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|    az.politics    |    Arizona politics    |    3,152 messages    |
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|    Message 1,447 of 3,152    |
|    Rudy Canoza to All    |
|    Rethinking Birthright Citizenship (3/4)    |
|    14 Jan 18 09:54:49    |
      [continued from previous message]              it meant, fundamentally, was that foreign nationals could secure       American citizenship for their children merely by giving birth on       American soil, whether or not their arrival on America’s shores was       legal or illegal, temporary or permanent.              Justice Gray stated that the children of only two classes of foreigner       nationals were not entitled to the birthright citizenship he thought       guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.              First, as noted above, were the children of ambassadors and other       foreign diplomats who, as the result of the fiction of       extraterritoriality, were not even considered subject to the territorial       jurisdiction of the United States.              Second were the children of members of invading armies who were born on       U.S. soil while it was occupied by the foreign army. But apart from       these two narrow exceptions, all children of foreign nationals who       managed to be born on U.S. soil were, in Justice Gray’s formulation,       citizens of the United States. Children born of parents who had been       offered permanent residence but were not yet citizens, and who as a       result had not yet renounced their allegiance to their prior sovereign,       would become citizens by birth on U.S. soil. This was true even if, as       was the case in Wong Kim Ark itself, the parents were, by treaty, unable       ever to become citizens.              Children of parents residing only temporarily in the United States on a       student or work visa would also become U.S. citizens. Children of       parents who had overstayed their temporary visas would likewise become       U.S. citizens, even though born of parents who were now in the United       States illegally. And, perhaps most troubling from the “consent”       rationale, even children of parents who never were in the United States       legally would become citizens as the direct result of the illegal action       by their parents. This would be true even if the parents were nationals       of a regime at war with the United States and even if the parents were       here to commit acts of sabotage against the United States, at least as       long as the sabotage did not actually involve occupying a portion of the       territory of the United States. The notion that the framers of the       Fourteenth Amendment, when seeking to guarantee the right of       citizenship to former slaves, also sought to guarantee citizenship to       the children of enemies of the United States who were in its territory       illegally is simply too absurd to be a credible interpretation of the       Citizenship Clause.              Although hard to sustain under the broad language used by Justice Gray,       the actual holding of Wong Kim Ark is actually much more narrow, and the       case need not be read so expansively as to produce such absurd results.       Because of the Chinese Exclusion Acts,[25] Wong Kim Ark’s parents were       ineligible for citizenship even if they had renounced their Chinese       citizenship and subjected themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of       the United States. As such, Wong Kim Ark arguably would have been       entitled to citizenship because, like his parents, he would in fact have       been “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the       complete, allegiance-obliging sense intended by the phrase.[26]              This is not to say that Congress could not, pursuant to its       naturalization power, choose to grant citizenship to the children of       foreign nationals.[27] But thus far it has not done so. Instead, the       language of the current naturalization statute simply tracks the       minimum constitutional guarantee— anyone “born in the United States, and       subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen.[28] Indeed, Congress       has by its own actions with respect to Native Americans—both before and       after this Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark—rejected the claim that the       Citizenship Clause itself confers citizenship merely by accident of       birth.[29] None of these citizenship acts would have been       necessary—indeed, all would have been redundant— under the expansive       view of the Citizenship Clause propounded by Justice Gray.              A Citizenship of Consent, not Feudal Allegiance              Once one considers the full import of Justice Gray’s language in Wong       Kim Ark, it becomes clear that his proposition is simply incompatible       not only with the text of the Citizenship Clause, but with the political       theory of the American Founding as well.              At its core, as articulated by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of       Independence, that political theory posits the following: Governments       are instituted among particular peoples, comprised of naturally equal       human beings, to secure for themselves certain unalienable rights. Such       governments, in order to be legitimate, must be grounded in the consent       of the governed—a necessary corollary to the self-evident proposition       of equality.[30] This consent must be present, either explicitly or       tacitly, not just in the formation of the government, but also in the       ongoing decision whether to embrace others within the social compact of       the particular people. As formulated in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights       of 1780:              The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of       government, is to secure the existence of the body-politic, to protect       it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of       enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural rights…. The       body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is       a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen       and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by       certain laws for the common good.[31]              Thus, as Professor Edward Erler has noted:              [T]he social contract requires reciprocal consent. Not only must the       individual consent to be governed, but he must also be accepted by the       community as a whole. If all persons born within the geographical limits       of the United States are to be counted citizens—even those whose parents       are in the United States illegally— then this would be tantamount to the       conferral of citizenship without the consent of “the whole people.”[32]              In other words, birthright citizenship is contrary to the principle of       consent that is one of the bedrock principles of the American regime.              Such a claim of birthright citizenship traces its roots not to the       republicanism of the American Founding, grounded as it was in the       consent of the governed, but to the feudalism of medieval England,       grounded in the notion that a subject owed perpetual allegiance and       fealty to his sovereign.[33] A necessary corollary of the feudal notion       of citizenship was the ban on expatriation, embraced by England and       described by Blackstone as follows:              Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king’s       dominions immediately upon their birth. For, immediately upon their       birth, they are under the king’s protection…. Natural allegiance is       therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, canceled, or       altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance…. For it is a       principle of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one prince       cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another,       put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former: for this       natural allegiance was intrinsic, and primitive, and antecedent to the       other, and cannot be divested without the concurrence act of that prince       to whom it was first due.[34]              Thus, when Congress passed as a companion to the Fourteenth Amendment              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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