From: stefan@mailchuck.com
D wrote:
>
> (quoting links recently posted in )
>
> (using Tor Browser 14.5.2)
> https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684
> > Deanonymizing Tor hidden service users through Bitcoin transactions
analysis
> > Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad
Authors Info
> > & Claims
> > Volume 89, Issue C
> > https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684
> > Published: 01 February 2020 Publication History
> > ACM Digital Library
> > Abstract
> > With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are
continuously seeking
> > privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to
provide
> > anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its
pseudonymity model,
> > Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means historical
pieces of
> > information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting
publicly available
> > information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor hidden
services could
> > lead to deanonymization of these services? users. Such linking is possible
by finding
> > at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their
publicly declared
> > Bitcoin addresses.
> > To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we
carried out a
> > real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled
1.5K hidden
> > services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then
crawled 5B
> > tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique
Bitcoin
> > addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online
identity along
> > with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the
Blockchain,
> > we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 hidden services, including
sensitive ones,
> > such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in
detail to
> > demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users
anonymity. In
> > particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered
exploitable, as they
> > can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially
important for Tor
> > hidden service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.
> > References
> > ...
> [end quoted excerpt]
>
> (using Tor Browser 14.5.2)
> https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3589335.3651487
> > Deanonymizing Transactions Originating from Monero Tor Hidden Service Nodes
> > Authors: Ruisheng Shi, Yulian Ge, Lina Lan, Zhiyuan Peng, Shenwen Lin, Lin
Li Authors
> > Info & Claims
> > WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024
> > Pages 678 - 681
> > https://doi.org/10.1145/3589335.3651487
> > Published: 13 May 2024 Publication History
> > Get Access
> > WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024
> > Deanonymizing Transactions Originating from Monero Tor Hidden Service Nodes
> > Pages 678 - 681
> > ACM Digital Library
> > Abstract
> > Monero is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency that incorporates anonymity
networks (such
> > as Tor and I2P) and deploys the Dandelion++ protocol to prevent malicious
attackers
> > from linking transactions with their source IPs. However, this paper
highlights a
> > vulnerability in Monero's integration of the Tor network, which allows an
attacker to
> > successfully deanonymize transactions originating from Monero Tor hidden
service nodes
> > at the network-layer level.
> > Our approach involves injecting malicious Monero Tor hidden service nodes
into the
> > Monero P2P network to correlate the onion addresses of incoming Monero Tor
hidden
> > service peers with their originating transactions. And by sending a signal
watermark
> > embedded with the onion address to the Tor circuit, we establish a
correlation between
> > the onion address and IP address of a Monero Tor hidden service node.
Ultimately, we
> > correlate transactions and IPs of Monero Tor hidden service nodes.
> > Through experimentation on the Monero testnet, we provide empirical
evidence of the
> > effectiveness of our approach in successfully deanonymizing transactions
originating
> > from Monero Tor hidden service nodes.
> > Supplemental Material
> > MP4 File
> > Supplemental video
> > Download 7.23 MB
> > https://dl.acm.org/doi/suppl/10.1145/3589335.3651487/suppl_
ile/shp4046.mp4
> > References
> > ...
> [end quoted excerpt]
>
> p.s. the best advice i've ever read about big money is to "avoid not evade"
>
That's why people are using Monero with the Nym Mixnet, dummie.
https://nym.com/blog/new-mixnet-integration-nym-for-monero
Or Bitcoin Mixers, which the FBI don't like.
Regards
Stefan
--- SoupGate-DOS v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
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