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|    alt.philosophy    |    Didn't Freud have sex with his mother?    |    170,335 messages    |
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|    Message 170,074 of 170,335    |
|    D to Richmond    |
|    Re: Where am "I"? (1/3)    |
|    09 Apr 25 22:11:06    |
      From: nospam@example.net              On Sun, 6 Apr 2025, Richmond wrote:              >>>> I disagree. Because it implies no certainty, no truth, and no other       >>>> consciousness who can partake of the story, so everything, assuming       >>>> the strictest solipsism becomes meaningless.       >>>       >>> According to that definition, dreams are meaningless. But I think       >>> dreams are meaningful. They are at least meaningful to the dreamer.       >>       >> Why would dreams be meaningless?       >       > Because in a dream there is "no certainty, no truth, and no other       > consciousness who can partake of the story". So it is in that sense like       > your definition of solipsism up there. But I am disputing it because       > dreams are actually meaningful. And so can solipsism be meaningful.              No, there is a difference. Dreams have a "connection" to the waking world. Our       waking experience influeces our dreams, and our dreams can influence our waking       experience. That is why they can have meaning. They also have a function, so       from a descriptive point of view they are valuable.              Solipsism, the position of doubting everything, including ones self, becomes       meaningless, because there is no truth, so there is no ground for any       discussion.              I had a fun discussion about what might "jar" the solipsist in an email thread,       see my previous post for some interesting thoughts on the subject.              >> We have correlations between dreaming and memory formation for       >> instance. The reason for that, is that dreams is a process in the       >> physical world, we can track their effects on the brain and the       >> organism. This is not the same as solipsism. I think I am       >> misunderstand you here.       >       > Or maybe I misunderstand you. But anyway, I don't think you can       > understand a dream from its effects on the brain.              Depends on what you mean with understanding. Why have evidence for the function       of dreaming. Dreaming can assist in problem solving, and they do correspond       with       the previous days emotional state about 50% of the time.              We do not understand everything about dreams, but we understand a lot more than       in the days of Freud.              >>> OK you can have a burden of proof in philosophy. But generally it       >>> rests on the person who made the positive statement. The statement       >>> "sense evidence is a source of knowledge" is a positive statement.       >>       >> I think that's a gross simplification, that leads to infinite       >> regression, which lands you into solipsism territory. If every       >> positive statement has the burden of proof, you'll end up with       >> something like this. The world exist, what's the proof? The senses see       >> the world. Ok, what's the proof? Well, things don't move when I close       >> my eyes, and other people agree wit hme. Ok, so what's the proof? You       >> see how this position eventually lands you into trouble?       >       > Only if you require proof of everything. But actually, making       > assumptions is quite normal. There is no reason you can't assume that       > sense evidence is a source of knowledge, without being able to prove       > it. But what you have done is said that it is problematic to manage       > without it and therefore someone else must prove it is false. How could       > someone prove than sense evidence is not a source of knowledge? by       > proving that no piece of knowledge was ever derived from sense evidence?              That is one way that has been tried by philosophers. Another way could be to       prove that we do in fact live in a simulation, so our sense experience was       entirely fabricated. Yet another way could be that we are just thoughts in gods       mind.              Basically, we live in the external world, X, and showing that something else       exists as the fundamental substratum of reality would effectively falsify X.              >> Now!       >>       >> As I have stated before, although not emphasized, is that we solve       >> this by making sure what we say is open to falsification!       >>       >> I already wrote how someone who denies that the world exist, since       >> that person denies the evidence of their senses, then has to falsify       >> the claim that the world exist.       >>       >> No one in 2500 years of philosophy, has been able to falsify the claim       >> that the external world exists, nor that what we see exists.       >       > How do you know?              Haha, true. ;) Maybe someone did and just didn't tell anyone. ;)              >> Until the falsification is made, the world does in fact exist, and the       >> proof is the senses.       >>       > No. The truth is the truth regardless of whether anyone proves it or       > disproves it. (Otherwise truth becomes subjective, or consensus truth).              And why are you against the consensus theory of truth? Are you a scientific       realist or anti-realist? If there is no consciousness in the universe, do you       still believe in the concept of truth? And if so, exactly _where_ in the world       does truth then exist?              Let me emphasize, that this is not me being difficult, this is me just trying       to       understand your position on these questions.              >> So if you can show me that, as per my earlier message, we live in a       >> simulation, that there in fact is an evil demon tricking us etc. I'll       >> happily agree! But no one has done it, so what we see, lacking proof       >> or falsification, is the truth.       >       > This is very odd. I can't prove it is a simulation, but you can't prove       > it isn't. So we don't really know. But we assume it isn't, because that       > is simpler.              So do you then assume gravity works, or do you know gravity works? I know, due       to the evidence of my senses that the external world exists, and that gravity       works. I don't need to assume that.              Now... if I make a bad interpretation of what my senses tell me, I acknowledge       my mistake, and update my model describing how the world works. I think that is       the most important point of my position, which means that I do not dogmatically       insist on the external world, if proof is presented to the contrary.              > But interestingly (to me anyway) is that for some things 'simulation'       > isn't meaningful, for example, simulating mathematics or logic would be       > the same as mathematics or logic. So if the universe is mathematical,       > then it is like a naturally occuring simulation. This idea of abstract       > being real is mad on the face of it, but quanta are just numbers...              My opinion is that QM is formulas we use to make testable predictions. It does       not commit us to any existence claims beyond that, and I doubt we will ever be       able to translate those formulas into meaningful ideas, expressed in ordinary       language, that tells us anything about how the world works beyond predictions       and verification and falsification.              >>> I don't know what it means to say "idealist is a real truth". I think       >>> solipsism means that only the mind is real. But that doesn't exclude       >>> the possibility of communicating with entities within the mind. To       >>> the subject, these entities could be as real as objectively real       >>> entities.       >>       >> No, actually solipsism means you even have to doubt your mind, since              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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