From: santepIab@arcor.de   
      
   B) Description of the model   
      
   I. Introduction   
      
   Global challenges and problems require global actions. The UN should be   
   the organization to manage them. To enable the UN to do so, three main   
   obstacles are to overcome.   
      
   1. Insufficient financial resources:   
   Important tasks often are postponed or stopped due to lack of funds.   
   Money arrives, if ever, after lengthy donor conferences. When people   
   have already starved, the money will be wasted to money-grubbers.   
   Financing shall be improved by higher assessed contributions, incentives   
   to pay fully and in time (e.g. weighted voting rights), and integration   
   of non-state partners in a New Global Fund with enough capital to   
   support other bodies and advance money just in time when it's needed.   
      
   2. Difficult decision-making and lack of authority:   
   Most UN organs lack authority. The Charter must be revised to enable   
   essential organs to make binding decisions and to impose sanctions if   
   necessary. Voting system must be changed to prevent abuse of authority.   
   A single person mustn't get too much power. In every system (included   
   democracy) sometimes people not committed to public welfare gain power.   
   (Even Adolf Hitler came to power through a democratic election.)   
   Organs to which the Assembly doesn't want to grant authority should be   
   checked if they can be closed.   
   The Security Council, the only body with considerable authority at the   
   moment, has been designed in a way that decisions can be blocked or   
   watered down due to permanent members' right of veto. And political or   
   financial pressure from strong and influential states on weak ones can   
   have the same effect, in the General Assembly as well. Therefore voting   
   rules should be changed to make it impossible to predict the result.   
   Nobody who wants to prevent or get through a decision shall know whom he   
   must put under pressure. This can be achieved by voting rights weighted   
   by a random factor. Such rules shall be introduced in every UN bodies.   
      
   3. Corruption:   
   Corruption seems to be a big problem in the UN (Sanjuan 2006: Die   
   UN-Gang). When more money comes, the problem will become even bigger.   
   Fighting corruption is essential. Therefore decisions shall be made by   
   several persons together, with voting rights fluctuating by a random factor.   
      
   If reforms cannot be carried out, a new attractive organization should   
   be founded to compete with and gradually substitute the UN.   
      
      
   II. Membership, responsibility and decision-making in important organs   
   to reform   
      
   Unable to decide, which of the numerous UN bodies should be kept,   
   reformed or shut down, I content myself to make some suggestions   
   regarding selected organs which could make further reforms possible.   
      
      
   1. General Assembly   
      
   Membership:   
   Every present member may remain. A minimum population defined by the   
   General Assembly (e.g.: 1 Million inhabitants) shall be required for new   
   members. Several states below this limit shall be allowed to get joined   
   membership, given they exceed the limit together. Ethnic groups having   
   neither a state of their own nor equal civil rights in their host   
   countries shall be able to become members, provided they can name   
   representatives supported by a majority and independent from other   
   members. A state or ethnic group which is under control of another one   
   and cannot make decisions shall not become a member. The General   
   Assembly shall decide about the admission to membership.   
      
   Voting and responsibility:   
   The General Assembly shall have the right to decide binding resolutions   
   and to impose sanctions. This shall apply to subjects handled by the   
   Security Council, too. In case of inconsistency with a decision of the   
   Security Council, the most up to date decision shall be valid until the   
   conflict is solved by a mediation committee or in a common session of GA   
   and SC.   
      
   The current principle one state one vote seems to be improper regarded   
   extreme different size of members. Moreover it's an incentive to   
   splitting states. Most of all the principle involves the danger that   
   rich and powerful members influence the vote putting pressure or   
   offering benefits to weak and tiny members. On the other hand heavy   
   weighting of population would lead to dominance of a few big countries   
   and could motivate dictators to increase their power by promoting insane   
   population growth. Therefore voting rights shall be weighted by   
   population to a very moderate extent.   
      
   Voting rights shall depend on fulfilling obligations, particularly   
   paying contributions and observing resolutions. In addition each   
   member's voting right shall fluctuate by a random factor to decrease the   
   influence of buying or extorting votes.   
      
   So the following procedure of weighting votes is proposed:   
      
   First: Every year voting rights are calculated for each member according   
   to a formula like this:   
      
   Voting right = cubic_root(Pop) * PaymentQuota * Compliance   
      
   with:   
       Pop = Population   
       PaymentQuota = Paid contributions divided by assessed contributions   
   [3 recent years]   
       Compliance = Degree of commitment to UN resolutions   
          [normally = 1,   
             may be decreased to 0 in steps of 0,1 by decision of Security   
   Council due to severe violations]   
      
   Second: After voting each member draws a random number to multiply with   
   the voting right:   
      
   Weighted Voting right = Voting right  * Random[range]   
      
   with:   
       Random = random number drawn after voting   
       range = defined range of random numbers   
      
   The range should be defined by the General Assembly on the   
   recommendation of experts. In the Assembly a broader range (compared to   
   the Security Council) should be chosen to enable sufficient fluctuations   
   despite big number of members.   
   preliminary proposed values:   
       lower limit = 0.2   
       upper limit = 5.0   
      
   Decisions on not binding resolutions shall be made by simple majority of   
   weighted votes.   
   Binding resolutions and sanctions shall be made by a two-thirds majority   
   of weighted votes.   
   When decisions are made on resolutions on military conflicts or crime   
   against humanity, members involved in the conflict (directly or   
   supporting) shall have no right to vote.   
   The election of members of the Security Council, the Economic and Social   
   Council and other bodies shall need two-thirds of weighted votes.   
   Admission of new members shall need two-thirds of weighted votes.   
   Expulsion of members shall need a majority of both two-thirds of   
   weighted votes and two-thirds of votes without weighting by random-factor.   
   The General Assembly shall be authorized to amend or revise the Charter   
   by a majority of both two-thirds of weighted votes and two-thirds of   
   votes without weighting by random-factor.   
      
      
   2. Security Council   
      
   Membership:   
   The Security Council should be enlarged moderately to, say, 24 members,   
   12 of them permanent, to both include a great part of the world and stay   
   able to act fast.   
      
   The non-permanent members shall be elected by the General Assembly. The   
      
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