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   can.legal      Debating Canuck legal system quirks      10,932 messages   

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   Message 9,706 of 10,932   
   KingofthePaupers to All   
   TURMEL: Justice Morissette can't return    
   13 Sep 12 19:04:44   
   
   63f2856c   
   XPost: alt.fan.john-turmel, can.politics, alt.drugs   
   XPost: alt.conspiracy   
   From: johnturmel@yahoo.com   
      
   JCT: I didn't get a chance transcribe this last January but   
      
   since we're filing Mike's Appeal Factum in Toronto tomorrow,   
      
   I decided to key it in since it's what we're appealing   
      
   about. Both Provincial and Superior Court judges wanted to   
      
   return his car but ruled no jurisdiction. We're appealing   
      
   one of them had to.   
      
   Citation R. v. Spottiswood, 2012 ONSC 425   
      
   Court File No.: 10948   
      
   Date: 2012/01/17   
      
   ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE   
      
   IN THE MATTER of an Application by the Accused for the   
      
   return of his motor vehicle, seized as offence-related   
      
   property pursuant to Section 490(9) of the Criminal Code.   
      
   RE: Her Majesty The Queen v. Michael K. Spottiswood   
      
   BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice J. N. Morissette   
      
   COUNSEL: Myfanwy Smith, for the Crown (Respondent)   
      
   Michael K. Spottiswood, representing himself (Applicant)   
      
   HEARD: December 9th, 2011   
      
   ENDORSEMENT   
      
   [1] The Applicant seeks the return of his motor vehicle that   
      
   was seized when London Police arrested him leaving a grow   
      
   operation. In the trunk, there were 20 marihuana plants   
      
   apparently ready for harvest.   
      
   [2] During oral argument in support of his application for   
      
   the return of his motor vehicle, the applicant sought relief   
      
   based on compassionate grounds, stating that he now has a   
      
   medical certificate to grow marijuana and to possess   
      
   marijuana and that he cannot be mobile without his motor   
      
   vehicle. He submitted that his situation is akin to having a   
      
   wheelchair seized. Without his vehicle, he cannot get   
      
   around. The applicant therefore argued that this Court's   
      
   inherent jurisdiction has the power to return the vehicle to   
      
   him.   
      
   [3] I provided both parties time to provide written   
      
   submissions on the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to   
      
   return the vehicle in the face of the statutory scheme under   
      
   s.490 of the Criminal Code.   
      
   [4] Having now reviewed the submissions, the following are   
      
   my reasons why the application must fail.   
      
   Jurisdiction:   
      
   [5] S.490(7) and (8) read:   
      
   Application for order of return   
      
   (7) A person from whom anything has been seized may, after   
      
   the expiration of the periods of detention provided for or   
      
   ordered under subsections (1) to (3) and on three clear days   
      
   notice to the Attorney General, apply summarily to   
      
   (a) a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or   
      
   a judge as defined in section 552, where a judge ordered the   
      
   detention of the thing seized under subsection (3), or   
      
   (b) a justice, in any other case,   
      
   for an order under paragraph (9)(c) that the thing seized be   
      
   returned to the applicant.   
      
   Exception   
      
   (8) A judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or   
      
   a judge as defined in section 552, where a judge ordered the   
      
   detention of the thing seized under subsection (3), or a   
      
   justice, in any other case, may allow an application to be   
      
   made under subsection (7) prior to the expiration of the   
      
   periods referred to therein where he is satisfied that   
      
   hardship will result unless the application is so allowed.   
      
   [6] Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines justice as a   
      
   justice of the peace or a Provincial judge. It appears then   
      
   that a Superior Court judge only has jurisdiction to hear an   
      
   application under S.490 where a previous order has been made   
      
   for the detention of the thing by the Superior Court.   
      
   [7] In R. v. Flynn, 2011 BCSC 1688 [2011] B.C.J. No. 2410,   
      
   the court found that an application under S.490 should only   
      
   be made to a judge of Superior Court where that court has   
      
   ordered the detention or retention of the thing seized. In   
      
   any other case, the application should be made to a justice   
      
   of the peace or a Provincial Court judge. A similar result   
      
   was reached in R. v. Piche, 2003, SKQB 405, 240 Sask. R.   
      
   282, where the court found that unless the superior court   
      
   had ordered the detention of the seized property, an   
      
   application for its release must be brought before a justice   
      
   of the peace or a Provincial Court judge.   
      
   [8] The applicant in this case has sought the return of his   
      
   motor vehicle before J. Pockele of the Ontario Court of   
      
   Justice who heard the applicant's request to return the   
      
   motor vehicle to him and rejected it, although reluctantly.   
      
   JCT: He rejected it on the grounds of "no jurisdiction." She   
      
   should have mentioned that he didn't dismiss it on the   
      
   merits, actually, he would have granted it on the merits.   
      
   [9] So now the applicant is asking this court to exercise   
      
   its inherent jurisdiction to release the motor vehicle on   
      
   hardship grounds.   
      
   Inherent jurisdiction:   
      
   [10] The inherent jurisdiction of a Superior Court finds its   
      
   source in common law and in the nature of the court as a   
      
   superior court of law. Generally, the inherent jurisdiction   
      
   of a Superior Court allows the court the power to maintain   
      
   its authority to prevent its process from being obstructed   
      
   and abused.   
      
   JCT: And taking away someone's wheelchair isn't the process   
      
   being abused?   
      
   However, it does have limits. It cannot contravene any   
      
   statutory provisions.   
      
   JCT: Even if those statutory provisions violate human   
      
   rights?   
      
   [11] There is no clear authority stating that the Superior   
      
   Court has inherent jurisdiction to return seized items.   
      
   JCT: Okay, no clear authority to return a cripple's   
      
   wheelchair.   
      
   There are cases which deal with the court's inherent   
      
   jurisdiction to return items that have been wrongfully   
      
   seized,   
      
   JCT: Isn't seizing a cripple's mobility wrongful seizure?   
      
   such as when a search warrant is quashed, but this is not   
      
   the case here (see for example, Re: Chapman and the Queen   
      
   (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.); Bergeron v. Deschamps,   
      
   [1978] 1 S.C.R. 243; Butler v. Canada (Solicitor General),   
      
   [1981] B.C.J. No. 1936.   
      
   [12] The Manitoba Court of Appeal, although recognizing that   
      
   a Superior Court has inherent jurisdiction to return   
      
   wrongfully seized items, has held that this remedy shouldn't   
      
   be granted where other relief is available, including the   
      
   statutory scheme under s.490 of the Criminal Code (see R.   
      
   v.Bunn, [1991] M.J. No. 529 (C.A.)).   
      
   [13] R. v. Wyatt, [2009] O.J. No. 5608 (S.C.) dealt with the   
      
   forfeiture provisions in s.490(1). The court found that   
      
   those provisions constituted a complete code governing   
      
   forfeiture and the relief from it. Therefore, it would not   
      
   be appropriate for the court to exercise it's inherent   
      
   jurisdiction, if it had it, over the seized items.   
      
   [14] This type of reasoning could also be applied to s.490.   
      
   In R. v. Raponi, 2004, SCC 50, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 35   
      
   Supreme Court of Canada noted that s.490 purports to operate   
      
   as a complete scheme for the return of seized property, but   
      
   fails to provide what happens to property that was   
      
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)   

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