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|    alt.privacy    |    Discussing privacy, laws, tinfoil hats    |    112,125 messages    |
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|    Message 110,694 of 112,125    |
|    D to J.O. Aho    |
|    Fw: Why can't you get on another vpn whe    |
|    08 Sep 24 13:57:52    |
      [continued from previous message]              >Normally Tor switches frequently its path through the network. When       >you choose a permanent destination X, you give away this advantage,       >which may have serious repercussions for your anonymity.       >You -> Tor -> VPN/SSH       >You can also route VPN/SSH services through Tor. That hides and       >secures your Internet activity from Tor exit nodes. Although you are       >exposed to VPN/SSH exit nodes, you at least get to choose them. If       >you're using VPN/SSHs in this way, you'll want to pay for them       >anonymously (cash in the mail [beware of your fingerprint and printer       >fingerprint], Liberty Reserve, well-laundered Bitcoin, etc).       >However, you can't readily do this without using virtual machines. And       >you'll need to use TCP mode for the VPNs (to route through Tor). In       >our experience, establishing VPN connections through Tor is chancy,       >and requires much tweaking.       >Even if you pay for them anonymously, you're making a bottleneck where       >all your traffic goes -- the VPN/SSH can build a profile of everything       >you do, and over time that will probably be really dangerous.       >You -> Tor -> Proxy       >You can also route proxy connections through Tor. That does not hide       >and secure your Internet activity from Tor exit nodes because the       >connection between the exit node to the proxy is not encrypted, not       >one, but two parties may log and manipulate your clear traffic now. If       >you're using proxies in this way, you'll want to pay for them       >anonymously (cash in the mail [beware of your fingerprint and printer       >fingerprint], Liberty Reserve, well-laundered Bitcoin, etc) or use       >free proxies.       >One way to do that is proxychains. Another way would be to use a       >Transparent Proxy and then either proxify (set proxy settings) or       >socksify (use helper applications to force your application to use a       >proxy) the programs you want to chain inside your Transparent Proxy       >client machine.       >You -> X -> Tor -> X       >No research whether this is technically possible. Remember that this       >is likely a very poor plan because [#You-Tor-X you -> Tor -> X] is       >already a really poor plan.       >You -> your own (local) VPN server -> Tor       >This is different from above. You do not have to pay a VPN provider       >here as you host your own local VPN server. This won't protect you       >from your ISP of seeing you connect to Tor and this also won't       >protect you from spying Tor exit servers.       >This is done to enforce, that all your traffic routes through Tor       >without any leaks. Further read: TorVPN. If you want this, it may       >unnecessary to use VPN, a simple Tor-Gateway may be easier, for       >example Whonix.       >VPN/SSH Fingerprinting       >Using a VPN or SSH does not provide strong guarantees of hiding your       >the fact you are using Tor from your ISP. VPN's and SSH's are       >vulnerable to an attack called Website traffic fingerprinting ^1^. Very       >briefly, it's a passive eavesdropping attack, although the adversary       >only watches encrypted traffic from the VPN or SSH, the adversary can       >still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have       >specific traffic patterns. The content of the transmission is still       >hidden, but to which website one connects to isn't secret anymore.       >There are multiple research papers on that topic. ^2^ Once the premise       >is accepted, that VPN's and SSH's can leak which website one is       >visiting with a high accuracy, it's not difficult to imagine, that       >also encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN's or SSH's could be       >classified. There are no research papers on that topic.       >What about Proxy Fingerprinting? It has been said above already, that       >connections to proxies are not encrypted, therefore this attack isn't       >even required against proxies, since proxies can not hide the fact,       >you're using Tor anyway.       >,, ^1^ See Tor Browser Design for a general definition and       >introduction into Website traffic fingerprinting.       >^2^ See slides for Touching from a Distance: Website Fingerprinting       >Attacks and Defenses. There is also a research paper from those       >authors. Unfortunately, it's not free. However, you can find free ones       >using search engines. Good search terms include "Website Fingerprinting       >VPN". You'll find multiple research papers on that topic.       [end quote]              for windows 10/11, recommend using tor browser with default settings       and duckduckgo for search . . . but for windows 7/8, recommend using       omnimix tor with another browser e.g. pale moon, kmeleon etc., since       tor browser will no longer be supported after 1 october (next month);              while most websites will open in tor browser, including "google.com",       some websites will not, so using the most current windows 11 firefox,       edge or other "mainstream" browser is recommended; test your browser:              (using Tor Browser 13.5.3)       https://duckduckgo.com/?q=browser+fingerprint+test       >...       >https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/       >Test your browser to see how well you are protected from tracking and       >fingerprinting:       >TEST YOUR BROWSER       >https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/kcarter?aat=1       >Test with a real tracking company ?       >Our tests indicate that you have strong protection against Web tracking.       >...       >How does tracking technology follow your trail around the web, even if       >you've taken protective measures? Cover Your Tracks shows you how trackers       >see your browser. It provides you with an overview of your browser's most       >unique and identifying characteristics.       >Only anonymous data will be collected through this site.       >Want to learn more about tracking? Read how it works with our guide:       >LEARN MORE ABOUT FINGERPRINTING       >https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn       >...       (cf. any browser using Omnimix' built-in Tor)       >Our tests indicate that you have strong protection against Web tracking.       >...       (cf. any browser not using Tor)       >Our tests indicate that you are not protected against tracking on the Web.       [end quote]              (using Tor Browser 13.5.3)       https://check.torproject.org/       >Congratulations. This browser is configured to use Tor.       >Your IP address appears to be: ###.###.###.###       >...       (cf. any browser using Omnimix' built-in Tor)       >Congratulations. This browser is configured to use Tor.       >Your IP address appears to be: ###.###.###.###       >However, it does not appear to be Tor Browser.       >Click here to go to the download page       >https://www.torproject.org/download/       >...       (cf. any browser not using Tor)       >Sorry. You are not using Tor.       >Your IP address appears to be: ###.###.###.###       [end quote]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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