XPost: alt.privacy.anon-server, misc.test   
   From: victor@virebent.tcpreset   
      
   SEC3 wrote:> Pretty neat: https://aliceandbob.io/   
   >   
   > This post is exclusively about the online version of aliceandbob.io:   
      
   I've just completed a security review of the Alice & Bob Go implementation   
   (https://github.com/aliceandbob-io/aliceandbob ) and must raise a serious red   
   flag: there is no runtime protection for private keys in memory.   
      
   Unlike hardened implementations, like the one written by myself   
   (e.g., https://github.com/gabrix73/Nofuture-Go-Memguard ),   
      
   https://safecomms.virebent.art/   
      
   which use memory locking, anti-dump measures, ptrace restrictions, and   
   defense-in-depth against local root compromise, Alice & Bob's code:   
      
   Stores private keys in regular Go heap memory (subject to GC, swapping, core   
   dumps).   
      
   Does not lock pages with mlock or equivalent.   
      
   Does not disable core dumps or restrict /proc//mem access.   
      
   Does not prevent debugging or memory scraping via gcore, ptrace, or forensic   
   tools.   
      
   Assumes a trusted local environment, a dangerous assumption in 2024.   
      
   This means: if an attacker gains local access (even non-root in some cases, or   
   root via escalation), they can trivially extract private keys from memory,   
   complete identity theft with zero resistance.   
      
   Gabx   
      
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