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   XPost: alt.fan.john-turmel, can.politics, alt.drugs   
   XPost: alt.conspiracy   
   From: johnturmel@yahoo.com   
      
   JCT: When Mike showed up with his Factum ready to asking   
   that the Crown get their Factum and the Appeal Book done   
   quickly, Madam  Justice Hoy ordered the Crown to do so and   
   booked the appeal for Oct 23, 2012.   
      
   So here's his Factum for the return of his 1999 Honda that   
   was seized as he was moving his marijuana plants.   
      
   Court File No. 55042   
                   COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO   
      
      IN THE MATTER of an Application by the Accused for the   
   return of Applicant's seized 1999 Honda automobile.   
      
   Between:   
                      Michael K. Spottiswood   
                                              Appellant/Accused   
                               and   
      
                      Her Majesty the Queen   
                                           Respondent/Plaintiff   
      
                        APPELLANT'S FACTUM   
      
   OVERVIEW   
      
   1. Appellant's 1999 Honda was seized when he was charged   
   with growing medical marijuana. Appellant then received a   
   Health Canada MMAR exemption to use marijuana for medical   
   purposes and sought the return of his automobile under S.490   
   on the humanitarian grounds or that detention of the auto is   
   a violation of Appellant's Charter Right to Life. Both   
   Ontario Court Justice Pockele and Superior Court Justice   
   Morissette bemoaned no jurisdiction to prevent the damage to   
   Appellant's health by seizure of his only mobility.   
   Appellant submits one of the Courts has jurisdiction.   
      
   PART I - STATEMENT OF FACTS   
      
   2. On Jan 18 2011, Appellant was charged with growing a few   
   hundred plants and possessing 556 grams of marijuana for the   
   purpose of trafficking and his auto seized for forfeiture.   
      
   3. Appellant then received a Health Canada MMAR exemption to   
   use marijuana for medical purposes establishing medical need   
   after years of trying.   
      
   4. On Aug 17 2011, an application for the return of the auto   
   under S.490 on the humanitarian grounds or that detention of   
   the auto is a violation of Appellant's Charter Right to   
   Life was heard by Ontario Court Justice Pockele who bemoaned   
   not having the jurisdiction to return Appellant's only means   
   of transportation. He also opined that the establishment of   
   Appellant's medical need seemed a valid common law defence.   
   Seems Judge Pockele expects the Applicant to be found not   
   guilty and the motor vehicle to be returned.   
      
   5. On Dec 9 2011, the application was heard by Ontario   
   Superior Court Madam Justice Morissette who also bemoaned   
   not having the jurisdiction to release the Honda.   
      
   6. Justice Morissette wrote:   
   [7] In R. v. Flynn, the court found that an application   
   under S.490 should only be made to a judge of Superior Court   
   where that court has ordered the detention or retention of   
   the thing seized. In any other case, the application should   
   be made to a justice of the peace or a Provincial Court   
   judge.   
   [8] The applicant in this case has sought the return of his   
   motor vehicle before J. Pockele of the Ontario Court of   
   Justice who heard the applicant's request to return the   
   motor vehicle to him and rejected it, although reluctantly.   
   [9] So now the applicant is asking this court to exercise   
   its inherent jurisdiction to release the motor vehicle on   
   hardship grounds.   
      
   7. Unfortunately, the judge failed to note that Judge   
   Pockele ruled he had no jurisdiction to return the auto. Had   
   he ruled on the merits, Applicant would have appealed, not   
   sought a remedy under the Superior Court's inherent   
   jurisdiction.   
      
   8. The judge further wrote:   
   [10] The inherent jurisdiction of a Superior Court finds its   
   source in common law and in the nature of the court as a   
   superior court of law. Generally, the inherent jurisdiction   
   of a Superior Court allows the court the power to maintain   
   its authority to prevent its process from being obstructed   
   and abused, however, it does have limits. It cannot   
   contravene any statutory provisions.   
      
   9. Applicant submits the forfeiture of someone's wheelchair   
   or other mobility device is an abuse of the process and that   
   the court has the power to strike down such statutory   
   provisions that violate Charter Rights.   
      
   10. Justice Morissette explains:   
   Hardship:   
   [16] If I am wrong about my lack of jurisdiction, and   
   therefore can hear this application, then I may consider   
   hardship under s.490(8) to allow an application under   
   s.490(7) prior to expiry of the period of detention. This   
   section has been interpreted to mean that a finding of   
   hardship allows an application to be brought under s.490(7)   
   before the expiry of the time period for detention. For   
   example in R. v. Alchin, 2007 ONCJ 589, [2007] O.J. No.   
   4930, the court found that even if hardship is established   
   under s.490(8) this only provides the defendant with the   
   opportunity to make an application under s.490(9) before the   
   expiry of the time period of detention; it does not provide   
   the defendant with grounds for the release of the thing...   
   [21] The Crown submits that the motor vehicle is required   
   for the purpose of a forfeiture hearing and therefore, there   
   is no jurisdiction to allow its return.   
   [22] If the Crown's argument stands, any items seized for   
   the eventual possibility of forfeiture hearing could never   
   be released for hardship reasons. Then why have a hardship   
   provision in the Code if one cannot access it?   
   [23] In my view, even if satisfied that the vehicle is   
   required for an eventual possible forfeiture hearing, the   
   court ought to balance the respective issues interests of   
   each party.   
   [24] The applicant submits that his requirement for the   
   motor vehicle is due to his disability and inability to be   
   mobile without it. That, in my view, is grounds for   
   hardship.   
   [25] Accordingly, when balancing the interests of the seized   
   item, between the purpose for the detention and the hardship   
   the detention creates, in my view, the value to the Crown of   
   this 1999 Honda is outweighed by the value to the applicant   
   in gaining his mobility.   
   [26] In this case, had I had jurisdiction, I would have   
   released the 1999 Honda to the applicant, notwithstanding   
   the possible future forfeiture proceeding, pending the   
   outcome of the trial.   
   Disposition:   
   [27] However, for the reasons set out above, I find that I   
   do not have jurisdiction, inherent or otherwise, to grant   
   the application.   
   Justice J.N. Morissette   
      
   11. Appellant submits either Provincial or Superior Court   
   had jurisdiction to provide the relief sought.   
      
   PART II - ISSUE   
      
   12. A) May a forfeiture Order that would be a violation of   
   the Appellant's Right to Life after the proceedings are   
   complete be prohibited by the Court before the violation   
   takes place?   
      
   13. B) Why have a hardship provision if any items seized for   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)