From: johnturmel@gmail.com   
      
   TURMEL: Crown Reply to challenges against 150-gram and 1-year caps   
      
   JCT: Remember, we've Responded to their arguments at:   
   https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/alt.fan.john-   
      
   turmel/6yhsDQT9ArY   
      
   Points addressed there:   
      
   1. Other drugs all get 30 days   
   2. Garber precedent get 10 days   
   7. "Few if any" means some.   
   12. Caps never argued   
   15. Phelan ruled "moot."   
        [28] can claim against new regime!   
   16. No 150-gram ruling   
   19. Believe Court continued with mooted issues?   
   21. Garber undermines 150 gram   
   28. Phelan not deal with under-medicated   
   33. Allard against "150 gram or 30x"   
   35. Cullen found irreparable harm   
   43. What different tests?   
   47. Harris has D.P.   
   51. Equal Treatment not raised by Harris before, others now   
   61. Other courts affirmed need for doctor, not annual   
   65. Spottiswood on MMAR, so Harris filed. Do they reply?   
      
   So here's the Reply of the Crown to our points:   
      
                 WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS IN REPLY   
                   DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE   
      
   CR: A. OVERVIEW   
      
   1. Of the plaintiffs in these proceedings, only the   
   plaintiff in the Harris claim has opposed Canada's motion to   
   strike.   
      
   JCT: Only Allan Jeff Harris has opposed the motion because   
   he's the Lead Plaintiff.   
      
   CR: However, he has failed to address the fundamental   
   defects in the claims that are identified in Canada's   
   motion. The claims should accordingly be struck without   
   leave to amend.   
      
   JCT: Yes, he's sticking with the fact he is authorized for   
   100 grams per day and the 150 grams is as inconvenient for   
   him as it was for the Garber defendant. And that no court   
   has ever affirmed the annual doctor visits.   
      
   CR: B. THE PLAINTIFFS' PRIOR CLAIMS WERE STRUCK FOR NO CAUSE   
   OF ACTION AND AS FRIVOLOUS AND VEXATIOUS   
      
   2. In his response to Canada's motion, the plaintiff   
   acknowledges that this Court previously struck   
   constitutional challenges by Harris and Spottiswood to the   
   150 gram possession and shipping limits and annual medical   
   authorization requirement in the former Marihuana for   
   Medical Purposes Regulations ("MMPR"). He argues however   
   that the prior claims were dismissed as moot and never   
   litigated. This is a clear mischaracterization of this   
   Court's prior decision.   
      
   JCT: All they have to do is show us where Phelan analysed   
   the 150 gram limit with respect to high dosages, not to   
   travel and inconvenience, and can't. Since no argument was   
   allowed, how could be it mischaracterization to say it was   
   never litigated?   
      
   CR: 3. In striking the prior claims, Phelan J. noted first   
   that the MMPR had been declared invalid in Allard v Canada   
   ("Allard") and had since been repealed and replaced by the   
   Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulations. He   
   found that the claims were therefore moot. However, Phelan   
   J. then proceeded to consider whether the claims should also   
   be struck on other grounds, and found as follows:   
      
   JCT: Without allowing any argument on it, he found:   
       [38] I need not go into great detail that the claims   
       disclose no reasonable cause of action. I noted that   
       neither the users of the Turmel Kit nor Hunt have filed   
       claims that contain details of their personal   
       circumstances and personal infringement of their rights.   
       These pleadings are in marked contrast to the pleadings   
       in Allard.   
      
   JCT: Justice Phelan had no right to want to see why the   
   doctor prescribed the medication. He had no right to insist   
   on playing doctor for which he was not qualified. Sure, the   
   Allard plaintiffs were ready to drop their pants when the   
   judge wanted to personally check them but we would not do   
   what was none of his business.   
      
       [39] This Court in its stay decision referred to the   
       "dearth of detail", the vague generalities and hyperbole   
       of the Turmel Kit, and the paucity of information on   
       personal circumstances. Nothing has changed and no party   
       took advantage of the opportunity provided by the Court   
       to amend and provide further details. It would be unjust   
       to allow amendments at this stage.   
       [40] Along the same lines and with respect to the   
       "frivolous, vexatious and abuse of process" argument,   
       the pleadings fail on this ground also. A pleading is   
       frivolous and vexatious if it is argumentative or   
       includes statements that are irrelevant,   
       incomprehensible, or inserted for colour, as if it seeks   
       relief that the Court clearly cannot grant (Simon v   
       Canada, 2011 FCA 6, 197 ACWS (3d)485).   
       [41] The pleadings, as noted above, suffer from such a   
       lack of specificity that it is difficult to respond or   
       to regulate the proceedings. Comments in the Turmel Kit   
       are overblown, insulting, and argumentative.3   
      
   JCT: Who cares about his opinion on issues he did not permit   
   to be litigated. Our point is that he did not permit   
   litigation even if he gave an opinion without hearing us.   
      
   CR: 4. It is clear from these statements that the   
   plaintiffs' prior claims were struck not only as moot but   
   also for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action   
   and as frivolous and vexatious. The plaintiff has identified   
   no reason why this Court should depart from those   
   conclusions here.   
      
   JCT: It is also clear that they were struck without any   
   argument being presented. We made that point, hope Judge   
   Brown remembers it.   
      
   CR: C. THE HARRIS CLAIM CONCERNING PUBLIC POSSESSION AND   
   SHIPPING LIMITS SHOULD BE STRUCK   
      
   5, The plaintiff suggests that this Court should not follow   
   its trial decision in Allard concerning the   
   constitutionality of the 150 gram possession limit because   
   (1) it has been overtaken by the Garber decision of the   
   British Columbia Supreme Court, (2) Allard does not address   
   the same issues at this case, (3) the plaintiffs in Allard   
   sought much broader relief than is sought here, and (4) the   
   judge in Allard was unaware that the 150 gram possession   
   limit the was based on "fraudulent" Health Canada data.   
   These arguments mischaracterize both Allard and the present   
   claims.   
      
   6. First, the plaintiff suggests that Canada relies on the   
   Allard trial decision but fails to note the "subsequent"   
   Garber decision.4 Garber was issued on October 2, 2015, and   
   Allard was issued on February 24, 2016.5 Allard is thus   
   clearly the more recent decision, and as a trial decision of   
   this Court, it is more authoritative than the injunction   
   decision of another court in a matter that did not proceed   
   to trial.6   
      
   7. Second, the plaintiff suggests that Allard was not   
   concerned with "life and death under-medication," but only   
   with whether the 150 gram possession limit restricted   
      
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