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|    alt.survival    |    Discussing survivalism for end-times    |    131,158 messages    |
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|    Message 130,578 of 131,158    |
|    Dark Brandon to Jan Panteltje    |
|    Re: A power engineer on the Iberian grid    |
|    02 May 25 09:42:20    |
      XPost: misc.survivalism, alt.conspiracy       From: DB@cocks.net              On 5/1/2025 11:34 PM, Jan Panteltje wrote:       >> Story by Capell Aris The Telegraph       >>       >> Last Monday, the Iberian grid suffered a disturbance in the south-west       >> at 12:33. In 3.5 seconds this worsened and the interconnection to France       >> disconnected. All renewable generation then went off-line, followed by       >> disconnection of all rotating generation plant. The Iberian blackout was       >> complete within a few seconds.       >>       >> At the time the grid was producing 28.4 GW of power, of which 79 per       >> cent was solar and wind. This was a problematic situation as solar and       >> wind plants have another, not widely known, downside – one quite apart       >>from their intermittency and expense.       >>       >> This is the fact that they do not supply any inertia to the grid.       >> Thermal powerplants – coal, gas, nuclear, for example – drive large       >> spinning generators which are directly, synchronously connected to the       >> grid. If there are changes which cause a difference between demand and       >> supply, the generators will start to spin faster or slower: but their       >> inertia resists this process, meaning that the frequency of the       >> alternating current in the grid changes only slowly. There is time for       >> the grid managers to act, matching supply to demand and keeping the grid       >> frequency within limits.       >>       >> This is vital because all grids must supply power at a steady frequency       >> so that electrical appliances work properly and safely. Deviations from       >> the standard grid frequency can cause damage to equipment and other       >> problems: in practice what happens quite rapidly when frequency changes       >> significantly is that grid machinery trips out to prevent these issues       >> and grids go down.       >>       >> When a grid has very little inertia in it – as with the Iberian one on       >> Monday – a problem which a high-inertia grid would easily resist can       >> cause a blackout within seconds. Lack of inertia was almost certainly       >> the primary cause of the Iberian blackout, as Matt Oliver has opined in       >> these pages. A grid with more inertia would not have collapsed as       >> quickly, and its operators would have had time to keep it up and running.       >>       >> Restoration of supplies was completed by early Tuesday morning, based on       >> reconnection to France, which facilitated progressive area reconnections       >> across Spain and Portugal.       >>       >> Iberia is part of the Continental Europe Synchronous Area which       >> stretches to 32 countries. It is interconnected as a phase-locked, 50 Hz       >> grid with a generation capacity of 700 GW. To improve the stability of       >> this grid, the EU aim is that all partners will extract 10 per cent of       >> their power consumption from synchronous interconnectors – ones which       >> transmit grid inertia – helping to make the whole system more resilient.       >> France is at 10 per cent, but peninsula grids and those at the       >> geographical fringe are the least interconnected. Spain has just 2 per       >> cent from synchronous interconnectors.       >>       >> But there are places where things are worse. The UK and Ireland are       >> island grids. They do have undersea power interconnectors to Europe but       >> these are non-synchronous DC links and transmit no grid inertia. There’s       >> little prospect that this will change.       >>       >> Both the Irish and UK grid system operators had developed an array of       >> grid protection services that can control grid frequency, loss of load       >> or generation protection, grid phase angle and recovering from grid       >> outages. Neither country has, to date, ever experienced a total system       >> failure, even during WWII.       >>       >> In 1974 construction started on Dinorwig Power Station. It is a pumped       >> storage generation plant designed specifically for the provision of all       >> the UK’s grid protection services. Dinorwig can make huge changes to its       >> output in a matter of seconds, compensating for sudden events. Operation       >> began in 1984. In 1990 all the UK’s generating stations could provide       >> inertia.       >>       >> Nowadays, 55 per cent of our generation mix (wind, solar, DC imports)       >> cannot supply inertia to the grid. Are we approaching a system that       >> compares with Spain and Portugal on Monday?       >>       >> It certainly looks that way. In 2012 the National Grid produced a solar       >> briefing note for the government which is still available online. In       >> that note they imagine a system that has 22 GW of solar power attached       >> to the grid. They demonstrate their concerns based on a sunny summer day       >> when demand is low. The sun rises at 5 o’clock when little or no       >> synchronous plant other than nuclear generation will be on line and at       >> midday, solar is 60 per cent of all generation. The Grid’s engineers       >> then considered that situation “difficult to manage” and concluded that       >> wind+solar power must never exceed 60 per cent of generation.       >>       >> We now have 17.7 GW of grid-connected solar farms to which we must add       >> all rooftop solar installations. At midday on Tuesday according to       >> Gridwatch the UK’s asynchronous, no-inertia generation was at 66 per       >> cent of total generation.       >>       >> In 2014 National Grid produced a System Operability Framework document.       >> Their objective was to outline how future scenarios of generation mixes       >> would impact upon protection services for the grid. As more and more       >> renewable generators are brought on-line, the difficulties of managing       >> the grid have become more and more onerous. For example, one service       >> titled “primary response” in 1990 called for selected generation plants       >> to increase generation within 10 seconds after a fault is detected: by       >> 1,200 MW in winter and 1,500 MW in summer. In 2024 these increases are       >> required in 1.2 seconds!       >>       >> After nearly 50 years of operation, Dinorwig Power Station is currently       >> shut down for major repairs and there has been no information on when it       >> will re-open. Over the next five years all of our nuclear stations, bar       >> Sizewell, will be closed. Over the same period our combined cycle gas       >> generator fleet will halve from 30 GW to 15 GW. (It takes 5 years to       >> build a new CCGT even using an existing site. The new ones are 66 per       >> cent efficient and cost less than £1 billion to build a 1 GW plant – one       >> third the cost of an offshore windmill.)       >>       >> We will lose huge amounts of grid inertia. Low-inertia operation will       >> become routine. It is hard to imagine that we won’t start to suffer              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-DOS v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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