XPost: alt.privacy.anon-server   
   From: noreply@mixmin.net   
      
   SEC3  wrote:   
      
   >On 7/10/24 18:29, karl@bogus.net wrote:   
   >> Why does this onion choice supposedly make Tor more secure?  If a Tor   
   >> relay point can be compromised, cannot an onion relay also? Does not   
   >> this onion double the work of having to keep check on two types of   
   >> relays instead of only the Tor relay network?   
   >>   
   >> I don't understand the necessity of this onion thing.   
   >   
   >It's a user's choice whether they want to inject their remailer message   
   >into the remailer network via a Tor hidden service like Mixmin's   
   >   
   >3fd6guyxldqnjaqtfzejnjvq6bj7ilv5u7g7ovbubhwoeqhc222zvrad.onion:25   
   >   
   >or whether they want to inject it directly via the SMTP server of the   
   >entry remailer, say fleegle.mixmin.net:25   
   >   
   >The former method hides your IP address from the the entry remailer.   
   >   
   >The later method reveals your IP address to the entry remailer.   
      
   Nope, that's wrong.  Your address is NEVER revealed!   
      
   Tor always hides the client's IP address.   
      
   What a .onion service does is to implement another anonymizing circuit   
   from the server to a rendezvous point with the end of the client's   
   circuit.  That provides anonymity to the server as well, which thereby   
   then offers a "hidden service".  For the client it additionally means,   
   that data no longer leave the Tor network on their way to the server, as   
   there no longer is an 3rd party exit node, which connects with the   
   server over the open Internet.   
      
   HTH   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)