From: noreply@mixmin.net   
      
   On Thu, 11 Jul 2024 00:29:32 +0200 (CEST), karl@bogus.net wrote:   
   >Why does this onion choice supposedly make Tor more secure?  If a Tor   
   >relay point can be compromised, cannot an onion relay also? Does not   
   >this onion double the work of having to keep check on two types of   
   >relays instead of only the Tor relay network?   
   >I don't understand the necessity of this onion thing.   
      
   The Tor Project website (https://www.torproject.org) is the best place   
   to start (but Windows 7/8 users will soon be looking for alternatives);   
   Omnimix is very well maintained, including its built-in customized Tor   
   feature, and it works great on common Windows versions (from XP to 11);   
   Omnimix' Tor also works as a proxy with most popular web browsers, e.g.   
      
   Firefox Browser v128.0 (64-bit):   
     Tools > Settings > General > Network Settings >   
     Settings... > Manual proxy configuration:   
     SOCKS Host: 127.0.0.1   
     Port: 9150   
     SOCKS v5   
     Proxy DNS when using SOCKS v5   
      
   Pale Moon v33.2 (64-bit):   
     Preferences > Advanced > Network > Connection >   
     Settings > Manual proxy configuration:   
     SOCKS Host: 127.0.0.1   
     Port: 9054   
     SOCKS v5   
      
   https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortor.htm   
   >OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor 	PreviousTopNext   
   >Tor is a real-time onion-routing system, which thereby allows anonymous   
   >Internet communication without any delay. That makes it useful to hide   
   >your identity especially while surfing the web or using other services,   
   >that aren't available by mail. But the lack of latency on the other   
   >hand substantially increases the chances for an adversary. So for   
   >anonymous mailing setting up a free email account through Tor is only   
   >the second best solution.   
   >Nevertheless OmniMix enables you to benefit from Tor with various kinds   
   >of communication, which require immediate response, e.g. the retrieval   
   >of remailer statistics or a stealthy Mixmaster packet delivery to entry   
   >remailers. The program is preconfigured to run its own Tor instance and   
   >use that for every Internet connection it establishes. You have to read   
   >the 'Configuration' chapter only when problems arise or in case you're   
   >interested in what's going on 'under the hood'.   
   >But there are further services provided by OmniMix based on Tor, which   
   >you can read about in the 'TorPlus' chapter. .../omom/tutortorplus.htm   
   >Configuration   
   https://www.danner-net.de/omom/tutortorconfig.htm   
   >OmniMix * Tutorial * Tor * Configuration  PreviousTopNext   
   >In order to hide your communication with the Mixmaster network, OmniMix   
   >has to bypass your ISP's mail server and connect directly to the entry   
   >remailer via the Tor network. Provided that Tor is installed on your   
   >system and running, activate the routing through Tor for the specific   
   >task by specifying the SOCKS protocol, which OmniMix has to use for the   
   >communication with Tor.   
   >E.g. to access the 'Anon Mail Host' by selecting SOCKS version 4, you   
   >have to enter the IP address of the remailer into the 'Host' field of   
   >the 'Anon Mail S(MTP)' tab, version 4a requires the host name, whereas   
   >with version 5 you have the choice. To access a hidden service, enter   
   >its name (ending with '.onion') as the remailer's host name. Since in   
   >this case Tor has to resolve a name, the protocol alternatives are only   
   >SOCKS version 4a and 5.   
   >Like Vidalia, the controller software that comes with Tor, OmniMix is   
   >capable of interacting with Tor in many ways, launching, remote   
   >controlling and shutting down the Tor instance it uses. That's what the   
   >options under the 'Tor' tab are designated for.   
   >There's always a risk that the Tor connections of different   
   >simultaneous tasks use the same routing up to the exit node, which may   
   >allow an adversary sitting there to figure out relations. Therefore,   
   >even if you already use Tor with your webbrowser, it's advisable to   
   >separate communication by running another instance for exclusive access   
   >by OmniMix, which is easy to achieve:   
   >At the 'Run' tab set the paths to Tor ('tor.exe') and its configuration   
   >file ('torrc'). With a 'Start' button click OmniMix launches that Tor   
   >executable and, with 'Autoconnect' at the 'Control' tab activated,   
   >establishes a connection with its control port. After clicking   
   >'Shutdown' OmniMix orders Tor to shut down, then closes the control   
   >port connection. To start and stop Tor automatically in conjunction   
   >with OmniMix itself activate 'Autostart' and 'Autoclose'.   
   >At least for your first experiments it can be wise to check the 'Tor   
   >Window' box, which opens a command window when starting Tor, showing   
   >the logged data and allowing to terminate the program by closing this   
   >window instead of having to end the 'tor.exe' process from within the   
   >Windows Task Manager. Finally when Tor runs and connects correctly   
   >uncheck the box to get rid of that window.   
   >With 'Check DNS' it's possible to recognize unsecure domain name   
   >resolutions, as it makes Tor generate a notice-level event for each   
   >connection to the SOCKS port, indicating whether the request uses a   
   >domain name or an IP address. Thereby it allows to detect the   
   >revelation of communication targets via unsecured DNS requests. If   
   >Tor gets an IP address it may have been resolved with a direct DNS   
   >server access bypassing the Tor gateway, which means that your target   
   >address has become public.   
   >A message like the following appearing in the Tor log therefore   
   >indicates, that everything is all right:   
   >17:01:25.062 650 NOTICE Your application (using socks5 to port 25)   
   >instructed Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if necessary.   
   >This is good.   
   >This option only takes effect with Tor instances newly launched by   
   >OmniMix.   
   >When Tor is started and a control port connection established the   
   >color of both Tor activity scales in the indicator field change from   
   >grey to yellow. If that doesn't happen first check whether a new   
   >'tor.exe' entry shows up in the Processes list of the Windows Task   
   >Manager. Furthermore look whether the paths to Tor and its   
   >configuration file are set correctly and whether SOCKS and control   
   >port through which Tor tries to communicate are available and not   
   >already occupied by another application.   
   >Setting 'Host', the address of the Tor instance, and 'Port', its   
   >SOCKS port, at the 'Config' tab is mandatory to allow OmniMix to   
   >route external connections with servers on the Internet through   
   >Tor's anonymizing SOCKS proxy service. The Tor SOCKS port number of   
   >the OmniMix system defaults to 9054, as 9050 and 9150 are usually   
   >occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor Browser. Shut   
   >down Tor before changing the port number.   
   >Using the 'Host' location from the 'Config' tab, the 'Port'   
   >parameter at the 'Control' tab is required to connect with Tor's   
   >control port in order to send commands and retrieve status data,   
   >which then are displayed at the 'Tor' list. The Tor control port   
   >number of the OmniMix system defaults to 9055, as 9051 and 9151 are   
   >usually occupied by a standard Tor installation resp. the Tor   
   >Browser. Shut down Tor before changing the port number.   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)