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|    comp.ai.philosophy    |    Perhaps we should ask SkyNet about this    |    59,235 messages    |
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|    Message 57,874 of 59,235    |
|    dbush to olcott    |
|    Re: Some decision problems are only "und    |
|    13 Aug 25 23:26:34    |
      XPost: comp.theory, sci.logic       From: dbush.mobile@gmail.com              On 8/13/2025 11:06 PM, olcott wrote:       > On 8/13/2025 9:56 PM, dbush wrote:       >> On 8/13/2025 10:29 PM, olcott wrote:       >>> On 8/13/2025 9:02 PM, dbush wrote:       >>>> On 8/13/2025 9:56 PM, olcott wrote:       >>>>> On 8/13/2025 8:45 PM, dbush wrote:       >>>>>> On 8/13/2025 9:40 PM, olcott wrote:       >>>>>>> How many tests that are black in color are entirely       >>>>>>> white in color and the answer must be a positive       >>>>>>> integer and must come with proof that it is correct.       >>>>>>       >>>>>> Error: Assumes that something can be entirely black and entirely       >>>>>> white       >>>>>>       >>>>>>>       >>>>>>> What time is it (yes or no) ?       >>>>>>       >>>>>> Error: Assumes that the answer can be yes or no       >>>>>>       >>>>>>>       >>>>>>> Is this sentence true or false: "This sentence is not true" ?       >>>>>>> The above is the basis for the Tarski undefinability theorem.       >>>>>>       >>>>>> Error: Assume that sentence can have a truth value       >>>>>>       >>>>>       >>>>> Yes and by saying that you have proven that you       >>>>> understand the Liar Paradox much better than every       >>>>> expert on the philosophy of logic in the world.       >>>>> The very best expert in the sub field of truthmaker       >>>>> maximalism said that the Liar Paradox might not       >>>>> have a truth value.       >>>>       >>>>       >>>> They all understand that.       >>>>       >>>> What you don't understand is that if you assume that a truth       >>>> predicate exists, then by performing a set series of truth       >>>> preserving operations we reach the conclusion that the liar paradox       >>>> does have a truth value.       >>>>       >>>       >>> I have the actual Tarski proof and it does not go       >>> that way at all.       >>>       >>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf       >>       >> That's exactly how it goes. You just don't understand it, just like       >> you don't understand the halting problem proof.       >>       >       > If you totally ignore all the theory / metatheory stuff       > it may superficially seem that way.              In other words, you don't understand the proof.              >       >>>       >>>> Therefore no truth predicate exists.       >>>>       >>>> Once again, you're proving you don't understand proof by contradiction.       >>>>       >>>       >>> When the halting problem shows that there is an       >>> input that does the opposite of whatever the halt       >>> decider decides       >>       >> So you start with the assumption that a halt decider exists, i.e. you       >> have an H that meets these requirements:       >>       >>       >> Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)       >> X described as |
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