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|    can.legal    |    Debating Canuck legal system quirks    |    10,932 messages    |
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|    Message 10,474 of 10,932    |
|    John KingofthePaupers Turmel to All    |
|    TURMEL: Challenge to medpot patients per    |
|    01 Oct 18 07:31:08    |
   
   From: johnturmel@gmail.com   
      
    File No: _________   
    FEDERAL COURT   
   Between:   
    LIMITS ON PATIENTS PER GROWER & SITE   
    Plaintiff   
    AND   
    Her Majesty The Queen   
    Defendant   
    STATEMENT OF CLAIM   
    (Pursuant to S.48 of the Federal Court Act)   
      
   1. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the limits on   
   patient licenses per grower in Section 184(b) and licenses   
   per site in Section 184(c) of the Access to Cannabis for   
   Medical Purposes Regulations ("ACMPR") unconstitutionally   
   violate the S.7 Charter Right to Life, Liberty, Security of   
   cannabis-using patients not in accordance with principles of   
   fundamental justice to not be arbitrary, grossly   
   disproportional, conscience-shocking, incompetent,   
   malevolent and contemptuous of the courts.   
      
   PARTIES   
      
   2. The Plaintiff is a person Possessing ACMPR Authorization   
      
   MCR-___________ to produce cannabis.   
      
   3. The Defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,   
   as represented by the Attorney General of Canada, is named   
   as the representative of the Federal Government of Canada   
   and the Minister of Health for Canada who is the Minister   
   responsible for Health Canada and certain aspects of the   
   Controlled Drugs and Substances Act including the Narcotic   
   Control Regulations and the ACMPR.   
      
   BACKGROUND   
      
   HITZIG V. HMTQ   
      
   4. On Oct 7 2003 in Hitzig v. HMQ, the Ontario Court of   
   Appeal struck down the 1 patient per grower cap in MMAR   
   Section 41 and the 3 licenses per site cap in Section 54   
   which had unconstitutionally limited supply to the extent   
   the exemption was ruled illusory.   
      
   5. On Dec 10 2003, only 2 months later, Health Canada re-   
   imposed the same 1 patient per grower and 3 licenses per   
   site caps that had been declared unconstitutional in Hitzig.   
      
   SFETKOPOULOS V. CANADA [2008]   
      
   6. On Jan 10 2008, the Federal Court in Sfetkopoulos v. Canada   
   once again struck down the re-imposed cap of 1 patient per   
   grower as unconstitutionally limiting after patients   
   had suffered another 5 years.   
      
   R. V. BEREN [2009]   
      
   7. On Feb 2 2009, in R. v. Beren, the B.C. Superior Court   
   once again struck down the re-imposed the S.54 cap of 3   
   licenses per site as unconstitutionally limiting after   
   patients had suffered another 6 more years. Justice   
   Koenigsberg stated:   
      
    [126] The trial decision of Sfetkopoulos concluded the   
    impugned provisions were not in accordance with the   
    principles of fundamental justice and violated the   
    applicant's S.7 rights to liberty and security of the   
    person, found at paragraphs 19-21:   
      
    19. Consequently, I have concluded that the   
    restraint on access which paragraph 41(b.1)   
    provides is not in accordance with the principles   
    of fundamental justice. First, it does not   
    adequately respond to the concerns motivating the   
    Ontario Court of Appeal judgment in Hitzig: that is   
    it leaves those ATP holders who cannot grow for   
    themselves and who cannot engage a designated   
    producer because of the restrictions imposed on the   
    latter by the MMAR, to seek marihuana in the black   
    market. The Ontario Court of Appeal said that this   
    is contrary to the rule of law, to pressure a   
    citizen to break the law in order to have access to   
    something he medically requires. The only factor   
    which has changed since the Hitzig case arose is   
    the advent of PPS as a licensed dealer. The   
    Minister argues that any ATP holder, who cannot   
    grow for himself or cannot find a designated   
    producer prepared to dedicate himself solely to   
    that ATP holder, may obtain his dried marihuana or   
    seed from a government contractor, namely PPS. That   
    certainly does provide an alternative avenue of   
    access. But the evidence shows that after four   
    years of this new policy of the government supply   
    of marihuana, fewer than 20% of ATP holders resort   
    to it. The applicants take the position that the   
    PPS product is inferior and not to the taste of   
    most users. They say that PPS only makes available   
    one strain of marihuana for medical use whereas   
    there are several strains which have different   
    therapeutic effects depending on the condition of   
    the user. The evidence as to the quality of the PPS   
    product was almost all hearsay and anecdotal. The   
    expert scientific evidence as to the different   
    therapeutic effects of various strains mainly   
    indicates that there is great uncertainty and the   
    subject requires further research. I am therefore   
    not prepared to lead a judicial incursion into yet   
    another field of medicine and pass judgment on the   
    quality of the PPS product. In my view it is not   
    tenable for the government, consistently with the   
    right established in other courts for qualified   
    medical users to have reasonable access to   
    marihuana, to force them either to buy from the   
    government contractor, grow their own or be limited   
    to the unnecessarily restrictive system of   
    designated producers. At the moment, their only   
    alternative is to acquire marihuana illicitly and   
    that, according to Hitzig, is inconsistent with the   
    rule of law and therefore with the principles of   
    fundamental justice.   
      
    20. I also find that paragraph 41(b.1) is   
    inconsistent with the principles of fundamental   
    justice because it is arbitrary in the sense that   
    it causes individuals a major difficulty with   
    access while providing no commensurate furtherance   
    of the interests of the state.   
      
    21. For these reasons I find paragraph 41(b.1) to   
    infringe the applicants' rights to liberty and   
    security under section 7 of the Charter and   
    therefore to be invalid.   
      
    [127] Adopting the reasoning in Hitzig and Sfetkopoulos,   
    further bolstered by the evidence before this court, I   
    find ss. 41(b.1) and 54.1 of the MMAR contrary to s. 7   
    of the Charter.   
      
    [133] The discussions set out above, in both Hitzig and   
    then Sfetkopoulos, suggest the admissibility of finding   
    a means by which compassion clubs can be licensed or   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)   
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