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|    can.legal    |    Debating Canuck legal system quirks    |    10,932 messages    |
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|    Message 9,706 of 10,932    |
|    KingofthePaupers to All    |
|    TURMEL: Justice Morissette can't return     |
|    13 Sep 12 19:04:44    |
      63f2856c       XPost: alt.fan.john-turmel, can.politics, alt.drugs       XPost: alt.conspiracy       From: johnturmel@yahoo.com              JCT: I didn't get a chance transcribe this last January but              since we're filing Mike's Appeal Factum in Toronto tomorrow,              I decided to key it in since it's what we're appealing              about. Both Provincial and Superior Court judges wanted to              return his car but ruled no jurisdiction. We're appealing              one of them had to.              Citation R. v. Spottiswood, 2012 ONSC 425              Court File No.: 10948              Date: 2012/01/17              ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE              IN THE MATTER of an Application by the Accused for the              return of his motor vehicle, seized as offence-related              property pursuant to Section 490(9) of the Criminal Code.              RE: Her Majesty The Queen v. Michael K. Spottiswood              BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice J. N. Morissette              COUNSEL: Myfanwy Smith, for the Crown (Respondent)              Michael K. Spottiswood, representing himself (Applicant)              HEARD: December 9th, 2011              ENDORSEMENT              [1] The Applicant seeks the return of his motor vehicle that              was seized when London Police arrested him leaving a grow              operation. In the trunk, there were 20 marihuana plants              apparently ready for harvest.              [2] During oral argument in support of his application for              the return of his motor vehicle, the applicant sought relief              based on compassionate grounds, stating that he now has a              medical certificate to grow marijuana and to possess              marijuana and that he cannot be mobile without his motor              vehicle. He submitted that his situation is akin to having a              wheelchair seized. Without his vehicle, he cannot get              around. The applicant therefore argued that this Court's              inherent jurisdiction has the power to return the vehicle to              him.              [3] I provided both parties time to provide written              submissions on the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to              return the vehicle in the face of the statutory scheme under              s.490 of the Criminal Code.              [4] Having now reviewed the submissions, the following are              my reasons why the application must fail.              Jurisdiction:              [5] S.490(7) and (8) read:              Application for order of return              (7) A person from whom anything has been seized may, after              the expiration of the periods of detention provided for or              ordered under subsections (1) to (3) and on three clear days              notice to the Attorney General, apply summarily to              (a) a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or              a judge as defined in section 552, where a judge ordered the              detention of the thing seized under subsection (3), or              (b) a justice, in any other case,              for an order under paragraph (9)(c) that the thing seized be              returned to the applicant.              Exception              (8) A judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or              a judge as defined in section 552, where a judge ordered the              detention of the thing seized under subsection (3), or a              justice, in any other case, may allow an application to be              made under subsection (7) prior to the expiration of the              periods referred to therein where he is satisfied that              hardship will result unless the application is so allowed.              [6] Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines justice as a              justice of the peace or a Provincial judge. It appears then              that a Superior Court judge only has jurisdiction to hear an              application under S.490 where a previous order has been made              for the detention of the thing by the Superior Court.              [7] In R. v. Flynn, 2011 BCSC 1688 [2011] B.C.J. No. 2410,              the court found that an application under S.490 should only              be made to a judge of Superior Court where that court has              ordered the detention or retention of the thing seized. In              any other case, the application should be made to a justice              of the peace or a Provincial Court judge. A similar result              was reached in R. v. Piche, 2003, SKQB 405, 240 Sask. R.              282, where the court found that unless the superior court              had ordered the detention of the seized property, an              application for its release must be brought before a justice              of the peace or a Provincial Court judge.              [8] The applicant in this case has sought the return of his              motor vehicle before J. Pockele of the Ontario Court of              Justice who heard the applicant's request to return the              motor vehicle to him and rejected it, although reluctantly.              JCT: He rejected it on the grounds of "no jurisdiction." She              should have mentioned that he didn't dismiss it on the              merits, actually, he would have granted it on the merits.              [9] So now the applicant is asking this court to exercise              its inherent jurisdiction to release the motor vehicle on              hardship grounds.              Inherent jurisdiction:              [10] The inherent jurisdiction of a Superior Court finds its              source in common law and in the nature of the court as a              superior court of law. Generally, the inherent jurisdiction              of a Superior Court allows the court the power to maintain              its authority to prevent its process from being obstructed              and abused.              JCT: And taking away someone's wheelchair isn't the process              being abused?              However, it does have limits. It cannot contravene any              statutory provisions.              JCT: Even if those statutory provisions violate human              rights?              [11] There is no clear authority stating that the Superior              Court has inherent jurisdiction to return seized items.              JCT: Okay, no clear authority to return a cripple's              wheelchair.              There are cases which deal with the court's inherent              jurisdiction to return items that have been wrongfully              seized,              JCT: Isn't seizing a cripple's mobility wrongful seizure?              such as when a search warrant is quashed, but this is not              the case here (see for example, Re: Chapman and the Queen              (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.); Bergeron v. Deschamps,              [1978] 1 S.C.R. 243; Butler v. Canada (Solicitor General),              [1981] B.C.J. No. 1936.              [12] The Manitoba Court of Appeal, although recognizing that              a Superior Court has inherent jurisdiction to return              wrongfully seized items, has held that this remedy shouldn't              be granted where other relief is available, including the              statutory scheme under s.490 of the Criminal Code (see R.              v.Bunn, [1991] M.J. No. 529 (C.A.)).              [13] R. v. Wyatt, [2009] O.J. No. 5608 (S.C.) dealt with the              forfeiture provisions in s.490(1). The court found that              those provisions constituted a complete code governing              forfeiture and the relief from it. Therefore, it would not              be appropriate for the court to exercise it's inherent              jurisdiction, if it had it, over the seized items.              [14] This type of reasoning could also be applied to s.490.              In R. v. Raponi, 2004, SCC 50, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 35              Supreme Court of Canada noted that s.490 purports to operate              as a complete scheme for the return of seized property, but              fails to provide what happens to property that was                     [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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