[continued from previous message]   
      
   >To protect Tor's control port from unauthorized access there are   
   >two authentication methods, both supported by OmniMix. Switching   
   >between them requires editing the 'torrc' configuration file   
   >manually.   
   >If you intend to control Tor from different computers, 'Password'   
   >authentication would be the right choice. At the 'ConTor' tab   
   >select 'Password' authentication and enter your password, e.g.   
   >'my_password'. Be aware, that leading and trailing spaces are   
   >relevant! Then at the command prompt within the Tor directory   
   >calculate the hash value for the chosen password with the command   
   >g:\Programs\OmniMix\tor>tor --hash-password my_password   
   >Oct 06 22:36:45.707 [notice] Tor v0.1.1.23. This is experimental   
   >software. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity.   
   >16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31   
   >Finally, to enable Tor to check, whether the sent password is   
   >correct, add the 'HashedControlPassword' option with the   
   >resulting hash code to the 'torrc' file   
   >HashedControlPassword   
   >16:56DDB73813D8F525606245C49111696B791B87D7DCEFF575083DB78D31   
   >The alternative to a constant password would be the 'Cookie'   
   >authentication method, where at each launch Tor generates a file   
   >named 'control_auth_cookie' anew within its data directory   
   >containing 32 random bytes. Those bytes then have to be read by   
   >the controller application in order to use them for   
   >authentication. That's why apart from the activation of that   
   >method by adding   
   >CookieAuthentication 1   
   >to the 'torrc' file, the location of this file has to be set by   
   >means of the 'Cookie' file selector.   
   >Cookie authentication, which usually is limited to local   
   >controllers, as it requires access to a file in Tor's data   
   >folder, is the default method when using the OmniMix system's   
   >Tor instance.   
   >There are further torrc parameters relevant for anonymity   
   >reasons:   
   >*MaxCircuitDirtiness  defines for how long (in seconds) Tor   
   >                      continues reusing a circuit for new   
   >                      connections.   
   >                      'MaxCircuitDirtiness 0' makes Tor set   
   >                      up a new route for every connection   
   >                      request.   
   >*NewCircuitPeriod     determines how often (in seconds) Tor   
   >                      retries making new circuits if current   
   >                      ones are dirty, which means already used.   
   >At the 'Command' tab you find all instruments to influence a running   
   >Tor instance, but for sending commands a connection to the control   
   >port of the respective Tor instance has to be established.   
   >At the 'Events' list select the data you want to be logged at the 'Tor'   
   >tab. If you're connected press 'Set' to transfer the new settings to   
   >Tor. With 'Off' no more data are listed. That's advisable in particular   
   >for the period you request certain data from Tor by selecting an item   
   >from the dropdown list and pressing the 'Info' button. Otherwise you'd   
   >get a mixture of Tor events and the specific data you requested.   
   >Once connected   
   >*Info    requests the information specified by the pulldown menu   
   >         adjacent to it.   
   >*NewNym  initiates the switch to a clean server circuit. This is a   
   >         secure way to use separate Tor circuits for different jobs   
   >         that are done one after another.   
   >The available 'Info' data are   
   >*Version           The version of the server's software, including the   
   >                   name of the software.   
   >*Config location   The path to Tor's configuration file 'torrc' on your   
   >                   disc.   
   >*Network Status    A short space-separated listing of all router   
   >                   identities.   
   >*Known Routers     A detailed listing of all routers known to Tor and   
   >                   their characteristics.   
   >*IP Address        The best guess at our external IP address.   
   >*Circuit Status    Information about the circuits built.   
   >*Stream Status     Information about the stream status.   
   >*Connection Status Information about the onion routing connection   
   >                   status.   
   >*Entry Guards      Listing of the currently chosen entry guards.   
   >A smart way to access the OmniMix system at home from throughout the   
   >Internet are Tor Hidden Services. You don't have to know the server's   
   >IP address and the communication is completely hidden and end-to-end   
   >encrypted, as it never leaves the Tor network.   
   >The 'Hidden' tab allows to attach four local server ports, which don't   
   >necessarily have to be offered by OmniMix, to the Tor network, making   
   >them available from the Internet.   
   >For each of the local services you intend to offer you just have to   
   >check the 'Active' box, enter the port number under which it has to be   
   >accessed from the Internet at 'Port Ext', the local IP address of your   
   >service at 'Address Int' and its local port number at 'Port Int'. To   
   >install the Hidden Service Tor finally has to be restarted. It now   
   >initializes the Hidden Service by creating an encryption key associated   
   >with a random .onion address, the future address of your Hidden Service.   
   >These credentials are stored in the files 'hostname' and 'private_key',   
   >located in the folder defined in the 'Hidden Svc Dir' field. You may   
   >backup them in a safe place.   
   >Instead of reading your Hidden Service's .onion address directly from   
   >the 'hostname' file you can also get it from the 'Data' tab. With a   
   >click on 'Update' OmniMix not only requests the Hidden Service's address,   
   >which you can copy to the clipboard by using the '*' button. It also   
   >tries to retrieve Tor's current SOCKS and control port number as well as,   
   >if available, the WAN IP address of Tor's host computer. By the way, the   
   >latter offers OmniMix a great opportunity to replace external DDNS   
   >services, which is explained in the 'TorIP' chapter.   
   >If you want to change the .onion address because you don't like the   
   >randomly created term, or you need a new one for a different task, press   
   >the '-' button next to the 'HS Address' field and restart Tor. But keep   
   >in mind, only backing up the files 'hostname' and 'private_key' from the   
   >Hidden Service directory before they are removed with a reset allows you   
   >to reactivate the old address some day.   
   [end quote]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)