60d401a6   
   XPost: alt.fan.john-turmel, can.politics, alt.drugs   
   XPost: alt.conspiracy   
   From: johnturmel@yahoo.com   
      
   JCT: The Crown filed their Memorandum in Response to Todd   
   LeClair's Application for Leave to Appeal his conviction for   
   growing marijuana. His doctor had signed, but he got busted   
   before he got his exemption. So he established medical need   
   to claim Hitzig 170. Plus he had medical witnesses to the   
   flaws in the MMAR so there was evidence below. So here is   
   his reply to the Crown's points:   
      
   File Number: 34936   
                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA   
        (ON APPEAL FROM THE NEW BRUNSWICK COURT OF APPEAL)   
      
   BETWEEN:   
                      Todd Terrance Leclair   
                                                     Applicant   
                                                     Appellant   
                               and   
                      Her Majesty The Queen   
                                                     Respondent   
                        APPLICANT'S REPLY   
                 TODD TERRANCE LECLAIR, APPLICANT   
         (Pursuant to Rule 28 of the Supreme Court Rules)   
      
      
   For the Applicant:   
   Todd Terrance LeClair   
   1209 Central Hainesville Rd.   
   Upper Hainesville, NB, E6E 1J9   
   Tel/fax: 506-463-2476   
   E: need2btoad1@hotmail.com   
      
   To the Respondent:   
   Public Prosecution Service of Canada   
   5251 Duke St. Suite 1400   
   Halifax, NS,B3J 1P3   
   Tel/fax: 902-407-7701/426-1351   
   Suhanya Edwards   
   Counsel for the Respondent   
      
                        APPLICANT'S REPLY   
      
   1. The Crown has accurately reflected Applicant's arguments:   
      
   CR: 6.. The applicant alleged that sections 4 and 7 of the   
   CDSA were invalid as they had not been re-enacted after   
   being struck down by the Courts of Appeal for Alberta and   
   Ontario,   
      
   2. Applicant calls this the POLCOA argument: Parliament Only   
   Legislates, Courts Only Abrogate. S.43(a) of the   
   Interpretation Act says striking down flaws in one piece of   
   legislation (MMAR) cannot revive anything not in force in   
   another piece of legislation (CDSA).   
      
   3. CR:.. or that they were invalid as a result of Beren and   
   Sfetkopoulos decisions.   
      
   4. If the two sections on grower limits were ruled by Hitzig to so   
   impair the MMAR that the CDSA prohibitions had been invalid   
   during those two years those two flaws were present, why shouldn't   
   the same grower limits recently ruled unconstitutional by Beren and   
   Sfetkopoulos not also so impair the MMAr that the CDSA   
   prohibitions are again invalid during the years those two   
   flaws were again present? Why did the Bad Exemption found by   
   Hitzig mean No Offence during the first period of flaws but   
   the Bad Exemption found by Beren and Sfetkopoulos NOT mean   
   No Offence during the second period of flaws?   
      
   5. CR: 7.. Judge acknowledged.. the constitutional issue in   
   which the applicant challenged the validity of sections 4   
   and 7 of the CDSA due to the alleged defects in the MMAR as   
   follow:   
   a) limits to ATPs to growers (s.32(c) of the MMAR);   
   b) limits to growers per site (s.32(d) of the MMAR);   
   c) delays in processing.   
   12:... The judge declined to comment on Sections 32(d) and   
   (c) of the MMAR because the Applicant had led no evidence   
   and had made no arguments in support of those claims.   
      
   6. The Applicant did not lead the same evidence that   
   Sfetkopoulos and Beren had led because they had won and the   
   Applicant merely cited the recent Supreme Court of Canada   
   precedents that the caps on ATPs and growers had been struck   
   down thus proving they had been unconstitutional the whole   
   time. It seems rather illogical that the Court should have   
   expected Applicant to re-submit the same evidence to re-   
   prove what was was already successfully proven before.   
   What's the purpose of precedents if Applicant can't use them   
   and has to re-submit all the same evidence every time? So   
   the arguments that the limits found to be unconstitutional   
   in Beren and Sfetkopoulos were not dealt with because the   
   precedents weren't good enough, the judge wanted all the   
   same evidence re-submitted all over again.   
      
   7. CR: 25. The applicant asserts that the limits created by   
   sections 32(d) and (4) of the MMAR are unconstitutional. He   
   led no evidence to support these claims.   
      
   8. The Beren and Sfetkopoulos precedents assert that the   
   limits created by sections 32(d) and (4) of the MMAR are   
   unconstitutional and the Applicant led the Beren and   
   Sfetkopoulos precedents in support of these claims. Why   
   should have Applicant have proven those limits were   
   unconstitutional all over again when they'd successfully   
   been so proven already? Of course, Applicant cited the two   
   precedents and offered no new evidence in support of those   
   precedents. Since when do lawyers re-submit all the evidence   
   when they cite a precedent? New style law? The precedents   
   should have sufficed.   
      
   9. CR: 22.. The applicant claims that S.4(1) of the CDSA was   
   struck down in Beren.   
      
   10. Applicant does not claim that S.4(1) of the CDSA was   
   struck down in Beren. Applicant submitted precedents that   
   that S.32(c) and (d) of the MMAR were struck down in Beren.   
   And Applicant never claims that CDSA S.4(1) is struck down,   
   the Parker Court worded it as: the prohibition on possession   
   in S.4(1) is invalid. Applicant is not claiming S.4 or 7 are   
   struck down, that's hyperbole, only the prohibitions stated.   
   And when there was a second Bad Exemption, there was a   
   second No Offence period: BENO.   
      
   11. CR:.. That is not so. The Court in Beren found that the   
   MMAR did not create a valid exemption   
      
   12. For exactly the same reasons as in Hitzig, they found a   
   Bad Exemption due to the Gardening Limits.   
      
   13. CR:.. but that the defects could be corrected by   
   severing the offending provisions and leaving the rest of   
   the MMAR in force.   
      
   14. Exactly as the Hitzig Court had severed those same two   
   offending limits and left the rest of the MMAR intact. So if   
   there was No CDSA Offence while the MMAR contained the   
   flawed limits in the Hitzig period, why not No Offence while   
   the MMAR contained the same two flawed gardening limits in   
   the Beren-Sfetkopoulos period? Why did a Bad Exemption mean   
   No Offence (where the Crown dropped the remaining 4,000   
   possession charges) during the first BENO period and not now   
   with the very same flaws once again struck down by the   
   courts for a second BENO period?   
      
   15. It is best explained by Crown Attorney Sean Gaudet to   
   Supreme Court of Canada in Sfetkopoulos v. Canada:   
   "[33] The Court in R. v. J.P. ruled that the combined effect   
   of Parker and Hitzig meant there was no constitutionally   
   valid marijuana possession offence between July 31 2001 and   
   Oct 7 2003, the date the MMAR were constitutionally   
   rectified by the decision in Hitzig. Courts may construe the   
   Federal Court of Appeal's decision as creating a similar   
   period of retrospective invalidity dating back to December 3   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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