From: Some@Guy.com   
      
   JF Mezei wrote:   
      
   > For all I know, GardaLey can simply be monitory the list of peers   
   > that the tracker feeds it.  Yes, this means it can see % of file   
   > that a peer currently has. And yes, it can likely see whether a   
   > peer is accepting connections or if it is "chocked".   
      
   All of that is sufficient to establish that every IP participating in   
   that torrent is violating the rights of the owner of the work - as long   
   as the torrent does indeed constitute a copy of the work.   
      
   At that point, it doesn't matter how much of the work is uploaded to or   
   downloaded from any particular IP that is participating in the torrent.   
      
   > Finding over 4000 IP addresses who downloaded unknown/undesirable   
   > movies in a period of a month ?   
      
   The system is broken and needs to be fixed.   
      
   When a rights-holder finds a copy of their work on a file-locker, they   
   request that the work be taken down, and if it's taken down then that's   
   the end of the situation.   
      
   When a rights-holder finds a copy of their work on an active torrent,   
   they should be able to:   
      
   a) contacting the individual ISP's in question in "real time" and give   
   them their evidence and details of the torrent and compel the ISP to   
   disrupt / throttle / deactivate the internet connection of the customer   
   for a short period of time (6 to 24 hours) and send an e-mail to   
   what-ever e-mail address the ISP has on file for that customer   
   explaining what is going on and why, and that their connection will be   
   restored after the time-period is over, and that no further action will   
   be taken, and their identity will not be revealed to the rights-holder.   
      
   OR   
      
   b) do no real-time intervention, but impliment a "6-strikes" policy   
   against the customer (as as been implimented in the US).  Again, their   
   identity will not be revealed to the rights holder.   
      
   > > Poisoning a torrent has immediate effect in accomplishing relief   
   > > against financial loss without the costs associated with court   
   > > proceedings.   
   >   
   > You can't poison an existing torrent because there are checksums   
   > in each part.   
      
   I was under the impression that the individual parts or segments can be   
   composed of random data, and be constructed such that they have the   
   desired checksum, and these parts could be injected into the torrent by   
   the agent (Canipre).   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)