From: noreply@dirge.harmsk.com   
      
   (quoting links recently posted in )   
      
   (using Tor Browser 14.5.2)   
   https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684   
   >Deanonymizing Tor hidden service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis   
   >Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad   
   Authors Info   
   >& Claims   
   >Volume 89, Issue C   
   >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684   
   >Published: 01 February 2020 Publication History   
   >ACM Digital Library   
   >Abstract   
   >With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously   
   seeking   
   >privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to   
   provide   
   >anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity   
   model,   
   >Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means historical pieces   
   of   
   >information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting publicly   
   available   
   >information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor hidden   
   services could   
   >lead to deanonymization of these services¢ users. Such linking is possible by   
   finding   
   >at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly   
   declared   
   >Bitcoin addresses.   
   >To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we carried   
   out a   
   >real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled   
   1.5K hidden   
   >services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then   
   crawled 5B   
   >tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique   
   Bitcoin   
   >addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online   
   identity along   
   >with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the   
   Blockchain,   
   >we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 hidden services, including   
   sensitive ones,   
   >such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in   
   detail to   
   >demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users anonymity. In   
   >particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered   
   exploitable, as they   
   >can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important   
   for Tor   
   >hidden service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.   
   >References   
   >...   
   [end quoted excerpt]   
      
   (using Tor Browser 14.5.2)   
   https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3589335.3651487   
   >Deanonymizing Transactions Originating from Monero Tor Hidden Service Nodes   
   >Authors: Ruisheng Shi, Yulian Ge, Lina Lan, Zhiyuan Peng, Shenwen Lin, Lin Li   
   Authors   
   >Info & Claims   
   >WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024   
   >Pages 678 - 681   
   >https://doi.org/10.1145/3589335.3651487   
   >Published: 13 May 2024 Publication History   
   >Get Access   
   >WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024   
   >Deanonymizing Transactions Originating from Monero Tor Hidden Service Nodes   
   >Pages 678 - 681   
   >ACM Digital Library   
   >Abstract   
   >Monero is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency that incorporates anonymity   
   networks (such   
   >as Tor and I2P) and deploys the Dandelion++ protocol to prevent malicious   
   attackers   
   >from linking transactions with their source IPs. However, this paper   
   highlights a   
   >vulnerability in Monero's integration of the Tor network, which allows an   
   attacker to   
   >successfully deanonymize transactions originating from Monero Tor hidden   
   service nodes   
   >at the network-layer level.   
   >Our approach involves injecting malicious Monero Tor hidden service nodes   
   into the   
   >Monero P2P network to correlate the onion addresses of incoming Monero Tor   
   hidden   
   >service peers with their originating transactions. And by sending a signal   
   watermark   
   >embedded with the onion address to the Tor circuit, we establish a   
   correlation between   
   >the onion address and IP address of a Monero Tor hidden service node.   
   Ultimately, we   
   >correlate transactions and IPs of Monero Tor hidden service nodes.   
   >Through experimentation on the Monero testnet, we provide empirical evidence   
   of the   
   >effectiveness of our approach in successfully deanonymizing transactions   
   originating   
   >from Monero Tor hidden service nodes.   
   >Supplemental Material   
   >MP4 File   
   >Supplemental video   
   > Download   7.23 MB   
   >  https://dl.acm.org/doi/suppl/10.1145/3589335.3651487/suppl_file/shp4046.mp4   
   >References   
   >...   
   [end quoted excerpt]   
      
   p.s.  the best advice i've ever read about big money is to "avoid not evade"   
      
   --- SoupGate-DOS v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)