From: andr_gavriloov@yahoo.com   
      
   "Dmitry A. Kazakov"  writes:   
   > On Fri, 23 May 2008 19:51:53 GMT, Andrey Gavrilov wrote:   
   >   
   >> In my principle (and in other principles in my paper) I look on mind   
   >> (natural and desirable artificial) from point of view of phylosophy   
   >> (looking   
   >> laws of behavior, intaraction with environment, capabilities to adapt and   
   >> survive, motivation and so on) without any details of implementation of   
   >> concrete functions of mind.   
   >   
   You wrote:   
   > 1. How this (a particular instance of intelligence) can imply such a   
   > principle? In order to claim this, you have to show that this is the only   
   > possible way to construct an intelligent thing. Is it?   
   >   
   I can not to imply this principle, for example, for development of any   
   intelligent system.   
   I want to show this principle as property of real intelligent system (enough   
   similar to natural one).   
   And you can employ it as any constraint which is needed to keep in mind   
   during development of intelligent system.   
   Of cause you can develop any system similar to "Deep Blue" which   
      
   > 2. Even if any given intelligent system could not "know" its own   
   > implementation, that by no means would imply that no other system could.   
   > [When you are talking about "concepts," this in my eyes means   
   > "whatever/all   
   > possible intelligent systems."]   
   >   
      
   >> And I tried in my principle to focuse on similarity between thinking and   
   >> processes in quantum physics.   
   >   
   > Which again raises questions. There is only one quantum physics. If you   
   > say   
   > that your principle is a fundamental law of "thinking," then there should   
   > only one way of. Is it so?   
   >   
   I would like not say that it is fundamenrtal law of thinking. I would like   
   say that it is property of thinking.   
   And why you are sure that quantum physics is only one. May be different   
   descriptions of entities satisfying to same results of experiments.   
   We know just one QF yet (I think that with different possible futher   
   directions of future development).   
      
   > Let it be this way (A). Let a DFA (NN is a case of) can think (B). Then A   
   > &   
   > B is in contradiction to your principle because a DFA can be described   
   > exhaustively in both its structure and behavior. Ergo, your principle is   
   > incompatible with computability of thinking. Good grief.   
   >   
   Could you implement DFA describing all our world with all details and   
   features? No, of cause. It is true for implementation of NN too.   
   I don't agree that NN is case of DFA. Computer is DFA. But on this platform   
   we simulate different processes which can not be described and understanded   
   as DFA. Moreover, if we simulate thinking more far from determined processes   
   then we get more clear similarity of natural thinking.   
   And why you are sure that thinking must be computable?   
   There are different opinions about it. See, for example, books and papers of   
   Roger Penrouse.   
   Our perception of world is uncertain (fuzzy) and it is impossible to demand   
   from our mind (or from good artificial intelligence) deterministic decisions   
   (or responses).   
      
   Thank you for your reference to your site.   
      
   Andrey   
      
   > --   
   > Regards,   
   > Dmitry A. Kazakov   
   > http://www.dmitry-kazakov.de   
   >   
      
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