From: mailbox@dmitry-kazakov.de   
      
   On Fri, 23 May 2008 19:51:53 GMT, Andrey Gavrilov wrote:   
      
   > In my principle (and in other principles in my paper) I look on mind   
   > (natural and desirable artificial) from point of view of phylosophy (looking   
   > laws of behavior, intaraction with environment, capabilities to adapt and   
   > survive, motivation and so on) without any details of implementation of   
   > concrete functions of mind.   
      
   1. How this (a particular instance of intelligence) can imply such a   
   principle? In order to claim this, you have to show that this is the only   
   possible way to construct an intelligent thing. Is it?   
      
   2. Even if any given intelligent system could not "know" its own   
   implementation, that by no means would imply that no other system could.   
   [When you are talking about "concepts," this in my eyes means "whatever/all   
   possible intelligent systems."]   
      
   > And I tried in my principle to focuse on similarity between thinking and   
   > processes in quantum physics.   
      
   Which again raises questions. There is only one quantum physics. If you say   
   that your principle is a fundamental law of "thinking," then there should   
   only one way of. Is it so?   
      
   Let it be this way (A). Let a DFA (NN is a case of) can think (B). Then A &   
   B is in contradiction to your principle because a DFA can be described   
   exhaustively in both its structure and behavior. Ergo, your principle is   
   incompatible with computability of thinking. Good grief.   
      
   --   
   Regards,   
   Dmitry A. Kazakov   
   http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de   
      
   [ comp.ai is moderated ... your article may take a while to appear. ]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)