XPost: alt.privacy.anon-server, sci.crypt   
   From: virebent@tcpreset.invalid   
      
   Anonymous wrote:   
   > Stefan Claas :   
   >   
   >> Identification through Uniqueness: If you use a non-standard number of   
   >> hops (e.g., 7 or 9), you become an easier target for deanonymization.   
   >> You stand out from the vast majority of Tor users who stick to the   
   >> default 3 hops. This "fingerprinting" by circuit length could actually   
   >> reduce your anonymity by making you unique.   
   >   
   > Show us how to extract the number of hops from Tor packets.   
   >   
   > Otherwise FOAD!   
   >   
   You cannot directly determine the number of hop from a single Tor packet -   
   this would be a fundamental design flaw that would completely break Tor's   
   anonymity.   
   All Tor cells are exactly 512 bytes with encrypted layers. No hop counter, no   
   circuit length indicators, no visible packet structure differences between   
   3-hop vs 7-hop circuits.   
      
   Bottom line: Extended circuits don't leak hop counts through packets, but they   
   make you statistically unique through timing patterns and construction   
   behavior.   
      
   *You all could at least do your damn homework instead of parroting Uncle Sam   
   like good little data slaves*.   
      
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   ww2ayGtfpO8w8XnBM7SAQ==   
      
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    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)