > strange things like two dimentional entities, or numbers, or massless   
   > points. That's not what I was expecting, I was expecting something which   
   > was solid and could not be divided further. But why can't the external   
   > world be maths?  Why assume it has to be something else?   
      
   Apologies. My choice of term materialist (if I used it here, I'm mixing up   
   this conversation with one on a mailing list that is about 10x longer) is   
   a bad one. Let's say physicalist, and I include in the external world, all   
   that science can reach. Beyond that, I remain agnostic, and deny epistemic   
   closure, logical bivalence and other such things. I accept them, when   
   related to empirical tests and evidence, and when playing with symbols á   
   la math.   
      
   The world, in my opinion, cannot be math since math is a language and a   
   process. Without the mind there is no math. Math "happens" when the mind   
   processes information. That is also why quantum physics leads us astray.   
   We have formulas, they work, they generate data and predictions which we   
   can verify.   
      
   However... the error is made when we try to translate quantum physics into   
   ordinary everyday language. Our language is not designed to handle things   
   and ideas which go beyond our space/time, and that is why you get empty   
   speculation (or implication) such as MWI.   
      
   So for me, math is just a language and not something that exists in the   
   world. No one has ever empirically found the nr 1 or na integral in the   
   world. It only happens when we "compute".   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)